Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 812

611.61/10–551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
niact

Moscow, October 5, 1951—6 p. m.

586. Ref Embtel 577, October 4, repeated London 78, Paris 156, Tokyo 5.² I saw Vyshinsky today from 2 to 2:45. After preliminary remarks concerning my departure and travel plans I referred to my visit with Vyshinsky September 6 concerning Amer nationals in Chi (ref Deptel 227, September 28³) and expressed hope Sov Govt could soon notify US that request had been received favorably. Vyshinsky replied that unfortunately (he repeated the word) he not now able to give reply. I then made oral statement in accordance Deptel 249, October 3 adding suggested comment Deptel 253, October 4,⁴ in view line of discussion and Vyshinsky reaction.

Vyshinsky said that “note” would require careful study which would take time. I repeated that communication was not “note” but a verbal statement for Mr. Stalin’s attention (he then asked for copy of statement and said that if I wanted immediate reply he could provide it).

I reiterated that I was instructed by my govt to ask that my remarks be brought to attention Stalin. Vyshinsky more than once endeavored obtain a written copy of my remarks, at first indicating he could not accept responsibility for transmittal of statement to which US Govt attached great importance on the basis of his own notes. Finally toward end of conversation Vyshinsky assured me he would transmit content my remarks to Stalin. Verbal fencing regarding question of written copy of remarks occupied considerable portion of conversation.

Vyshinsky agreed undesirable enter discussion past events but said it necessary for him to “re-establish the truth” with regard to certain remarks in my statement not factually correct. For example remark concerning North Korea invasion—Sov Govt has shown that invasion was from South Korea, by South Koreans and interventionists. Further if Korean talks are at impasse responsibility rests with Amer side, with Ridgway. He said he could not understand why Amer command is protracting negots.

He continued that he could not understand why Kaesong not a suitable place for negots nor why US Govt addresses itself to Sov Govt but not North Korean Govt. Also how could question of armistice line be a political question since it is a question of negots for mil armistice. Proof of Sov Govt interest in matter is that it was initiator of proposal for armistice negots. There could be no doubt that Sov Govt would like to see negots completed satisfactorily. Sov Govt reciprocates in wish expressed by Amer Amb re US Govt desire for ceasefire. He noted that US has no aggressive intent against USSR and was pleased hear this statement, but many facts speak to contrary. If facts were same as words then all would be well.

I reiterated the sincerity of our statement to which Vyshinsky replied rather mockingly “all our statements are sincere”. I stated that uncompromising attitude Sov Govt around world has not contributed to settlement our mutual problems. When Vyshinsky in usual fashion asked for example of Sov Govt’s uncompromising attitude I replied that I not prepared cite chapter and verse, that history of Soviet Government’s attitude in UN and elsewhere not such as to lead to reasonable solution world problems. He continued maintain he did not understand and referred to US–USSR commercial treaty and fact that it was not Sov Govt that had broken it.⁵ He continued that it is well known that “trade affairs” are best basis for good relations. I cited as example uncompromising attitude negots in Paris last spring. When Vyshinsky asked who was responsible for ending negots I replied flatly that the USSR was. He said he felt two parties responsible, the US and UK (when interpreter reversed order Vyshinsky smilingly insisted on giving US priority). Vyshinsky referred to my remark re possibility breakdown armistice talks “might stimulate course events undesirable from point of view both our govts” as “possibly causing repercussions in relations our two govts” and continued, “How should we understand this—as a threat?” I replied quickly and emphatically, “certainly not” but should be understood rather as statement of fact. I said I was sure he well enough versed in history to know that limited wars have often spread. He said he understood that remarks should not be construed as threat and as regards spread of limited war, that depended on persons concerned.

I referred to an earlier remark and asked if it is correct that the USSR and USA agreed that Korean war should not get out hand. He replied affirmatively and repeated that USSR had proposed armistice talks; it was not a US proposal. I replied that US had accepted proposal to which he said “Good, you must now go forward”.

I said that we felt a point has been reached where if Soviet influence were put behind matter the Korean negots could be successfully concluded. He replied that we should come to an agreement with North Koreans, stating that Soviet Union is not a participant in negots. I called his attention to fact that USSR had diplomatic representation in North Korea and at Peking. His only response was that USSR has many connections, for example with US and that it cannot of course influence US Govt policy.

I concluded by repeating two points. First that Stalin should be particularly informed of my statement, which was specifically authorized by US Govt, that US intentions are not aggressive towards USSR. Second, that US Govt feels that if Sov Govt would assist with its good offices and good will Korean problem could be settled. He mentioned that USSR has always felt “good will” toward settlement Korean problem as soon as possible as was proved by Sov initiation proposal armistice negots. Finally I asked him to inform Stalin of my regret that I did not have opportunity to say farewell to him and expressed appreciation for everything done for me in this country.⁶

Vyshinsky seemed be impressed with importance my statement and took copious notes. I think we can rest assured that content my remarks will receive attention of highest Soviet authorities.

I twice endeavored draw him out on his possible attendance Paris UN without much success.

Although very businesslike re my statement, conversation was held in atmosphere of relative congeniality.

Kirk

1. Repeated niact to London and Paris.
2. Telegram 577 reported that Kirk had an appointment to see Vyshinsky on October 5. (611.61/10–451)
3. Not printed.
4. Regarding these telegrams, see Document 810.
5. The reference here is to the abrogation of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. commercial agreement of August 4, 1937; see Document 634.
6. The text of Ambassador Kirk’s statement to Vyshinsky was subsequently issued to the press by the Department of State on October 17; see Department of State Bulletin, October 29, 1951, p. 687. For Vyshinsky’s response to Kirk’s statement, see telegram 634, Document 814.