751G.00/2–251: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon ( Gullion ) to the Secretary of State
1363. At luncheon yesterday De Lattre asked me whether I had recieved any information from Washington about Truman–Pleven discussion. I said only that I had hastily glanced at cable not completely deciphered (Deptel 974, January 30), which appeared be provisional account of first day’s proceedings. I had noted the restriction on use of the Langley would probably be removed. De Lattre received this information with great enthusiasm stating it would be an important contribution to defense of Tonkin. He lambasted defense headquarters in France stating that French admirals hid behind restrictions imposed by MDAP to deny him the carrier. It was all of a piece with the thinking of the defeatist and write-off-Indochina school which had too many proponents both in government and in public. Too many people were playing to lose. He was playing to win.
He then asked me what further news I had of the talks. I said that I understood the conference had discussed possibilities of proposal for a permanent three-power SEA consultation between the US, Britain and France. De Lattre was definitely startled at this. He said it might have both good and bad aspects. Some kind of consultation was certainly desirable but it was all important that in next four to six months no provocation be offered Chinese and he thought that association of US and Britain in some kind of permanent headquarters might touch off Chinese reaction. He referred again, as he has so many times in the last few days, to the “situation intenable”. Seizing his champagnes glass to illustrate his point, he declared that the Indochina situation was as brimful of dire possibilities as the glass was of champagne. Pointing to rose centerpiece on table, he said any new pressure applied to present delicate balance, even if no heavier than rose petal, would cause catastrophe to overflow. For this reason he thought such a categoric step as creation of joint headquarters should be approached with great caution. I said I did not know whether the tripartite consultation in question was in nature of study group or something of more permanent and executive authority. De Lattre thought that former was preferable if its existence were kept secret.
Since it was clear that De Lattre was not fully briefed on French position at Washington talks I went no further into Deptel in reference except to state that prospects seemed hopeful for some kind of limited tripartite military conversations.
As the General reflected on idea of US-British French consultation it occurred to him that perhaps the proposal originated with General [Page 373] Juin,1 a possibility that appeared to exercise him greatly. (See Legtel 1358).2 General Juin had now taken over job which he, De Lattre, had prepared for him and that job had to do with Western Europe. He could not understand why anybody in these conversations would make any proposals about Indochina which had not been cleared with him. He then declaimed at some length necessity of his having free hand Indochina and said that if he were going to be supervised by Juin there was all the more reason for him return to his native village in France and although his own requests for reinforcements were very modest, the European Command might claim all available military resources for Europe leaving nothing for Indochina.
As he had so often declared in last few weeks, General said if he could not get 10,000 or 12,000 men whom he had requested from Pleven he would definitely withdraw from his post.
Following lunch De Lattre remarked that he was urging Viets to install Cabinet in clean-cut opposition to Viet Minh and said individual Viets must break with habit of keeping side door contacts with Viet Minh. I asked General whether he thought Letourneau’s recent speech about happily unclosed doors to contact with Viet Minh3 might not have encouraged Viets in course opposite to one he urged. De Lattre said he delighted I had asked this question but hoped “I would not ask to see the telegram which he had sent to Letourneau when he read that speech”. He could assure me that it was all mistake and that no French Government leaders would make any further such statements. In his most recent utterances Letourneau had tried to clear away confusion. Letourneau was “chic type” and we mustn’t misjudge him for this incident. It was indirect result of defeatism prevailing under prior administration. After De Lattre’s recent successes in Tonkin there may have been tendency on part of French Government to look on this as favorable moment for reconsidering attitude toward Viet Minh. De Lattre added that he had very difficult interview trying to explain Letourneau’s speech to Bao Dai in course of special visit made to Banmethuot for this purpose.
Since De Lattre thinks he has disposed of this failing on part of Paris, I imagine that paragraph 2c of Deptel 4 in reference would have marked effect on his blood pressure.
[Page 374]De Lattre left for Tonkin tonight expecting to be absent for ten days. At his request, Du Guardier5 called on me to ask if I could give him some résumé or excerpt of Department’s telegram. I shall give him most carefully edited version based on foregoing.
It is possible he will ask Blancké for further information. If Department plans furnish Hanoi such information it may wish to indicate what De Lattre can see. In any case, hope French Government will shortly supply the General with its own account.
Legation comment on Deptel in reference will follow shortly.
- General Alphonse Pierre Juin, Inspector General of the French Armed Forces: formerly French Resident General in Morocco; appointed Commander of Allied Land Forces in Europe, September 1951.↩
- Telegram 1358 from Saigon, February 1, is not printed.↩
- Reference is to a radio address by Jean Letourneau, Minister for the Associated States, January 17, reported in telegram 4170 from Paris, January 18, not printed (751G.00/1–1851).↩
- Reference is to telegram 974 to Saigon, January 30, p. 368.↩
- Roger Robert du Gardier, Diplomatic Adviser to the French High Commissioner in Indochina.↩