Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 766

661.00/2–1951: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Kirk) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Moscow, February 19, 1951—1 p.m.

1528. In speculating on timing of Stalin’s discussion of important international questions in Pravda interview² we believe his remarks may have been calculated to (a) establish favorable general popular attitude toward Soviet position in prospective CFM exploratory talks,³ thus in a sense anticipating our latest note this subject; (b) give new momentum to “peace” drive on eve World Peace Council meeting;⁴ (c) make manifest reasonableness and righteousness of Soviet policy for benefit of Soviet orbit population and wavering Communists abroad; (d) nourish certain popular dissatisfaction abroad at economic burdens of rearmament; (e) widen split focussed in UN between Asiatic and NATO Western Hemisphere countries; or (f) even to forestall damaging influence of proposed Congressional resolution on friendship with Russian people.⁵

Most significant aspect of interview is discussion of inevitability of war. Remarks here constitute sequel to those in Stassen 1947 interview where Stalin⁶ pictured unwillingness of capitalist world to cooperate as obstacle to peaceful coexistence between Communist and capitalist systems. Now he asserts that peace can be maintained if the people take the cause into their own hands and carry it through to the end. War can become inevitable if deception practiced by warmongers is successful. This clarifies Soviet propaganda line on this subject which until recently consistently stressed theme that peace forces would be victorious over war camp and constitutes notice to Soviet people and others that war is possibility.

Taken as whole, interview appears to convey message that in spite of Western charges to contrary in connection with its call for CFM on German remilitarization, USSR is willing to discuss other issues contributing to present state of tension on international scene including reduction of armaments, prohibition of atomic weapons and Korean settlement. However, UN where USSR is automatically outvoted and where CPR, major interested power, has been declared aggressor, is no longer realistic forum. Soviet Government has offered and still offers Big Five peace pact through which all such problems can be solved. If people unable make reactionary governments see this and act accordingly, war may become inevitable.

Door is reopened slightly for peaceful settlement on Korea. This may reflect some Soviet pressure on CPR in view Chou En-lai’s statements that passage UN “aggressor” resolution had removed any such possibilities. Stalin’s complimentary references to Anglo-American generalship and fighting ability suggests he is offering prospect of “honorable” settlement in which neither side need lose face. In view his observation on UN, CPR membership that body becomes less important but their participation in settlement on Korea and US withdrawal from Formosa appear indispensable conditions by implication.

While holding out prospect for discussion above problems looking toward real settlement, Stalin at same time makes standard Soviet “big lie” case for public consumption in his claim that peaceful orientation has prevailed in USSR since 1945 and his description of Korean war as defense by Korea and China against American aggression.

Stalin’s comments on UN suggest fundamental change in his attitude toward that organization. Until at least end of fifth GA, in spite of heavy criticism of manner in which UN was functioning, basis of Soviet position was his assertion that UN was most important instrument for maintenance of peace. Now he says it is organization acting in interests of American aggressors and being transformed into weapon of war. Presumably Stalin is implying that only peace pact between five permanent SC members can reestablish its moral authority and avoid Soviet bloc withdrawal. Implications are that Asiatic states which have been predicting Soviet withdrawal as result of passage “action for peace” and “aggressor” resolutions might also be impelled to leave the thirty-state “aggressor nucleus” behind in the organization or similar move.

From propaganda standpoint, Stalin’s answers to questions posed are crammed with material for Communist psychological warfare activities. Argument concerning detrimental effect of maintenance of large military establishment on any country’s economy bears special import for Western European peoples, particularly British. Comments on quality of fighting by Anglo-Americans in Korea foster ideas tending to set soldiers against officers and people against governments and are perhaps particularly designed to appeal to isolation sentiment in US. As mentioned above observations concerning UN serve to encourage split of Asiatic states away from NATO-Western Hemisphere groups. India’s longing to play role in international affairs commensurate with population and geographic location is cultivated blatantly in this answer. Stalin’s remarks about fighting abilities of Anglo-Americans run sharply counter to consistent Communist propaganda line since Korea that they are poor soldiers which was apparently taken to build up self-confidence of Soviet troops.

Of incidental interest is reference to price decreases which may contain intimation that one is impending for March as frequently predicted here.

May be said that in this interview, Stalin has involved his reputation for superior wisdom in much more sophistry than has prevailed in previous such expositions. This may reflect greater degree of vulnerability of Soviets on issues involved or feeling of Soviet leaders that Stalin authority may be margin needed to assure popular support abroad for Soviet foreign policy positions or that his intervention will cause sufficient confusion to pave way for success in any adventure to be undertaken in near future.⁷

Kirk

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
2. See the editorial note, supra.
3. For documentation concerning the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris, March–June 1951, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.
4. The World Peace Council, established by the Second World Peace Congress held in Warsaw in November 1950, held its first session in Berlin, February 21–26. For expressions of U.S. policy toward the World Peace Council, see the circular airgrams, Documents 625 and 629.
5. Regarding the proposed Congressional resolution, see Secretary Acheson’s letter to Senator Connally, Document 769.
6. For an account of this interview, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iv, pp. 552–553.

7. Telegram 1537 from Moscow, February 19, offered the following additional commentary on Stalin’s statements:

   “In considering desirable US and free world strategy in light Stalin’s Pravda pronouncements we believe that as we interpret his statements (Embtel 1528, February 19), he is in essence endeavoring to recapture a measure of diplomatic initiative which has been taken from him through effective inauguration of Western defense program and that it is consequently important that that program be continued vigorously.

   “Concomitantly the further formulation and presentation in appropriate forums of concrete Western proposals for reasonable solution in accordance with free world principles of problems causing international tension should have increasing effect of counteracting those aspects of Stalin’s edict addressed psychologically toward capitalizing on situations of confusion and uncertainty which Soviets seek to create.” (661.00/2–1951)