700.00(S)/7–2351: Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
Infotel. OIR Intelligence Estimate2 of world-wide reactions to, and consequences of, Korean armistice reaches fol conclusions: 1) primary immed aim of Kremlin is to frustrate western mobilization—particularly Ger and Jap rearmament, NATO defense program, and build up of US overseas bases—and if armistice is concluded USSR will pursue this aim by various diplomatic means; 2) USSR is unlikely to succeed in this aim after Korean armistice if US remains firm in its present policies; 3) believing peaceful co-existence impossible and that West might even employ “armed intervention” against USSR, USSR is unlikely make genuine concessions to reduce East-West tension as such course would shift balance of power; and 4) rather than execute genuine general retreat USSR will adopt course presupposing imminent mil showdown with West. OIR does not rule out possible Sov precipitation of such showdown, but it believes USSR is more likely to concentrate on maximizing its immed readiness for war and possibly utilizing local aggression to improve its strategic position.