663.001/10–251: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Austria ( Donnelly) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
1206. Deptel 1680 to London Sept 26, rptd Paris, Moscow, Frankfort, and Vienna,2 and London’s 1565 to Dept Sept 28 rptd Paris, Moscow, Frankfort, and Vienna.3
Part I. Leg comments on abbreviated text Aust treaty follow in 3 parts, with reference to political, German assets, and legal aspects, of which this part one.
[Page 1140]In Leg’s view, main objective remains that of obtain withdrawal of Sov troops from country, and the advantages of evacuation, if it were possible, are sufficient to justify giving Sov one more opportunity to conclude treaty on basis old text. This, however, they appear most unlikely to do, and fact that Sovs even less apt at this time to accept abbreviated text than old text does not justify inference that they might settle for old text. It appears to us they will continue to find excuses for not signing until they are ready on political grounds to evacuate this country, and that there is little prospect of the latter until either the general political antagonism is reduced or the progressive shift of military power to the West makes it hazardous for them to continue maintaining military forces here.
Sovs have in fact given clear indication their position in any forthcoming treaty discussion by blast in AC Sept 28,4 which resembles similar charges advanced in AC March and April 1950 and repeated by Zarubin at 252 deputies meeting (ref para 6 USFA, PC 22187, Dec 9, 1949; para 7, PC 22354, Dec 2, 1949; PC 24222, March 31, 1950; PC 24313, April 14, 1950; PC 24403, April 1950; London Delau 453, rptd Vienna 95, April 27, 19505). Sov charges re remilitarization West Austria may be used either in conjunction with charges on West German rearmament and Trieste military base or as substitute for awkward Trieste maneuver which led to countercharges re Sov breach of satellite treaties.
In these circumstances, question becomes one of best tactic for maintaining political and propaganda pressure to induce them to decide upon withdrawal as less disadvantageous course. Equally important is question of type of treaty that will best reflect prevailing positions and purposes of the respective signatory powers at time of signature and ratification. On both of these scores we very much favor abbreviated text proposed in Deptel 1680 to London Sept 26 rptd Paris, Vienna, Moscow and Frankfort.
In Leg’s view, there is no longer any great pressure value in old text which envisages Aust settlement in terms of 1946 conceptions and the recently concluded satellite treaties. Only enthusiasm this text awakens in Austs is that it represents what appears to be sole chance of obtaining withdrawal of troops. Propaganda advantage a better basis for possible UN action to be derived from intelligible clear-cut provisions of abbreviated text, especially with new article 6, are obvious. This advantage appears to us to greatly outweigh charge of inconsistency involved in tearing up “already existing [Page 1141] agreement” on other articles of present draft and Potsdam provisions on German assets. In our view, it is less important to maintain consistency with old provisions of agreed articles than to assume position compatible with current German, Italian, and Japanese settlements. Moreover, teeth can be drawn from objection by making final offer to conclude treaty on basis of old text at forthcoming meeting of deputies, and tactically it would remain within our power to assent to old text if Sovs fell back on this as their main argument.
Gruber informed Leg he believed some misunderstanding in views attributed to him by Brit FonOff (London 1565 to Dept Sept 28 rptd Paris 599, Vienna, Moscow, Frankfort), which he had clarified with Caccia today. Gruber stated misapprehension might have arisen from earlier conversation dating several weeks back before he had learned in detail of Depts proposal re abbreviated text. Gruber laid particular stress on sequence of steps in following order: 1, call meeting deputies; 2, serious effort to conclude treaty on basis old text; 3, when apparent that step two had failed, West deps to table new proposal of abbreviated text; 4, accompany step three with strong propaganda drive to mobilize public opinion for subsequent action, possibly in UN. Gruber stated that he had always felt best type of treaty was “evacuation treaty”, to which he considered deps abbreviated draft admirably adapted. These were Gruber personal views, since Aust Govt had not entirely concluded its study of proposal. Re question of timing Gruber has previously indicated he might be agreeable to postponing his mission until December if this suited our purposes better, which would provide opportunity to make progress on Trieste and Italian treaty question.
Leg would defer to Dept’s views concerning procedure for presenting abbreviated draft, but is inclined to favor taking step at deputies meeting with simultaneous approach through diplomatic channels Moscow, as at Paris meeting last spring. This would provide a break in deps session for a few days while Sovs dep communicated with Moscow but would keep stage set for West deps if Sov reply turned out unsatisfactory.