890.00R/10–2551
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Merrill C. Gay, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Future ECA Programs in Southeast Asia
| Participants: | Mr. Cleveland, ECA1 |
| Mr. Arnold, ECA | |
| Mr. Checchi, ECA | |
| Mr. Rusk, FE | |
| Mr. Gay, FE |
Mr. Cleveland hoped to get Departmental approval of the substance of his memorandum entitled “Action Program in Asia”2 prior to his departure for Baguio to attend the regional ECA Chief of Missions Conference. The memorandum calls for, among other things, the need to blend all assistance into country programs and to focus these programs on well understood goals and objectives. This focusing would involve setting up a definite period of years for planning purposes, a price tag on the assistance to be given and concrete country by country objectives which might be expressed as institutional goals. This focusing would also be promoted by a Presidentially appointed committee of private citizens which would draw up recommendations to be used in “dramatizing” the program.
Mr. Rusk felt we could not commit ourselves to this proposed course of action at this time for two major reasons. First, the Congressional attitudes in respect of enlarged American responsibilities in Asia (excluding the Philippines); he thought Congress would be increasingly irresponsive to appeals for an enlarged scope of economic action in this area particularly until after the next election. [Page 101] Secondly, he felt there were limits to the political receptivity in some of the countries of this area at this time for significant modifications in existing type programs. He felt, therefore, that the only reasonably firm position which could be taken to the Conference would be that outlined in the joint ECA–State circular telegram of October 20, 1951 which suggested that the Executive Branch of the Government would undertake to obtain authority permitting in 1953 continued assistance along the present lines as to form and scope.
In prolonged discussion certain views emerged. Mr. Cleveland felt that we needed our objectives set forth in more finite terms as to types and amounts of aid, institutions to be built and the period of time involved; he desired set forth an intermediary level of objectives somewhere between the presently used statement of general policy objectives and a blueprint covering details of individual projects.
Mr. Rusk observed that our European experience had created an impression in Europe that the US had established a “floor” below which it would not permit the European economies to drop. He did not want this psychology repeated in Asia; it would create a “quicksand” in so far as absorbing economic aid is concerned.
Mr. Cleveland thought that in Europe rather than creating the impression that we had established a floor the concept was that of maintaining “continuous growth” which was a healthy thing. Mr. Rusk observed that this concept in Asia might imply that the taproot extended into the US: this would be serious unless we were prepared to carry through, cutting off the root might be disastrous. He felt further that to the extent we associate with these Governments in setting up joint goals we implicitly assume the responsibility of picking up the check; he wanted to avoid “partnership responsibilities” which might follow from confusing US goals and those of the local Governments concerned.
Mr. Cleveland agreed that we should not become too closely involved with the goals of recipient countries (except in the case of the Philippines and Formosa) but felt that it was necessary to have something of the whole picture in order to effectively and strategically use our aid to break bottlenecks. Mr. Rusk did not want getting into the whole picture to mean too much injection of ourselves into the affairs of the various local ministries. He felt that getting involved to this extent might be politically objectionable particularly to countries like Burma and Indonesia which are more sensitive in their conception of the prerogatives of sovereignty than the more developed countries of Europe.
Mr. Rusk emphasized that he thought it desirable that there be a fullsome discussion of all the suggestions proposed in the memorandum at the meeting and that the views of the Mission Chiefs be fully explored and brought back for consideration here. It was repeatedly [Page 102] made clear, however, that the substance of the paper could not be considered as cleared in the Government and he felt that the above-mentioned difficulties and reservations involved in changing the type of program now in existence should be brought fully to the attention of the group.
Concerning the proposed public committee, Mr. Rusk stated the matter was under discussion in top levels of the Department. He felt it extremely doubtful that any Republican support for anything in the nature of an Asiatic policy charter could be gotten before the elections.