Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

790.5/12–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Regional Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

secret

[Washington,] December 10, 1951.¹

Subject: Tripartite Security Pact.

Participants:

Richard Casey, Foreign Minister of Australia, Ambassador Spender, Ambassador Cowen, Mr. Shullaw—BNA, Mr. Connors—FE/P, and Mr. Emmerson—FE.

Ambassador Spender opened the conversation by stating that in response to Ambassador Cowen’s request he had drawn up a list of personal suggestions of topics which might be taken up through the machinery to be set up under the Tripartite Security Pact. He stressed that these were personal views and that they were not exhaustive in character but rather suggestive of some of the points which might arise for discussion in the Pacific Council.

Ambassador Spender read from his memorandum² and discussed orally the points included therein. He later left a copy of his letter³ with Ambassador Cowen. The points mentioned by Ambassador Spender were the following:

1. Logistical support of Australian and New Zealand forces in war—and contribution from Australian production.

2. Free flow of needed information.

3. The responsibility for planning under Australian-New Zealand sector.

4. The division of responsibility for collecting and collating intelligence data in the Pacific and adjoining territories.

5. Selection and preparation of bases.

6. Interchange of personnel.

7. Security of Australia in global war.

8. Coordination of Pacific planning with global planning.

9. The form of military machinery for cooperation.

Ambassador Cowen stated that he appreciated the suggestions regarding topics to be discussed in the Pacific Council. He was anxious to get such suggestions and would utilize them in his talks on the subject with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He referred to the personal memorandum⁴ which Ambassador Spender had previously left in the Department and to the suggested chart of organization.⁵ The Foreign Minister inquired regarding our views of this suggested organization and asked whether he was right in assuming that we wished the simplest organization possible. Ambassador Cowen said that was our idea indeed and that the suggested outline was a start. Reference was made to the inquisitive nature of the press with respect to a Pacific Pact and the Foreign Minister said he wished to say nothing which would in any way adversely affect the ratification proceedings for the security treaty in the Senate. Ambassador Cowen said there would be no objection to stating that there had been an informal exchange of views between the Foreign Minister and the Department but that we would wish to avoid giving the impression that we were assuming Senate ratification of the treaty and on this assumption were already working out its implementation previous to ratification.

Ambassador Spender said he hoped our interpretation of “maximum simplicity” did not mean that the Council would be simply a paper organization. Ambassador Cowen assured him that such was not the case, that we were earnest in desiring to make the security arrangement a real thing. We had hoped that we could emphasize the political aspects of the pact in the beginning and proceed toward the military problems gradually. Ambassador Spender agreed with this point of view.

Foreign Minister Casey said that wherever he went he was constantly asked what plans were afoot for extending the security arrangements in the Pacific and that he always replied that the important thing was to proceed with the ratification of the present pacts and that their extension would have to be the subject of future discussion. In response to a question by Ambassador Cowen, Foreign Minister Casey said that his Government had not given a great deal of thought as to just how these arrangements might be extended. He found in his travels in Southeast Asia that each country seemed to be compartmentalized in its economic and military activities and although each was receiving assistance from the United States, there seemed to be little interchange of ideas or persons among these countries. Consequently, some unifying force would be beneficial. On the other hand, it was apparent that the bringing in of some of the Southeast Asian countries would add “weak sisters” who could not contribute to the mutual defense a few ports or airbases.

[Here follows discussion of the Netherlands New Guinea question.]

With respect to the ratification of the treaties, Foreign Minister Casey was informed that we expected the hearings to begin the first week in January and the four treaties to be ratified toward the end of February. The Foreign Minister said that there would probably be a brief session of the Australian Parliament in February at which time the ratification of the treaty might come about. He inquired specifically whether it would be helpful if Australian ratification preceded action by the United States Senate. Ambassador Cowen said he felt this would be helpful. The Foreign Minister estimated that in this case Australian ratification might take place early in February which would be after Senate hearings had begun but before actual ratification had taken place.

Ambassador Spender returned again to the organization of the Pacific Council; he remarked that while he did not foresee the necessity for a full-time secretariat, he thought records should be kept of meetings. He had in mind a “working group” which might be composed of the counsellors of the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington and a representative of the State Department. This group might refer certain subjects to the Ambassadors who would perhaps meet with Ambassador Cowen. He felt that records should be kept of the meetings of these groups as well as those of the Council itself. He stated that the first week in May was “Coral Sea Week” in Australia and it would be a “tremendous thing” if the first meeting of the Pacific Council could be held in Australia at that time.

Ambassador Cowen assured the Foreign Minister that we did not want to waste any time with respect to the security pact. He said we would be talking this over with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the immediate future and that we would, of course, expect to keep in constant contact with Ambassador Spender and hoped that there could be a continuing mutual exchange of ideas and information.

1. Drafted December 13. A marginal notation in an unidentified hand reads: “Approved Dec. 17, 1951 by Amb. Myron Cowen.”
2. Reference uncertain.
3. Dated December 8, not printed; it covered the main points enumerated in this memorandum of conversation. (790.5/12–851)
4. Reference uncertain.
5. Reference uncertain. Possibly the chart found attached to the letter of November 5 from Mr. Nash to Mr. Perkins, p. 252.