793.00/10–951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Burma ( Key ) to the Secretary of State


356. Reurtel 16 [17], Oct. 5.1 Comments Deptel 717, Sept 282 follow:

Para 1. While GOB will be delighted see all KMT troops withdraw Burmese territory, it feels must maintain outward appearance of attempting round them up for internment in order satisfy Peiping. Thus withdrawal wld have to be carried out through Indochina or Thailand with GOB forces ostensibly driving them out. As in past both Indochina and Thai Govts reluctant allow KMT troops enter their territory under these circumstances, possibility arranging withdrawal KMT troops from Burma appears slight.

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Para 2. This scheme tried by KMT earlier this year and failed miserably.

Para. 3. While GOB convinced presence KMT troops greatly enhances Chi Commie invasion threat, regardless this question GOB considers unauthorized occupation Burmese soil by KMT gross violation its sovereignty and contrary its settled policy neutrality.

Sent New Delhi 14; rptd info Dept 356.

  1. In telegram 17 from New Delhi, October 5, the Embassy reported that Thakin Nu and Nehru would exchange ideas about the Japanese peace treaty and the KMT troop situation in Burma when they met in New Delhi on October 21 (690B.91/10–551).
  2. In telegram 717 to New Delhi, September 28, the Department reported that when the U.S. Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) approached the Chinese Representative (Tsiang), about the possibility of Burma’s bringing the question of the KMT troops before the UN, Tsiang said that he did not think these forces would accept internment in Burma. Rather, he suggested that an accord be negotiated to bring about a guaranteed withdrawal of these troops to Taiwan, although he observed that he did not think this solution would be acceptable to the Burmese. Tsiang thought the best line of action would be to have Li Mi’s forces return to combat in Yunnan. (793.00/9–2851)