No. 940

868.413/11–2951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

719. During conversation with Tito, Congressmen Zablocki and Kelly pressed Tito vigorously on question of Stepinac,2 asking why they had not been allowed to visit him. Tito said Stepinac release from prison had already been decided upon and that consequently visit to him by US Congressmen at this moment wld be obviously inappropriate. In response to Zablocki questions, Tito said Stepinac wld be released within a month and wld be allowed to act as priest if he wished but not as bishop or archbishop.

While Zablocki appeared to be satisfied with outcome, Mrs. Kelly told me subsequently she wld reserve any judgement or statement until she had seen Holy Father in Rome.

Tito made no reference to correspondence with Pearson and I had no intimation of it whatever until it was made public six hours [Page 1867] later.3 Vilfan told me Yugo Govt was in somewhat awkward position since Tito’s statement to Congressmen (and presumably to Pearson) was in anticipation of enactment of special law in Yugo Parliament not yet announced. Under present law Stepinac apparently shld serve at least three more years to be eligible for parole. Tito overlooked or neglected technicality of special enactment.

Tito’s decision to make known decision through letter to Pearson was evidently due to his wish to avoid appearance of acting under Congressional pressure. I feel confident, however, that continual representations by various Congressmen have been primarily responsible for release.

Msgr. Oddi, chargé of Nunciature here, tells me Vatican will not be satisfied in any way with terms of Stepinac release. He called on me yesterday to express surprise that Congressman Barrett had informed press he was highly pleased. I assured Oddi that I had in no way prompted Barrett’s statement and had myself been surprised at it.

My view is that US Congressmen who have pressed Tito on Stepinac are entitled to take credit for release if they wish and that Tito will not be seriously embarrassed if they claim some credit in public statements. He dislikes to admit acting under pressure but at same time such statement will tend to get Tito off hook with Serbs.4

Allen
  1. Repeated to Rome, Paris, and London.
  2. During a meeting with Barrett, Burton, and Fugate on November 24, Tito stated that Archbishop Stepinac’s release would take place the moment he became eligible for probationary release under Yugoslav law and that he would be free to reside inside Yugoslavia as any other citizen although he could not resume his ecclesiastic functions. When Ambassador Allen was told that Tito’s statement was confidential, he suggested to Deputy Foreign Minister Vilfan that this news could not be kept secret for long and that therefore the Yugoslav Government should make a public statement on the subject promptly. (Telegram 700 from Belgrade, November 24, 868.413/11–2451)
  3. This correspondence presumably led to Drew Pearson’s column concerning the release of Archbishop Stepinac which appeared, for example, in the Washington Post of November 30.
  4. Archbishop Stepinac was released from prison on December 5. For the official communiqué issued at the time of Stepinac’s release and his statement made the following day, see Folliot, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 391–392.