661.00/7–2751: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State 1
562. Re Dept intel July 23, 1 a.m.2 Emb ventures submit fol suggestions:
It seems to us at least possible that:
- (a)
- USSR may believe “peaceful co-existence” is possible at least temporarily.
- (b)
- USSR may also believe such temporary “peaceful co-existence” desirable (for its own purposes) and if so it may be willing to make concessions to reduce East-West tension, which, altho possibly not “genuine” in terms of ultimate Sov aims, still may be of sufficient substantive value to warrant very careful attention on our part.
- (c)
- Altho “genuine general retreat by USSR” undoubtedly is beyond bounds of present possibility, it does not necessarily follow that only alternative is a “course presupposing imminent mil showdown with West”. There may even be question now whether, for time being, Sovs will attempt further local aggressions thru satellites, since the risk of thereby precipitating gen conflict may now be greater than they care to incur, and USSR might seek course [Page 1617] which it wld calculate to be sufficiently conciliatory to lessen danger of showdown.
- (d)
- Such possibilities may afford us a much desired opportunity to take further step toward reduction of Sov threat without resort to gen war.
Whatever the ultimate objective, Sov leaders in past have unquestionably believed in possibility and desirability (for them) of at least temporary “peaceful co-existence” of Russia and our own world. This was, in fact, a major objective of Sov fon pol of 1920’s and 30’s—when weakness forced Sovs to seek peace, trade, and non-interference, in order to consolidate their domestic regime and program. There appears to be no conclusive reason for thinking they might not again appreciate advantages of such a policy. Is it not at least possible that Kremlin has now decided it wants another such period? Its various pol and mil adventures in past 3 years, by which it has attempted further to extend its orbit and which have brought it into direct collision with West, have had mixed results—it has achieved some successes, but on other hand its failures have been just as conspicuous, larger, and in sum heavier in the balance. It has, moreover, awakened Western world and aroused our determination (now being put into practical terms) to defend ourselves. Kremlin appears to be aware that it is not strong enough to challenge us in full war. (Emb’s info is, of course, not complete, but from such as we have we do not judge that state of Sov industry or its mil and air-def preparations indicate immed gen threat.) Sov power does not appear to be fully consolidated and secure in either Russia or, much less, satellites. It seems at least possible that Kremlin’s present conclusion may be to seek safer course now—to reenter a period of “peaceful co-existence”, during which it can attempt to strengthen itself, while at same time reckoning that West may relapse again into unprepared complacency or econ crises or both.
We are not in any sense suggesting that US shld place any trust whatsoever in any Sov “agreement”, be deceived by their lullaby or offer any “appeasement”. On contrary, our point is simply that we believe it at least possible that conclusions of reftel might result in attitude which might allow us to overlook opportunities which, if they do exist, surely we shld be alert to seize and exploit.
What appears to be situation in Chi may have practical bearing on this point and is of course, directly related to subj of reftel, i.e., Korean armistice. Commie Chi seems plainly more an ally, with some independence, than a fully subservient satellite, and Sov policy may have to be cut to some extent to fit Chi desires, e.g., Russia’s policy of careful “neutrality” in Korea was swept aside by Chi, and cld be reasserted only after Chi intervention failed. Chi [Page 1618] revolutionary fervor and implicit recklessness may well remain in conflict with Sov cautiousness. It seems at least conceivable that possible consequence of this might be that Russia, compelled to support more stubborn postures in Far East cld, on other hand, be forced by us to be more conciliatory in Eur, where satellites are more malleable.
A specific example of an opportunity possibly to be exploited is suggestion of an early London mtg of deps on Austrian treaty. We feel that at least as far as relationships between East and West are concerned we shld have nothing to lose by such a mtg. In the event that no substantive progress is made at least it cld be used to our propaganda advantage as it wld put the spotlight on Sov performance instead of promises. Main point however is that this wld be excellent opportunity to test out at a plenary council table the new Sov protestations of a desire to cooperate. We feel the timing is propitious and it is such an opportunity as we feel we shld now make every effort to exploit.