No. 776

740.5/5–551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

top secret

5248. For Achilles from Barnard. Re Depto 888.2 Pursuant WG suggestion of brief prelim exchange views on USSR you may wish offer fol. As stated reftel we have left mil aspects for SG consideration.

1. General

Sov leaders in seeking Commie world order under Kremlin domination have clearly shown they consider selves engaged in unceasing and inescapable struggle against all non-Commie countries, particularly US, and regard struggle as essentially state of war in which to destroy “enemy” any tactic or weapon that promises success is admissible.

USSR committed to policy constant hostility toward non-Commies because (1) ideology teaches collapse capitalism not automatic, but must be brought about by active struggle; (2) since Sov power position rests on world Commie network as well as natl resources, [Page 1588] Kremlin compelled preserve militancy followers by deliberately generating hostility. Any prolonged relaxation hostility line wld weaken aggressiveness fon Commies and consequently dilute Sov power position. Basic policy change excluded since USSR cannot undertake genuine reconciliation with West without jettisoning Commie ideology and thereby weakening own power position.

2. Political

a. Stability of regime. Despite strains inherent in totalitarian prison-state, Sov Govt at present probably more secure than at any time since 1917. No signs dissension within CP sufficient weaken Party apparatus. No signs instability in Govt. Most postwar governmental reorganizations and personnel changes appeared designed increase efficiency. No signs either intention or capability armed forces challenge Party supremacy. Stalin’s death will present serious difficulties but situation surrounding present Politburo appears less conducive to major split than at time Lenin’s death.

b. Areas of discontent. Low living standard, which only moderately raised since war, produces continued dissatisfaction and lassitude on part many people, but no signs any organized opposition groups capable threatening Politburo control. Peasants probably least willing accept Sov conditions with recently collectivized peasants in Western areas most dissatisfied. These however together with natl minorities, workers, intelligentsia and religious groups subject pervasive police controls and lack capability offering organized threat.

3. Economic

No shortage raw materials likely cripple Sov war effort, but supply situation, despite stockpiling, wld be critical for certain ferro-alloys, industrial diamonds, tin, lead, and in long run natural rubber.

Sov economy with completion Fourth Five Year Plan shows substantial progress in output basic industrial raw materials and industrial machinery as result primary emphasis on development heavy industry. Agriculture and consumers’ goods goals unfulfilled. Comparison Sov and Western production for 1950 shows: (1) gross natl income, billion dollars, USSR, 70; including satellites 112.1; US, 281.4; including West, 433.7. (2) Crude steel, million metric tons, USSR, 25.4; including satellites, 33; US, 87.7; including West, 142.3. (3) Crude oil, million metric tons, USSR, 38; including satellites, 46.1; US, 266.2; including West, 459.1. (4) Primary aluminum, million metric tons, USSR, 180; including satellites, 192.5; US, 652.1; including West, 1,266.5.

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Economy expected continue expansion, although perhaps at slower rate than during past three years. In long war economy likely suffer from shortages complex machine tools, some types electronic and precision equipment, special-purpose bearings, replacement parts.

Sov manpower adequate for continued development economy. Intensive training program continues overcome shortage skilled labor, technicians, managers. Productivity lower than in US but apparently improving. Sov transportation, mostly rail, heavily taxed with little reserves and in wartime wld be subject critical strain despite improvisation measures.

Total agricultural output still somewhat below prewar. Postwar upward trend may be initially affected by program for merger collectives launched early 1950. Major deficiency remains livestock and animal products. Present general diet about equal to prewar in number calories, but consists even larger extent cereals and potatoes. In wartime draft power (animal and mechanical) likely be main bottleneck.

In event war USSR enjoys certain advantages. Controlled Sov economy including manpower already virtually mobilized for war and always concentrated on armaments and heavy industry. Sov leaders therefore can make quick production shifts and devote unusually large proportion total output to war since consumers needs have never been major influence in shaping Sov economy. Although present mobilized character Sov economy means less chance increase Sov production in wartime compared to US with its still five day work week and generally masculine labor force, fact remains USSR conducted World War II with annual steel availability of less than 10 million tons.

Refurtel last para additional info on polit side may be found in series briefing papers prepared recently for possible CFM (especially docs D–1/14, D–3/4, and D–7/4a3) and in fol vols which shld be available Emb library: Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 80th Congress, Second Session); Background Information on Soviet Union in International Relations (Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 81st Congress, Second Session); and article entitled “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in July 1947 issue of publication Foreign Affairs. [Barnard.]

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Klosson (DRS) and Barnard (EUR), cleared in draft by Reinhardt (EUR/EE) and Davis (EUR/EE), and approved for telegraphic transmission by Bon-bright (EUR) who also signed for the Secretary. Repeated to Paris for Bohlen.
  2. Telegram Depto 888 reported that a discussion of the USSR by the North Atlantic Council Deputies was expected to begin on May 16. A working group had proposed that the discussions aim at providing a picture of current strengths and weaknesses, the importance of the threat posed by Soviet policy and military strength, and the political and economic conditions which might obtain in the USSR in case of war. The working group had proposed an outline for the discussions. (740.5/5–551) Discussions were actually delayed until June; see telegram Depto 1115 from London, Document 779.
  3. The papers cited here, none printed, are part of the RPTS D series (documents relating to possible talks with the Soviets) prepared in the Department of State in preparation for a possible session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and are included in CFM files, lot M–88, RPTS D. RPTS D–1/14, February 2, was a 28-page paper entitled “World Communism as an Instrument of Soviet Power”. RPTS D–3/4, January 14, was entitled “Soviet Pressures on Yugoslavia”.