Vienna Post files, lot 55F125, 350—Conversations, 1951
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Legation in Austria (Kidd)
Dr. Gruber stated that there were three matters he wished to discuss with me: the question of raising our Legations to Embassies; treaty tactics in a possible forthcoming session of the Deputies; and general long-range tactics to be followed against the Soviets.
With regard to raising the status of our respective Missions to Embassies, I informed Dr. Gruber that it was my understanding that we were all clear on this point and were awaiting formal Notes from him. He said that that appeared to be the position in respect to the U.S. Government, but so far neither Caccia nor Lalouette had received any final instructions from their Governments. Dr. Gruber said that he would not desire to make this approach [Page 1133] to the three Western Governments without prior assurance that it would be acceptable. He had requested Caccia to communicate with his Government again, and would have an opportunity soon to do the same with Lalouette, but would appreciate it if our Government could be of any help through the British and French Embassies in Washington in firming up this matter at an early date. He said that he would like, if possible, to send out the Notes in another week or ten days time.
As regards treaty tactics, Dr. Gruber felt that it would be most desirable to confront the Soviets at the outset with the statement that the Western Powers were prepared to conclude the treaty on the Soviet terms as stated in the record.
I asked Dr. Gruber whether he meant the Soviet terms on the five disagreed Articles, No. 16, No. 27, No. 42, No. 48, and No. 48b, or the new articles and reopening of old ones, such as Article 9. Gruber said that there should be flat refusal to reopening of the old Articles or to consider new articles at this time, and that any debate should be confined to the five remaining disagreed articles.
Dr. Gruber said that he did not in fact expect the Soviets to conclude the treaty at this time. The purpose of our tactics should therefore be to lay the foundation for the subsequent political and propaganda position after we had received one more Soviet refusal.
Dr. Gruber felt that the most striking vindication of the West’s attitude would lie in their ability to prove that the Soviets would not even conclude a treaty upon their own terms. He felt that upon this basis could be built a most effective propaganda drive in Austria against the Soviets, a foundation for mobilizing the indignation of UN members if the case should be brought before the UN, and effective pressure to compel the Soviets to adopt one or other of the alternative texts if a short-form treaty were proposed through diplomatic channels. Dr. Gruber thus hoped to build up and focus popular and diplomatic pressure on a larger scale. He felt that there was no great point in such endeavors if there was still a possibility of armed conflict this year, and was therefore inclined to wait until November before the Deputies should meet again.
I told Dr. Gruber that it might indeed be an interesting tactic to begin by a flat announcement of willingness to accept the Soviet version of the remaining five Articles, with the thought in mind that they would refuse even this; certain of the points however, particularly Article 27, did have a genuine importance for us, and I thought that there might also be a genuine difficulty as far as the American people were concerned about opening up any diplomatic negotiations at this time with the public announcement of readiness to make further concessions to the Soviets. I said that it was our feeling that the concessions already made had gone very far, [Page 1134] and that we would not be inclined to make additional concessions to those which were already in the record, and thus, although I would transmit his views to Washington for the Department’s consideration, I could not give any assurance that such a tactic would be approved. Dr. Gruber said that although he felt that it would be by far the most convincing lead on our part, it was not vital, since the Soviets well knew that they could easily conclude the treaty point by point if they so wished.
Dr. Gruber said that even on Article 27, the Austrians would see to it that a way was found for American military instructors to be active in Austria. He said that a number of the points from which the Soviets hope to derive advantage would be evaded by the Austrians as soon as they might be. He said that he had no thoughts of any rash steps in this respect, but that after Austria became a member of the UN it should be possible to bring her case before the UN and openly request modification of any unreasonably restrictive impositions which the Soviets might hope to enforce upon the basis of the treaty.
Gruber said that he had discussed the possibility of the treaty with Timoshenko, the Soviet Political Advisor, this morning, and he had a feeling that the Soviets might be prepared to relax their position to some extent. He said this was perhaps largely a feeling on his part. He had pressed Timoshenko, who countered with a passing reference to Trieste and dwelt at some length upon the American military fortification of Salzburg as evidence that we had no intention of concluding a treaty. Dr. Gruber replied to this that “Salzburg or Doellersheim—it is all the same”, and that he was forced to conclude that the Soviet answer was NO. Timoshenko hastened to emphasize that he had not said NO and in fact had not said anything new or gone beyond that which Gromyko had already said.
With regard to the third part, general long-range tactics against the Soviets, Dr. Gruber said that he was convinced that the Soviets would withdraw from Austria only when the general power relations had so shifted in favor of the West that their continued presence here would be uncomfortable or risky. He said that he was convinced that that day would come and the important thing was to recognize it and then to utilize all means at one’s disposal to increase the pressure upon the Soviets. Prior to the time when the shift in power should occur, one had to proceed cautiously lest the Soviets take the initiative in resorting to armed force; after the turning-point was reached, he was sure in his own mind that they would never fight for this small corner of Austria and therefore that pressure might be built up with impunity. He felt that this critical point of time might come about sometime within the next [Page 1135] twelve months and that the present period should therefore be used in preparation for this. In the present period a treaty session in November and perhaps subsequent UN discussion of the Austrian issue would keep public Austrian opinion and world public opinion alive to the problem; when the appropriate time came the Austrians might add to this various forms of passive resistance, obstructionism, public clamor, refusal to pay occupation costs, and other measures representing a systematic campaign to make the continued occupation difficult. I asked Dr. Gruber whether he felt that such a campaign could be unleashed without the risk of immediate partition. He said that in his opinion it could not now be done, but it could after Western rearmament had been accomplished.
Dr. Gruber said that, in sum, the most important consideration was withdrawal of occupation troops from this area. All tactics, treaty, diplomatic, and Austrian, should be directed toward this end; all problems would be immeasurably easier to solve once this country was emptied of Soviet forces. He felt that we might pursue this course without risk, concurrently with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, since we would still have forces at our disposal on both flanks in Italy and in Germany, and we should gain the additional advantage of an Austrian armed force of 60,000 men, which would be created immediately to assist in Western defense. Dr. Gruber said that one of the principal hindrances to tactics in this sense was the continued British and French insistence upon occupation costs. He pointed out that it was not possible to give effective expression to Austrian indignation against the Soviet occupation, as by a refusal to pay occupation costs, so long as the British and French were still demanding these payments. He foresaw that the whole question might at some time be made a subject of parliamentary discussion and publicity campaign. He was prepared to offer the British and French a certain sum for construction purposes, such as the Americans were doing at Salzburg, but no more, and he would endeavor to abolish payments for running expenses, servants, etc.