Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 814

611.61/10–1551: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
priority

Moscow, October 15, 1951—5 p.m.

634. I was received by Vyshinsky at his request at 3 p.m. today for conversation lasting 45 minutes.

Vyshinsky read eight page statement in reply oral statement Ambassador Kirk October 5² and gave me copy at end interview.

Statement began with review of points made by Ambassador Kirk as understood by Vyshinsky and proceeded to comment on two main questions posed by Kirk (1) position in Korea and (2) Soviet American relations.

Re Korean situation: US interest to end its war in Korea against Korean people understandable, USSR interest in end war shown by its efforts in that direction; US responsible for delays in armistice talks; best way assure successful conclusion talks is instruct Ridgway not complicate matters with incidents or artificial difficulties such as relocation talks site; discussion armistice line military matter and must be included armistice talks; Soviet Union not participant negotiations but “all real efforts” toward successful conclusion negotiations “will meet in the present time as in the past with full and energetic support on the part of the Soviet Union”.

Re Soviet American relations: Re US emphasis on importance settlement Korean matter it goes without saying “in interest improvement international situation urgently necessary work out peaceful settlement Korean question”, USSR has made many attempts discuss with USA many unresolved international problems of primary importance; on Soviet initiative Paris 1951 conference was convoked but USA, UK and France refused discuss important questions proposed by USSR;³ if USA actually stands for improvement USSR–USA relations it has had many opportunities to confirm this with acts but it has not done so, Kirk’s statement re nonaggressive aim US re USSR et cetera not first time such statement made including Truman message to Shvernik⁴ but facts speak otherwise, witness abrogation commercial treaty, that military measures of US are defensive in nature contradicted by fact of war against Korean people and creation aggressive Atlantic bloc directed against USSR et cetera; Soviet Government ask what sort of “undesirable consequences” or “unpleasantness” US Government has in mind in case Kaesong negotiations unsuccessful, if it is question of worsening Soviet American relations how can they be worse than after President Truman stated to entire world that agreements with Soviet Union are not worth paper on which they written.

Statement concluded “in such circumstances can the statement of the wish to improve Soviet American relations be taken seriously? Would not it be truer to suppose that US Government actually is not striving for improvement of Soviet American relations and cooperation with Soviet Union but is interested only in conversations re cooperation and agreement. Nonetheless the Soviet Government following its peaceful policy and unceasingly striving for the establishment of cooperation with all countries prepared to cooperate with Soviet Union agrees to examine with the participation of US Government all important and unsettled questions and to discuss measures for improvement international relations including relations between USSR and USA.”

In answer to direct question Vyshinsky stated Kirk message brought to attention of Stalin.

Full translation follows.⁵

Cumming

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. See telegram 586 from Moscow, Document 812.
3. The reference is to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks, Paris, March 5–June 21, regarding possible convening of a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; for documentation on the talks, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.
4. See Document 788.
5. The translated text of Vyshinsky’s statement was transmitted in telegram 639 from Moscow, October 15; for text, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1042. Vyshinsky’s statement was subsequently released to the press by the Department of State on October 17; see Department of State Bulletin, October 29, 1951, pp. 688–691. Regarding the release of the Kirk–Vyshinsky statements to the press, see footnote 1, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1048.