751.13/1–3051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon

top secret

974. The fol is rough summary of Truman–Pleven discussions of yesterday as they pertain to IC:

Pleven presented his position as fols:

1) Events in the Far East make it necessary for the Western Powers to coordinate economically, militarily and politically and procedure for permanent consultation between US, Brit and Fr shld be established. It might include the establishment of a permanent tripartite body for this purpose.

2) As far as IC is concerned three hypotheses shld be considered:

a. The present situation of fighting an internal rebellion which Fr is and has faced for the last five years. With a reinforced VM Fr can only foresee heavier and heavier losses. The only possible daylight in matter lies in the planned development of Viet natl army. Immed question to be faced is whether Gen de Lattre’s demands for reinforcements shld be met or declined in the realization that similar demands may be expected regularly hereafter and cannot be met. The fact that Fr present effort entailed a comparable drain on her contribution to the defense of Western Europe is also pertinent. Amt of US aid to be anticipated is dominant consideration in arriving at decision in matter. Formation of four Vietnamese divisions during 1951 under study. Wld involve a cost of 58 billion francs, 25 billion of which cannot be covered in the contemplated contributions from both Fr and Vietnamese budgets. Particular mention was made of the furnishing of an aircraft carrier. Recommended that this and other technical questions shld be studied by Fr-US mil experts.

b. The second possibility is that which wld be created by an overt Chi Commie attack. Before the Fr can make any decision of action to be taken in this eventuality they must ask for further clarification of the US position vis-à-vis aid in both men and materiel. Fr Govt wld also appreciate info concerning anticipated US aid in the event of a forced evacuation.

The Fr invite us to consider the effect of the loss of Tonkin or of all IC on the rest of SEA (polit, econ and mil). A study of this matter might be considered by the group suggested in para one.

c. The third possibility is that which wld be created if peace negotiations were undertaken. While Fr observe that it is impossible to calculate if such possibility exists they believe consideration must be given to it “especially in the light of the recent reverses suffered by the VM.”

Although detailed minutes are not available fol is a brief summary of our replies to various questions:

Although we are not prepared to consider question of tripartite SEA command as suggested by Fr we are prepared under certain [Page 369] specific and limiting conditions to adhere to our agreement to take part in high level tripartite mil conversations as agreed at the Sep FonMin Conf. We are prepared to appoint man from Admiral Radford’s1 staff to represent us.

We assured Fr that our aid program to IC will be carried out as presently planned, barring unforeseen developments. We are prepared to give the Fr more detailed info on the way our aid program works and specific consideration being given to IC in overall picture. We have told the Fr we are not prepared to commit ground forces but wld, dependent on circumstances applicable at time, supply logistic support in the event of a forced evacuation.

Re the 25 billion franc deficit in sum required for natl armies (Fr state only 33 billion of 58 required can be covered by Fr and Viet budgets combined). The Fr made us a formal request for additional aid of 70 million dollars. We have given them no assurance in that regard and are now engaged in detailed studies at specialists level concerning matter. For your info it is very unlikely that this Govt will engage itself to finance the budgetary deficit of another govt but we hope to devise some other method to assure that necessary funds for the development of the natl armies be forthcoming.

Although we did not accede to the Fr request for another aircraft carrier, Gen Marshall2 informed Pleven that the present restrictions on the use of the Langley wld be removed, thus apparently making Langley available to Fr for use in Far Eastern waters if they so choose. We assured the Fr that the effect of the loss of Tonkin or of all of IC to rest of SEA is constantly under study by this govt.

We had no comment concerning third hypothesis.

The 58 billion franc figure for the formation of the natl armies is based on armies of 41 battalions. Of this sum it is estimated that the Fr budget cld only make a 15½ billion franc contribution and the Viet one of 17 billion as a maximum (40% of estimated total receipts). The deficit is thus 25½ billion francs or roughly $70 million. Of this sum approximately ⅔ wld be required for payroll and for ⅓ equipment and goods payable in francs and piasters. Eventually natl armies wld consist of four Vietnamese divisions of 34 battalions plus five Cambodian and two Laotian battalions. Fr have stated it will be impossible for them to furnish any equipment for battalions still to be formed and they count on the US for that.

Talks continue on European questions at Presidential level and on overall financial and mil matters at specialists levels

Sent to AmLegation, Saigon 974; rptd to AmEmbassy, Paris (for info) 3996.

Acheson
  1. Adm. Arthur W, Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific.
  2. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.