No. 529

CFM files, lot M–88, box 72, Bound volume—Austria, 1951

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Bonbright)

top secret

Subject: The Austrian Treaty

I am not sure that the position taken in Mr. Williamson’s memorandum1 on Defense objections relative to the Austrian Treaty is correct in respect to two points.

In regard to Article 27, RPTS D–3/le is in fundamental agreement with the Defense position but reaches the conclusion that the result of agreement upon the Soviet text would not be disastrous. The Joint Chiefs seem to contemplate the possibility that in the last resort, as we recommend, the Soviet version of Article 27 might be accepted. Their comments are therefore fundamentally addressed to the tactics of negotiation which is not a military problem and which is the responsibility of the State Department.

The same considerations apply to the objection which the Joint Chiefs have raised with the idea that we might propose acceptance of the Soviet text of five unagreed articles at the outset. We reached the conclusion that it might be good negotiating tactics to confront the Soviets with this packaged acceptance. We have pointed out that we must first get a tripartite position. It is not the function of the Joint Chiefs to advise us on these negotiating tactics. Their comments may have been sufficiently persuasive to have altered our own conclusions but I am not clear that is the fact.

There is an additional problem which I called to Mr. Williamson’s attention in a memorandum yesterday. This is the question whether we should make a special effort to have the Deputies2 [Page 1104] wind this up at their March meeting, for example by suggesting the acceptance of the Soviet text of the five unagreed articles, or whether we should let the Deputies’ meeting run its usual course and reserve the dramatic offer for the meeting of the Ministers. This is again a question of tactics which I believe should be decided by the Department of State.

In regard to having the Secretary send a communication to General Marshall on this point, it seems to me it would be wiser to deal at the same time with the Joint Chiefs objection to discussing Soviet troop strength in Hungary and Rumania and the question of the Austrian Treaty. We need to explain to them our negotiating tactics on linking these things together. We can make such an explanation more effectively if we deal with both points in the same communication. However, General Marshall has not yet acted upon the Joint Chiefs recommendation on the issue of the Soviet troop strength in Hungary and Rumania. It would seem to me desirable therefore to hold up our communication until the first of the week when we hope to have General Marshall’s decision. Meanwhile I should appreciate it if you or Mr. Williamson would let me know if you agree with my comments on the Austrian paper.

Philip C. Jessup
  1. Supra.
  2. The reference is to the Deputies for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers, also referred to as Treaty Deputies. They are not to be confused with the Deputy Foreign Ministers who were in Paris for the Four-Power Exploratory Talks.