611.68/4–1651
The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen)1
Dear George: We sent you a copy of the memorandum of conversation which I had with Ambassador Popovic on March 29 regarding Archbishop Stepinac.2 This problem was raised with us again on April 12 when the Speaker of the House of Representatives3 and Floor Leader McCormack took it up with Jack McFall. Mr. McCormack said he felt the time was now ripe for us to proceed actively to try to get some results and that he hoped we would tackle it vigorously. The Speaker expressed complete accord with the Floor Leader’s view. Jack hopes, in view of the very many active legislative irons which the Department now has in the fire, we will give every possible consideration to the wishes of these two leaders of the House.
In view of the highly reprehensible leak on Tito’s request for arms aid4 and the internal political complications resulting there-from, which you reported in your telegram No. 1490 of April 12,5 the Department is inclined to agree with the analysis in the last paragraph of your despatch No. 746 of April 146 that further pressure on the Yugoslav Government to take action in this matter [Page 1782] may possibly have effects contrary to those we desire. Nevertheless, I feel that we must overlook no opportunity which offers any possibility of bringing about a solution to this problem.
It seems to me that in pursuing this matter further with the Yugoslav Government we should emphasize the point that the problem is theirs, not ours, and that as long as it remains unsolved it provides the principal stumbling block to the amount and character of assistance which this Government, in the light of public opinion in the United States and elsewhere, can extend to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government should face the fact squarely, as we are necessarily doing here, that there is a growing opposition in this country at this time to further foreign aid and that where extraneous elements, such as the Stepinac case, are involved, the difficulties are further increased. We have no assurance that in the case of Yugoslavia, for instance, the existence of the Stepinac complication might not make the difference between aid, and no aid for Yugoslavia. We have the impression that the Yugoslav Government underrates the seriousness of this complication.
I have no particular suggestion as to how you should proceed at this time in your efforts to bring about a solution to the problem. I would suggest, however, that you give it your most serious consideration and take whatever action you deem advisable under the circumstances. Naturally we would wish to be kept informed of your actions so that we can be in a position to inform such interested persons as the Speaker of the House and the Floor Leader.
Since formal communications on this subject seem to have a tendency to leak, I have brought this to your attention in this manner and suggest that you keep me informed in a like manner.7
On the general subject of church-state relations in Yugoslavia, we should like to receive considerably more reports and analyses and recommendations from the Embassy. Your despatch to which I have already referred was helpful but we hope the Embassy’s reporting can be futher expanded and improved.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by Higgs.↩
- Not printed. Following a conversation with Ambassador Popović concerning Yugoslavia’s request for economic assistance, Perkins informed Popović of the importance of resolving the problem of Archbishop Stepinac’s continued detention since the American people were concerned with this matter. The Ambassador agreed to bring the problem to the attention of his government. (768.00/3–2951)↩
- Sam Rayburn.↩
- This is a reference to an Associated Press story from Washington, dated April 8, which described an informal request for arms assistance by Yugoslavia that was presently under consideration by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. (Telegram 1074 to Belgrade, April 9, 768.56/4–951)↩
- Telegram 1490 reported Yugoslavia’s serious concern over the leak, although Ambassador Allen stated his belief that the primary concern of Tito was not fear of Cominform reaction but rather concern over the internal reaction within his own Communist Party organization in Yugoslavia and its effect on Yugoslavia’s ideological position abroad. (768.56/4–1251)↩
- Not printed.↩
- In a letter to Perkins dated April 26, Allen stated that he would “do everything I can to get some results in this case”. Since the utmost discretion was necessary to be successful, Allen agreed that personal letters between himself and Perkins was the best way to handle the communications. (611.68/4–2651)↩