No. 785

740.5/6–2551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

secret
priority

6233. For Spofford. Re Depto 1169.2 Following analysis Sov cold war tactics shld be read against background Deptel 5248, May 18 [15]3 and A–2396, June 16.4

USSR occupies unique position for conducting cold war since Kremlin (1) operates on premise of permanent conflict with non-Sov world; (2) can act “correctly” on governmental level while Commies resort to violence on unofficial level; (3) able act quickly, secretly and arbitrarily without reference to opinion legislature, special interest groups, public, or allies; (4) able use Commie ideology as moral fig leaf for own hostile actions and as idealistic magnet to attract for groups; (5) succeeded among some circles in identifying USSR with liberal slogans of peace, progress, democracy; (6) able coordinate own actions with single voice propaganda campaign; (7) can largely frustrate by own security measures non-Sov countermoves directed at Sov peoples.

Choice of instruments and tactics varies according to local situation, but all centered on single basic aim weakening non-Sov position either for Commie take-over local area or undermining potential enemy in event all-out war. Sov ability suddenly reverse tactics integral part of strategy rather than reflection any modification in basic objectives.

On official level Kremlin utilizes traditional diplomatic and mil moves, although Sov participation negotiations primarily directed toward dividing non-Sov powers and confusing world opinion. Threat of war implicit in Sov mil strength remains main weapon in official Sov arsenal. Korean situation shows USSR not even adverse having satellite undertake limited war, despite grave risks involved.

On unofficial level worldwide network Commie and front organizations gives USSR unique advantage local fol in many countries. Mass Commie parties can play pol role to stimulate disunity, party hard core provides paramilitary potential, and together with crypto-Commies, apparatus for espionage and sabotage. Parties and [Page 1607] local friendship with USSR societies provide local-language dissemination Sov propaganda. Local and international front organizations directed at attracting by use liberal slogans special groups—labor, women, youth, intellectuals—to support Sov aims by bringing pol pressure on local govts. Commie emphasis on infiltration trade unions designed not only provide level for dislocation local economy but also control strategic unions—communications, transportation, armaments—to increase sabotage potential in event war.

Kremlin also attempts capture nationalist movements in colonial or former colonial areas which have attained independence in order eliminate influence capitalist powers and deny to them natural resources vital to western world. Since 1949 use armed force obtain revolutionary aims proclaimed central policy, notably in Far East.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Klosson (DRS), cleared by Barnard (EUR) and Davis (EUR/EE), and approved for transmission by Martin (EUR/RA). (740.5/6–2551)
  2. Telegram Depto 1169 requested guidance on Soviet cold war tactics.
  3. Document 776.
  4. Document 782.