751G.5 MAP/1–951: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon ( Heath ) to the Secretary of State

secret

1209. Accompanied by General Brink,1 I saw De Lattre yesterday evening. De Lattre started complaining that, while General Brink and I were always ready to consider any reasonable request for military aid, subordinate officers of MAAG were refusing to entertain requests presented by his staff, were requiring excessive “justification” for each demand and stating orally with regard to many requests that they would not be satisfied since the US was more interested in arming Europe than providing equipment for Indochina. These officers whom De Lattre did not name, were, he alleged, giving impression US was no longer interested in Indochina. He said that subordinate officers of MAAG had refused French request for perforated landing mats for extra airfields which he must build with least possible delay in order to disperse his planes against possible enemy air attack and to provide operating bases for additional planes he expects. These mats were absolutely necessary. If unobtainable he would have to have cement strips which would take months to complete and for which cement was lacking. He was using all available cement for fortifications [Page 345] in the north and to provide necessary subterranean hangars for certain fields.

I told General De Lattre that there was no change in the situation; that France had already received a large amount of the material with little delay. General Brink had taken the initiative of going to see MacArthur2 and had obtained from the latter, at some sacrifice to reserves for Korean action, large quantity of material which French were now utilizing. General Brink’s initiative had advanced deliveries of these items by probably three months. Requests for military aid to Indochina enjoyed a priority immediately after that of Korean operations. I remarked that De Lattre’s staff had probably misunderstood the observations of the officers of MAAG.

We had recommended giving sizable program of aid of which many items would arrive without delay. General Brink pointed out that he had recommended the provision of landing mats and was still recommending delivery but from what he had learned in Japan they were in short or non-existent supply. It would take several months to get them. He, General Brink, had informed the Chief-of-Staff of the circumstances and it was a service to De Lattre to know in advance just what material he could receive only with considerable delay, so he could plan realistically. De Lattre expressed himself satisfied but asked that Brink go over with his Chief-of-Staff a list of pending requests and point out items whose delivery would involve long delay. I closed this part of the conversation by the remark that he knew he could count on us to cooperate in every way toward the acceleration of the armament program. I also remarked that some ten days ago De Lattre had told us he was sending the next day a list of items which were urgently needed. We had altered our military mission to process the requests but the list actually had only been received yesterday. De Lattre admitted this delay which was caused by the fact that he had turned the list over to Colonel Beauffre whom he had to take with him on his sudden trip to Hanoi to work out defense measures against Viet Minh attacks of two weeks ago.

De Lattre said he had changed his plans about going to Paris. He had now decided not to go before the middle of February. He had to be on hand here during this period of possible Viet Minh attacks. He was no longer worried over the renewal of Viet Minh offensive. He did not believe French would lose an inch of ground nor did he believe the Chinese troops would join operations at this time. With expected material, some reinforcements, airfield and defense construction he [Page 346] felt he could hold. He replied that morale was magnificent. He said he had changed his mind about asking for heavy reinforcements from France. He realized that they simply could not be supplied in view of the necessity of rapidly building up the Metropolitan army. He would try, however, to get a few battalions.

When he had completed his reorganization and construction in the north he was going to take personal hold of the formation of the Viet National Army which was lagging badly due to the lack of energy and competency in the Viet Government. In leaving De Lattre thanked me warmly for my cooperation.

Last night De Lattre was guest honor dinner given by Huu and responded eloquently to latter’s toast affirming that Vietnam was now free.

Department pass Paris. Sent Department 1209, repeated info Paris 559, Hanoi unnumbered.

Heath
  1. Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group at Saigon.
  2. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan; Commander in Chief, Far East; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.