Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

790B.00/1–252

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, January 2, 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to Department of State draft position paper TCT D–5/7b entitled “Burma”.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur generally in the Position to be Presented in this paper but strongly recommend certain modifications, in that section of the paper and elsewhere to avoid the implication that the United States might entertain planning which would directly involve this nation in Burma in certain eventualities. Other recommendations are made in the interests of clarity, preciseness, and completeness. These views are contained in the inclosed memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which have my concurrence.¹

Sincerely yours.

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

secret

Washington, December 28, 1951.

Subject: Department of State Draft Position Paper on “Burma” (TCT D–5/7b)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Department of State draft position paper entitled “Burma” (TCT D–5/7b, dated 20 December 1951) which was enclosed with your memorandum dated 24 December 1951.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur generally with the section of the subject paper entitled “Position to be Presented: (On U.S. initiative).” They recommend, however, that, in the interests of clarity, preciseness, and completeness, this section be revised to incorporate expression of the following views:

a. The United States considers that Burma is an area of British strategic responsibility;

b. The fall of Burma to communism would threaten Pakistan, India, and Ceylon, as well as the remainder of the Southeast Asia area;

c. The United States will discuss political, psychological, and limited economic support (including minor military assistance short of the commitment of any United States armed forces or military personnel) to the British in their programs designed to counter the threat of communism or communist aggression in Burma; and

d. In the light of:

(1) the current world situation;

(2) the degree of availability of the forces of the noncommunist world for operations in other areas; and

(3) the attitude of the Burmese toward the United States and toward the United Kingdom,

the United States considers that it would be appropriate for British programs in Burma to receive active support from other Commonwealth Nations, especially Pakistan, India, and Ceylon. Such support would be expected to include, although not be limited to, changes in the composition of the British Service Mission to Burma in order to reflect the interest of the Commonwealth Nations in the integrity of that Nation.

3. Further, and in any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following modifications of the “Position to be Presented” as appearing in the basic paper in order to avoid the implication that the United States might entertain planning which would directly involve this nation in Burma in certain eventualities:

a. The first sentence of the second paragraph should be changed to read as follows:

“I believe that the situation is conditions are serious enough to make it wise for British and American officials to get together as soon as possible and discusswhat our two countries might do, either individually or jointly, to accomplish our objectives in Burma the situation.”

b. The fourth sentence of the second paragraph should be revised to indicate that any increases of war materials supplied to the Burmese forces from United States sources would be very limited; and

c. Delete the last sentence of the second paragraph.

4. In order that the section of the subject paper entitled “Discussion” conform to the views expressed in paragraph 3 above the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that subparagraph (3) under “Discussion” be amended to read as follows:

• “(3) An exploration of possible joint or coordinated action situations that might arise in case the Communists should be successful in their declared intention of establishing control over a substantial part of Northern Burma within the next two years.”

5. In the interest of completeness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the addition of the following new paragraph at the end of the “Discussion:”

• “This discussion does not take into consideration the possibility of Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The United States policy under this eventuality is now undergoing review.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The Department of State’s special Steering Group accepted the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and issued the approved Position Paper on Burma on that same day designated, TCT D–5/7c.