Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot M 88, Box 160

Draft Position Paper on Burma Prepared by the Department of State¹

secret
TCT–D–5/7b

[Washington,] December 20, 1951.

Burma

problem

To determine what, if any, action the British and American Governments should take to improve the seriously deteriorating situation; in Burma.

u.s. objectives

The U.S. seeks an increase in the will and ability of the Burmese Government and people to halt the spread of Communism and to defend the country against Communist subversion or invasion.

probable position of the u.k.

From the views expressed by various British officials, we understand that the British objectives are the same as our own in this respect.

Burma

Position to be presented: (On U.S. initiative)

I am sure that we agree on the strategic importance of Burma. It is to our mutual interest to keep this “soft spot” of Southeast Asia, from falling under Communist control. Furthermore, the Government and people appear apathetic to the Communist threat, and this makes it difficult to find specific ways in which we can help.

I believe that the situation is serious enough to make it wise for British and American officials to get together as soon as possible and discuss what our two countries might do, either individually or jointly, to accomplish our objectives in Burma. We should then consult with Burmese officials to see what steps can be taken. My advisers have made several tentative suggestions as to what our people might want to discuss. One suggestion is that they might want to consider ways of increasing Burma’s military strength by supplying more war materials to the Burmese forces. Another suggestion is that British and American information programs in Burma might also be re-examined to see what can be done to make them more effective during the present crucial period. A final suggestion is that our representatives might want to look into whatever possible joint or coordinated action may be necessary in case the Communists should succeed in taking over most of Northern Burma in the next two years.

discussion

British and American officials generally agree that the situation in Burma is deteriorating at an alarming rate, that Burma is the “soft spot” of Southeast Asia and that because the Government and people of Burma are apathetic to the Communist threat and highly suspicious of British and American motives, it is difficult to find any way in which we can render assistance. However, it would appear that by a joint study of the problem we might discover ways in which our respective policies could be made more effective in increasing the will and ability of the Burmese to resist Communist pressures.

Among matters which might appropriately be discussed are:

(1) The possibility of increasing Burmese military strength by augmenting the supply of war materials to the Burmese armed forces and by improving the effectiveness of the British Services Mission. The British might wish to consider the feasibility of making the Mission more acceptable to the Burmese by changing its composition to include elements from other Commonwealth nations, especially Oriental.

(2) A re-examination of our respective information programs to determine whether they could profitably be changed to have a stronger impact during the present, crucial two-year period.

(3) An exploration of possible joint or coordinated action in case the Communists should be successful in their declared intention of establishing control over a substantial part of Northern Burma within the next two years.

1. This paper was prepared for the forthcoming talks between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Truman, January 7–8, 1952. This document was one of many drafted by a special Steering Group in anticipation of these meetings.