Lot 54D423
Draft of Letter by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I thank you for your letter of August 8,2 in reply to my letter of August 2, 1951,3 transmitting the copy of the memorandum of 8 August 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of United States–Philippines Treaty of Alliance.
We appreciate the prompt action of the Joint Chiefs which we sought in view of the rather critical political situation that now prevails in the Philippines.
I am glad to note the recognition by the Joint Chiefs that, when all considerations which bear on this matter are taken into account, it may be to the over-all advantage of the United States to have such a Treaty of Alliance.
With respect to the suggestions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to the suggested draft of Treaty enclosed in my letter of August 2, 1951, I have the following observations to make:
Comment a calls for deletion in the Preamble of the reference to “the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area”. This language is precisely that which was approved without question by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Preamble to the Security Treaty to be signed with Australia and New Zealand.4 It is responsive to the view of the Department of State that a more comprehensive system is desirable at some future date, and this view is held strongly by both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was, furthermore, reflected in the President’s Statement of April 18, 1951, previously approved by the Department of Defense, which outlined a series of specific steps in the Western Pacific and called them “natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area”, thereby clearly implying that there may be further steps. It would be extremely difficult to explain why two treaties of similar import, which would presumably be signed at the same time, would involve a discrepancy in this respect. It might be inferred that if there were a more comprehensive system of regional security as envisaged by the other treaty, the Philippines would be excluded from the more comprehensive system. This inference would nullify the over-all advantage sought and referred to in Paragraph 3 of the Joint Chiefs’ Memorandum.
Paragraph b suggests deletion of Article 2, dealing with “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid”. The language again is [Page 242] identical with that which was approved by the Joint Chiefs for the Australia–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty. It is taken from the “Vandenberg” Resolution which stipulates that regional and other collective arrangements with which the United States becomes associated should be “based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid”. The purpose, we understand, is to make it clear that these arrangements do not give anyone a “free ride” but that there must be mutuality of effort. The “mutual aid” contemplated does not imply that the United States will support a Philippine military establishment, or that the Philippines will support a United States military establishment. The “mutual aid” can be through the development by the United States of its military establishment and the development by the Philippines of its military establishment.
As regards paragraph c, suggesting the introduction of the words “by external armed attack”, we understand that the actual position of the United States is that it cannot permit the Philippine Islands to be taken either by external aggression or internal subversion (See NSC 84/2–paragraph 5).5 However, we shall seek in our negotiations to secure the results suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This involves a deviation from the pending Australia–New Zealand Treaty, but it is a deviation which we think we may be able to explain and justify because of the different circumstances which prevail in the Philippines, and because of a desire to negative any desire to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Philippines.
We do not yet know whether the Philippines will be prepared to negotiate a Security Treaty with the understanding that it is coupled to their participation in the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty. However, I felt it useful as promptly as possible to give you our reactions to your letter and its enclosure.
Sincerely yours,
- The source text bears no notation that would identify the drafting officer. It does bear this notation in an unidentified handwriting: “Not used J[ohn] F[oster] D[ulles] signed 8/9/51 letter instead”. See p. 243.↩
- Ante, p. 238.↩
- Ante, p. 232.↩
- See draft of February 17, p. 172.↩
- Text of NSC 84/2, approved by the President November 10, 1950, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1514.↩