Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 806

611.61/9–551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

confidential

[Washington,] September 5, 1951.

Subject: Draft Reply from President to Shvernik

The attached draft, like the Japanese Peace Treaty, is an attempt to compromise widely differing points of view and, as such, will not be entirely satisfactory to anyone.

The principal issues are:

1) Should the President continue this correspondence?

The President himself took the initative on this by announcing at the press conference that he intended to answer the Shvernik letter.² He also has referred to his proposed reply at subsequent press conferences.

2) Should the President’s reply be heavily weighted on the substantive side—a kind of “White Paper” on US–USSR relations—and be designed to end the correspondence, or should it be used as another wedge to widen further the crack in the Iron Curtain caused by the McMahon Resolution and the President’s letter of transmittal, plus the Morrison-Pravda exchange?

There are good arguments for both points of view. The attached letter is an effort to find a middle road. We believe it has enough substance to stand alone, yet it also poses a further challenge to the Kremlin.

3) Should the President be committed to a special broadcast to the peoples of the world before the speech is written and fully approved?³

Original objections to the broadcast arose when it was proposed as a special message to the Soviet peoples. It is our feeling this objection is removed by broadening the target to include all peoples. It is inconceivable to us that there will not be an occasion in the next few months (particularly as a prelude to the General Assembly) when we will want the President to make a major foreign policy pronouncement which will get maximum attention throughout the world. However, we do not believe such a speech could or should be written now because the substantive decision which presumably would provide its base has not been finalized and, furthermore, it is impossible to foresee the circumstances which will exist several months hence.

4) Should a continuation of this correspondence coincide with the San Francisco Conference?⁴

Since no action was taken on this before the San Francisco Conference, we believe it should now await the conclusion of that conference. David Lloyd of the White House staff and Oren Stephens of this office, who have been discussing this matter, propose the following tentative schedule:

1. Submission of draft to White House September 10.

2. Transmission to Shvernik September 15.

3. Release to press (if Soviets have not already released) September 22 for Sunday papers or September 23 for Monday morning papers.

[Enclosure]

Proposed Letter From President Truman to His Excellency Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.⁵

I have the the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 6, 1951,⁶ and the enclosed resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Both were made public the day they were received. I transmitted them formally on August 20 to the Congress of the United States,⁷ whose resolution⁸ expressing the friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, initiated this exchange of views.

In the United States the channels of public information are neither directed nor controlled by the government. Thus the extensive publicity given these communications shows clearly the public interest here in the statements of high Soviet officials on matters affecting world peace.

But I must tell you, frankly and to the point, that the general American reaction was one of disappointment. This was quite obvious from the many letters I received from private citizens, together with comments in newspapers and on the radio and television. These reflected a deep regret that the Soviet Government had given no indication of a willingness to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in support of its Charter, but instead appeared to wish to create another and more limited obligation through a five-power pact. I wonder whether your government would continue to advocate this proposal if your people really had an opportunity to find out something about its history and meaning.

This is neither a new nor a helpful proposal. It came before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949 and 1950 and was turned down by a great majority of nations, including the United States, each time. I think the Soviet people should know the reasons why this great majority of nations thus rejected a “five-power peace pact.” They rejected it because they think it will weaken rather than strengthen the cause of peace.

This great majority continues to believe that the United Nations system provides the best guarantee of world peace. The United Nations Charter obligates each of its 60 member-states to observe two main rules of conduct: (1) to refrain from the threat or use of force, and (2) to settle international disputes by peaceful means. These rules were designed to safeguard every nation from aggression, and to enable the world’s peoples to live together without fear of their neighbors in the same way that people within democratic countries now live.

Yet the world’s peoples know that promises of good behavior, if not backed by a system of organized collective security, are not enough. Too often such promises, in the form of peace pacts, have been used to mask plans for aggression. The Soviet peoples will remember how M. Litvinov fought in the League of Nations for such a system of organized collective security which could have prevented the Nazi aggressors from inflicting war upon the Soviet Union. When this failed, the Soviet Union signed a peace pact with the Nazis. The Soviet peoples will not need to be reminded of the consequences of that pact.

It was as a result of such experiences that the peoples of the world supported the creation of a United Nations organization in which the main rules of international conduct could be enforced through a system of organized collective security.

Prevention of aggression was not, however, the sole purpose of the United Nations. We pledged ourselves also to make positive contributions to world peace and human well-being through collective action to improve the living standards and social conditions of all peoples. For us, the United Nations was more than a traditional peace pact; it was truly a Charter for a better world.

The American people share the deep disappointment of peoples everywhere that our hopes for a better world through the United Nations have not yet been realized. They have not been realized because the Soviet Government has not lived up to its obligations within the United Nations. The Soviet Government has placed a premium on force rather than peaceful settlement. It has used its great power against peace rather than for peace—in Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Korea, and elsewhere. The Soviet Government has obstructed the work of the United Nations in other important ways—by vetoing the admission of eleven states to the United Nations, by refusing to join in a collective security system, and by rejecting effective proposals for the control and regulation of armaments and for international control of atomic energy. The Soviet Government has taken no part in the United Nations’ efforts to improve the living standards and social conditions of the worlds’ peoples.

You have never said what would be in your proposed peace pact but it is natural to suppose that it would include an agreement by the five powers not to attack each other. Now what stronger pledge could there be than the promises in the United Nations Charter, by which both our nations already are bound, against the use of force or the threat of force?

We are living up to these UN obligations. If the Soviet Government is now prepared to do likewise, the proposed new pact is unnecessary. If the Soviet Government is not prepared to do so, neither the proposed pact nor any other will bring about the relaxation of international tensions which is sought.

If the Soviet Government now wants to cooperate with other nations for world peace, it can prove its desire by deeds. It can stop flouting the authority of the United Nations, it can cease supporting armed aggression in defiance of the verdict of the United Nations, it can make constructive contributions toward establishing conditions of peace with Germany, Austria and Japan, it can refrain from employing force to maintain in other countries regimes which do not command the support of their people, it can cease supporting subversive movements in other countries, it can cease its distortion of the motives and actions of other peoples and governments, it can stop violating fundamental human rights and liberties, and it can join in good faith in the earnest effort to find means for reducing armaments and controlling atomic energy in the interests of peace.

To many peoples, including the American people, peace means more than an absence of war. It also means striving to remove the causes of misunderstanding and to reduce the tensions which produce conflict. This can be done only if all the peoples have full and free access to the facts about other peoples and nations.

When the Soviet Government made known to the Soviet peoples the content of the resolution of peace and friendship adopted by the American Congress, we here believed the move was a gesture in the right direction.

Likewise, we were encouraged by your statement that the Soviet Government “hospitably receives communications of peace from any country and by every means contributes to the intercourse of the Soviet peoples with the peoples of other countries, placing no barriers in the path.”

That statement leads me to believe that you will publicize this letter. I am sure that the peoples of the Soviet Union will have a lively interest in the American response to your letter.

Your statement also leads me to believe that if the Soviet government is genuinely interested in promoting better understanding among all peoples, you will welcome the suggestion I now make. In the past from time to time I have had something to say about the views of the American people on the crucial issues of our time. I shall undoubtedly have an occasion in coming months to make a similar talk, which will be broadcast over the world-wide network of the Voice of America.

This talk will be translated simultaneously into the languages of other peoples, as is the practice in the United Nations. I feel sure that the great peoples of the Soviet Union, who must rely primarily upon government-controlled sources of information, will want the opportunity to consider such a statement of the American point of view. For this reason, I will welcome your assurance that you will make arrangements for simultaneous transmission of my next talk over the internal broadcasting systems of the Soviet Union.

I await your answer with keen anticipation.

In closing, let me once more assure you of my respect for the great peoples of your country.

1. Drafted by Oren Stephens (P). Attached to the source text is the following handwritten note from Sargeant to Matthews, dated September 6:

   “Doc—

   “Shvernik Exchange

   “I think I have gone as far as possible in trying to reconcile the views of Phil Jessup, Chip Bohlen, George Perkins, and Jack Hickerson.

   “Time is now pressing us. So is the White House. I’d like to talk over our next move with you Friday morning, on basis of attached memo and draft—Howland”

   There is no indication on the source text or elsewhere in Department of State files regarding the response to the proposals made in this memorandum. For further information regarding the drafting of a proposed message from President Truman to Shvernik, see footnote 5 below.

2. Regarding the President’s news conference comment, see Document 802.
3. According to a memorandum of August 22 from Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr. (P) to Bohlen, Sargeant (P), Shulman (S), and officers in EE, UNA, and S/P, a proposal had apparently been made for a broadcast to be made by President Truman, transmitted by VOA and other “free world” radio and also by Soviet broadcasting channels, to the people of the USSR in reply to Shvernik’s communication of August 6. A working group, headed by Bohlen, was to meet on August 23 to consider the merits of the proposal and develop an outline for such an address. (611.61/8–2251) No documentation has been found regarding the meeting of August 23 when presumably the proposal for a Presidential broadcast to the USSR was rejected.
4. The reference here is to the conference for the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, held at San Francisco, September 4–8, 1951.

5. A marginal typewritten notation at the top of the first page of the source text reads: “(Very rough draft—HHS: September 5th, 1951)”.

   An earlier draft of this proposed message to Shvernik was circulated by Sargeant to Bohlen (C), Matthews (G), Ferguson (S/P), Perkins (EUR), Jessup (S/A), and Hickerson (UNA) under cover of the following explanatory memorandum:

   “Attached is a proposed draft of the reply from President Truman to President Shvernik. Since the White House has expressed a desire to see a Departmental recommendation on this reply as soon as possible, your concurrence would be appreciated by the close of business on Thursday, August 30.”

   The first three and final seven paragraphs of the earlier draft were identical with the version printed here. The central section of the proposed message as printed here represents a substantial revision of the earlier draft. (611.61/8–2951) Only Jessup’s comments, as set forth in a memorandum of August 29 to Sargeant, have been found in Department of State files. (611.618–2951)

   The files also include a much shorter “Draft Outline of Letter From President to Shvernik,” dated October 19, bearing Assistant Secretary Barrett’s handwritten notation: “Mr. Bohlen For our 5 p m session. Ed Barrett”. (611.61/10–1951)

6. Document 798.
7. See Document 802.
8. For text of the McMahon-Ribicoff Resolution, see Document 786.