768.5/2–2051: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 1
1547. Pass Defense. Embassy noted with interest interpretation by press and radio commentators of press conference statements of February 142 referring to President’s July 19 report to Congress as warning to Russia and satellites against launching attack on Yugoslavia.
In recent conversations here my British, French and Italian colleagues have all expressed concern in regard to previous public speculation concerning probable Western reaction to an attack on Yugoslavia. They have been apprehensive at the impression that speculation might be creating in the minds of Soviet planners. It has been their feeling that the implication of such speculation was that there is considerable doubt in the absence of definite official statements to the contrary, as to whether the Western Powers would react vigorously with military force against an attack and that there may be a danger that the Kremlin might be tempted in the circumstances to risk an adventure against Yugoslavia in the hope that Western countermeasures would be sufficiently ineffectual and dilatory to enable Soviets to achieve a fait accompli localized in the Balkan area. In this connection, there is recalled the influence of miscalculations as to US reaction on German decisions to launch World Wars I and II, and in particular that of England in World War I.
In line with above thinking, my colleagues have felt that it would be desirable to insure by appropriate means that there be no misapprehension in the mind of the Kremlin as to the vigor of Western reaction to an attack on Yugoslavia. To this end they have been considering the desirability of suggesting that Soviets be approached discreetly and forcefully informed of determination of West and particularly the US to meet any armed threat to Yugoslavia with such forces as the situation may require. Representations [Page 1739] of this type might be made either through UK, US and French Ambassadors in Moscow or through Soviet Ambassadors abroad or in some manner through NAT organization. An alternative would be definitive public pronouncements by US, UK, France and other NAT countries.
We appreciate the difficulties inherent in any of the foregoing approaches. While a categoric public announcement would presumably go further to disabuse Soviet policy planners of whatever doubts they may have and would have the advantage of simultaneously informing and thus rallying support of US and free world public, to a reciprocal extent a firm public position of this nature would tend to engage Soviet prestige and seem likely to increase tensions. On other hand it would appear to be of doubtful wisdom to endeavor to undertake a step of this importance on a secret basis and the problem of securing its confidential nature would be a major one. If inadvertently leaks should occur speculation, which would further confuse the picture and thus tend to defeat their objective, might be enhanced. Furthermore aside from mere advantage of taking any advance step which could deter the Soviets from a rash adventure, there may be some question as to whether it is advisable to give Tito a blank check of so definite nature. In this connection it should be noted that England’s guarantee to Poland in early 1939 may not, in historical perspective, appear wholly the part of wisdom. In the circumstances, it is probably undesirable to attempt at this time any more definite pronouncement concerning Yugoslavia than the President’s July 19 declaration, and the reaction of the press to references thereto can be regarded as fortuitous.
In general connection with the likelihood of an adventure against Yugoslavia in near future, we do not have here information to suggest that such an adventure is more imminent than previously estimated and we note Belgrade’s telegram 1100, February 14,3 in which Tito and Kardelj are reported to adhere to their previously expressed view that satellite or USSR attack immediately is unlikely. However, we note British statement (infotel February 15, 4 a.m.)4 at NAT Council Deputies meeting in which British Deputy withdrew previous opinion that satellite attack is improbable until after 1951 training season and it appears from information reaching us from other posts that there is some increase in tempo of satellite military activities. In my view these developments suggest an urgent necessity for US and our Allies, if they have not already [Page 1740] done so, to consider steps beyond the contemplated (infotel above cited) possibility that we shall have to meet critical Yugoslav material requirements, and in fact to determine at an early date what would be the military reaction of West to Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia in various contingencies should such eventuate in near future.