Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.00/1–151: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath)² to the Secretary of State

secret niact

Saigon, January 1, 1951—midnight.

1157. With reference to Deptel 813, December 29.³ Battle for Indochina and possibly all SEA being fought in Tonkin at this moment. Assumption unavoidable that sooner or later and probably soon Chinese Communist will invade IC with organized units. In this situation there are additional steps which we can and must take immediately and within next six months if IC is to be held. Of measures recommended in part 2 Legation would attach highest priority to: (1) Acceleration and increase of existing programs of military aid; (2) Pressure on Bao Dai⁴ to form and lead government of national union which can take effective action and, (3) Immediate organization by French and IC states of counter-guerrilla and resistance forces to carry war to enemy-held territory.

Part 1 gives our present views on the political and military situation and part 2 lists new and additional measures which should be given immediate consideration.

I(A). At end of 1950 IC military situation characterized by following salient factors:

1. Entire north, except shrinking Hanoi-Haiphong beachhead, must be written off for time being with additional possibility Hanoi itself will be lost or abandoned, all without mass intervention by Chinese Communists;

2. Policy must be based on assumption of invasion by Chinese as organized units from now on. Chinese Communist units plus VM could within six months liquidate Haiphong, obtain control of IC south at least to Vinh. Concurrently VM activities and terrorism may increase in south sufficiently to contain French and Viet forces there. Combined VM forces would then be in position directly to assault south Vietnam, or turn against Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand for forced or negotiated surrenders.⁵ Situation would not be lost at this point but with VM installed in Hanoi, one of historic Asian capitals and city which typifies Viet nationalism to much greater degree than Saigon, with Chinese and VM troops supreme in north, and with Chinese and Soviet representatives installed in capital of government they recognize, weight of manpower, logistics and morale would then be in Sino-VM favor and defense of IC and SEA would enter final phase, in truth, last ditch affair.

(B) Most important policy aspects IC political situation at end 1950 were:

1. Organic relationship between Associated States (AS) and France, while not yet contending Viet nationals had more satisfactory and viable framework than at any previous time since end last war. Transfer substantial economic sovereignty to AS at Pau,⁶ decision to activate true national armies, assurance drastic reduction number French officials in IC, cession all local revenues to AS have established new high water mark IC progress toward independence. Good will which might normally have attached to French as result this body of concessions is, however, marred by Viet suspicions that VM strength, menace of Chinese Communists, imperative of French position in Europe contributed preponderantly to grants of last two months. Volatile Viets who only recently complained French would never leave now have begun to doubt French intent to see war in IC through. Had French willingly made two years ago 1950 concessions and had Bao Dai and his government had two years experience Under new formula, there would have been radically different IC situation. Basis political question today is whether there is time enough to utilize new political framework to mobilize mass allegiance behind Bao Dai.

2. Viet Government has thus far failed to display any real dynamism and has not yet won confidence of public in its ability to provide security or welfare. The Chief of State has yet to exhibit sustained energy or the know-how of leadership, its cabinet lacks stature, color, and broad representativeness; its administrators are generally inexperienced and frequently venal. There have, however, been occasional flashes of energy; in Huu,⁷ Giao⁸ and Tri,⁹ Bao Dai has a second level of recognized leaders; the government senses some of its inadequacies and is turning increasingly to US for advice and assistance; and, very importantly, the Viet military forces, armed religious groups and ethnic minorities have stood firm with Bao Dai and display will to fight.

3. Lack of unity among IC’s neighbors within SEA and divergencies in Far East policy of great powers are further weaknesses in IC situation. These in turn make UN position re Chinese aggression in IC equivocal. This general lack of cohesion and clarity in west is today one of the Communists’ greatest advantages in its SEA march.

(C) Economic situation at end 1950 as measured by traditional indices no worse than for past 18 months. However, attention called reported pressure on exchange authorities convert piasters into francs, slackening rate imports particularly in north, and near-panic conditions latter area with French trying dispose of stocks in real estate in anticipation VM victory. Military success warranting belief French and Bao Dai regimes could remain Tonkin might reverse these negative trends. Basically mass IC are relatively better off re food, shelter and clothing than many other Asiatic peoples. Only breakdown in transportation such as occurred 1946 in Tonkin could bring about famine conditions. On other hand economy for decades has been underdeveloped with chronic state of semi-unemployment in north and lack full employment in south, while for last 4 years its balance of international payments has been balanced only by massive imports financed directly or indirectly by French payments for military costs, for other budget deficits, etc. To attack either of latter two problems, however, is long-term project requiring provision capital, improvement agricultural practices, etc.

Only important immediate emergency economic problems would appear to be: (1) Handling of growing influx of refugees, particularly in north and (2) financing additional military burdens as expected to incur, while building up their national armies early 1951. Hitherto burden military expenses almost entirely French, but with signing Pau and December 18 [8] military convention,¹⁰ states are given all public revenues from IC sources and in turn expected by French carry appreciable cost of national armies. Out of total resources of about 2.1 billion piasters for instance, Viet expected by French to earmark about 500 million and secure another 500 from reduction other expenditures, increasing tax yields, and levying additional taxes. These conditions might cripple VN government at start to say nothing of drastically limiting necessary social and economic reform progress whose absence hitherto one of Bao Dai’s greatest weaknesses.

Accumulating evidence also indicates at least some Viet business and political “leaders” looking forward assumption formerly French economic apparatus of dirigisme in order line own pockets and that whole transfer governmental and economic powers may create serious problem for new governments due lack trained personnel and reluctance continuance rely on French advisers. Another Philippine situation clearly possible.¹¹

II(A). Military.

1. Immediate shipment all items requested by French in emergency list recommended Legtel 566 and later request for equipment of Viet army, Legtel 1077 of December 16 pouched Paris plus greatest expedition of possible shipment remaining fiscal year 1950 and fiscal year 1951 MDAP items.¹²

2. French must be convinced prepare or at least consent to preparation of counter-guerrilla and resistance organization for operation within and behind enemy lines, and for communications network in upper Tonkin. Correlation of such activities with systematic aid to Chinese Nationalists guerrillas in southern China provinces should be established. So far counter-guerrilla war and implantation of resistance organization have been slighted by French; nor is there any sure indication that De Lattre¹³ will move at an early date to remedy this deficiency.

3. Area military conference of at least US–UK–France to be held earliest possible date to explore possibilities unified strategic concept. Almost year has passed since Legation recommended joint staff talks and systematic intelligence exchanges within area and from time to time suggestion has received various endorsements. View deepening IC crisis conference should no longer be delayed.

4. Legation believes projected MDAP allocations for Title III countries¹⁴ 1952 should be rescanned determined whether IC which must meet primary threat and where fate all other SEA countries will in large measure be determined could receive increased supplies.

5. If financial aid for national armies necessary under conditions posited part I Legation recommends serious consideration to grant direct financial aid.

6. If Chinese Communists intervene in open aggression Legation assumes UN and US must assist French and AS. Form of this assistance in primary stages would be air units and carrier strikes. In meantime Legation would urge review decision no US carrier now available for transfer to French in IC and immediate earmarking carrier units for eventual US operations against Sino-VM. Readiness these units and ability for them become operational in IC immediately on Chinese invasion would be incalculable benefit.

7. Legation recommends acceptance principle direct equipment local urban police and provincial guard units under MDAP and with MAAG observation.

8. On assumption imminent Chinese invasion US should promptly recommend to French air reconnaissance Chinese border area including Hainan. French now operate under strict orders confine flights eight kilometers this side northern frontier.

9. US should make available air and surface facilities to assist in evacuating large number important Tonkinese officials and private citizens some of whom could constitute useful resistance leaders.

10. MATS route through Saigon approved by competent officials more than month ago should be promptly instituted to provide east-west air lift critical supplies.

(B) Political.

1. In view new attributes sovereignty conferred on AS at Pau, French should promptly sponsor UN membership for AS, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. While applications may not prosper it should be made clear that only Soviet world is opposed.

2. Immediate consideration should be given to ways of utilizing new UN facilities such as observation committees in IC situation. While access to VM territory doubtless would be denied, air observation of border movements could be undertaken.

3. Renewed efforts should be made by US and UK diplomacy to obtain recognition AS by Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, India, Pakistan. With Chinese aggression in Korea and Tibet,¹⁵ Communists need for resources of SEA, and militant revolutionary expansionism of Peking, IC’s neighbors should be asked to recognize threat to area and to each of them Communist success in IC would represent. At same time, transfer of economic powers including 100% revenues to AS plus formation national armies should dispel much of their earlier objections to French Union formula.

4. Renewed attempt should be made align US-UK-French policy in FE. If this not practicable, clear understanding should be reached on IC. Legation is particularly disturbed lest lack of understanding should facilitate French or UK-French negotiations with Chinese Communists. Legation not convinced that preliminary explorations this possibility were insignificant (London’s 3613, December 28¹⁶)…. [It has been] stated to Legation officer informally … that British are pressing French to negotiate. Rumors same effect are beginning circulate locally. Whole matter may be Cominform propaganda but it serves emphasize need for urgent tripartite consultations on IC. This mission uninformed re Truman–Attlee conversations on IC.¹⁷

National:

5. Renewed effort should be made to animate Bao Dai to sustained and vigorous effort of leadership. Whatever excuse may have existed in past to effect that Bao Dai could not link his future to government not truly sovereign no longer exist today after Pau transfers and in face Chinese menace.

6. US will exert pressure for constitution broadened national unity government which would forthwith announce plans and proceed to implentation liberal program social educational, and economic betterment (with present and if necessary increased ECA funds) and would set in motion machinery for institution representative organs.

7. US will indicate availability under approved circumstances forms of assistance to facilitate defections from VM. Legation suggests this must be activity another agency.

(C) Economic.

View nature AS economic problems sketched part I, present STEM program, in character if not in quantity or rate, regarded as reasonably satisfactory. Though its importance should greatly increase in 1951 as organization and planning period of 1950 is translated into major deliveries of current fiscal year, every effort should continue be made speed procurement and shipment programmed items. In next six months military effort must be given priority, although in long run economic assistance through capital development and improved technology necessary put AS on truly sound economic base.

Emergency economic needs are: (1) US may have to finance anticipated AS budgetary deficits 1951 as explained part I, if French unwilling or unable to do so, (2) preparations for assisting in handling northern refugees if large numbers make way south, and (3) settling soonest with French issue of US being able in spite March 8 accord furnish advisers AS governments to supplement, not supplant French, in order assist more efficient and honest administration, lack of which may contribute discourage the whole-hearted support for Bao Dai’s government which is so badly needed.

(D) Informational.

This activity should approach if not parallel importance our military and economic programs. The executive staff of USIS now consists of two junior officers. The focus should shift from “sell America” to “hit the enemy”. We must expand our use of all media, employing materials collected and edited locally. The program outlined by Goodfriend mission should be backed with funds and personnel. Efforts to insure sympathy of youth, labor and religious groups should be energetically promoted. Viets must be coached by American technicians in giving Viet government “new look”; uniforms, stamps, seals, government forms, street signs, money, etc. As long as Bao Dai is our candidate he must be ingeniously “sold”—an American advisor should be stationed with him. Bao Dai should issue now first of series of “last calls” to erring VM nationalists—he should announce, in his name, projects for building, “two year plans” and the like.

Political warfare should be aggressively pushed—playing on dispersed nature Viet Minh, promoting discord, defeatism, confusion, using all media borrowed or bought—radio, pamphlets, press, agents, word-of-mouth—with all shades of allegiance and experts for these activities should not be further delayed. Legation should inaugurate cooperation with projected Franco-British joint committee for psychological warfare Saigon.

Certain of foregoing recommendations will involve expenditures: for which appropriations may not now be earmarked for IC. Legation final recommendation is for all interested US agencies survey current funds to determine if special deficiency appropriations will be needed for defense of IC in next six months. If they may be, we recommend promptest submittal necessary bills.

MAAG, Service Attachés, STEM concur in foregoing.

Department pass Paris; sent Department 1157, repeated info Paris 544, Hanoi unnumbered. Department please pass other posts as appropriate.

Heath

2. Minister Donald R. Heath and the staff of the Legation at Saigon were accredited to the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos as well as to the State of Viet-Nam.
3. In telegram 813 to Saigon, December 29, 1950, the Department requested the Legation’s suggestions on additional steps which the United States might take in the immediate future to strengthen Indochina. The Legation was also asked for its general analysis of the situation. For text of telegram 813, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 958.
4. Chief of State of Viet-Nam; former Emperor of Annam.
5. For additional documentation on U.S. concern regarding the Communist threat to Southeast Asia, see pp. 1 ff.
6. The interstate conference at Pau, France, attended by representatives of France and the Associated States of Indochina, ended on November 27, 1950, after almost five months of negotiations. For texts of ten quadripartite agreements concluded at the conference and signed on December 16, 1950, see France, Direction de la Documentation, Notes et Etudes Documentaires. No. 1425 (January 24, 1951), pp. 1–38.
7. Tran Van Huu, Prime Minister of Viet-Nam.
8. Phan Van Giao, Governor of Central Viet-Nam.
9. Nguyen Huu Tri, Governor of Tonkin.
10. A French-Vietnamese military convention signed on December 8, 1950, established a Vietnamese national army by effecting the transfer of certain units from French to Vietnamese control.
11. For documentation on U.S. relations with the Philippines, see pp. 1491 ff.
12. Telegrams 566, October 16, 1950, and 1077, December 16, 1950, from Saigon, are not printed. For other documentation on French requests for military assistance, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.
13. Général d’Armée Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina; Commander of French Union forces in Indochina.
14. Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 51st Cong.; 63 Stat. 714) as amended in 1950 (Public Law 621, 81st Cong.; 64 Stat. 373) under which military assistance was being programmed. Title III, Section 303, authorized aid to countries in the “general area” of China.
15. Documentation on the Korean War is scheduled for publication in volume vii; see also Foreign Relations, 1950, volume vii. For documentation on the Chinese invasion of Tibet, October 7, 1950, see ibid., vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.
16. Not printed.
17. President Truman and Clement R. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met in Washington from December 4 to December 8, 1950, to discuss the situation arising from Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Indochina did not receive extensive consideration. The record of the first meeting, December 4, does attribute the following to Secretary of State Acheson, however: “If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. He doubted if any one of the President’s advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation.” For the record of the first meeting and other documentation on the Truman–Attlee conversations, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1789 ff. For additional documentation on the conference, see ibid., vol. vii, pp. 1237 ff.