762A.5/2–451:Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Barbour) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
1457. Eyes only for Byroade, Bruce, Gifford and McCloy. I concur that if we are to have any appreciable hope of eventual achievement of Western oriented united Germany, consolidation of Europe including at least West Germany and creation of strong West defenses are conditions precedent unification. (Frankfort’s telegram 6261, January 29, repeated Moscow 87, Paris 575, London 524.2) Soviet efforts to obtain weak neutralized united Germany as evidenced by Grotewohl letter, GDR Parliament approach, et cetera, [Page 1530] are impressive and appear to us to have fertile field Soviet exploitation among German and European opinion.
Presentation of a concrete plan of wide scope and obviously addressed towards relaxation of principal points of tension should go far to retain initiative which has lain with us since formation of Atlantic Pact organization and to counter dangerous European “neutralist” sentiment. As for nature plan, idea of establishing defense ceiling is attractive. However, while limiting proposals to creation parity of forces in Germany would, I agree, be inadvisable for reasons stated and also would seem inadequate to meet broader considerations of present world or even European power situation, I am apprehensive of proposal envisaging ceiling on total East-West forces. There is every evidence that whatever they are prepared to do Soviets are not and will not be seriously disposed to effect reduction or limitation their own forces. If that is the case, specific limitation on US forces could dangerously threaten indefinite continuation on present disparity in East-West balance. However, it is conceivable that Soviets might be receptive to some arrangement whereby integrated European forces would be limited to level precluding possibility of European attack on USSR. If such level could at same time be sufficient to constitute major deterrent to Soviet attack against Europe, there might be basis for at least a temporary détente.
Possibly a formula for such limitation could be found in offering to establish definite limits on the Atlantic Treaty force but at the same time excluding limitations on national military establishments. In return for a limitation of this kind we would demand a packaged agreement on part of Soviets to solutions Austrian treaty, non-neutralized unification of Germany, German peace treaty, et cetera.
Whether Soviets disposed reach settlement this basis or not it seems to me psychological effect of proposal on European neutralist and lukewarm sentiment would be good and Soviet refusal would emphasize spuriousness their expressions of apprehension over alleged aggressive intent NAT. To extent there is any foundation to their expressed apprehensions, they might be inclined toward agreement.
From standpoint possible adverse effect western limitation on NATO force on present power position, I assume it unlikely in any case that European components of defense force will in reasonable future reach level above that envisaged in proposed limit and that European countries will not be in position to create national military establishments appreciably above contributions to NATO force. In effect, therefore, limitation of this nature would be little [Page 1531] more than stabilization by agreement of situation which is likely to prevail in practice in any event.
In essence we would be capitalizing on the area of strength we have achieved by the creation of the NAT structure to seek at best a satisfactory resolution of basic European problems causing tension and at least the further exposure of Soviet imperialist designs. In extension of both these objectives we might well couple package proposal with renewal expression our desire continue efforts through established bodies toward general East-West reduction armaments.
It is obvious, of course, that whatever relaxation of tensions might result from a satisfactory accord along above lines, we would merely have succeeded in stabilizing military position in one area, albeit important. In line with general Soviet objectives we could expect no let-up in Soviet war effort against the free world in the fields of political, psychological, or economic warfare, nor in Soviet military assistance to its lackeys outside Europe.
- Repeated to Paris, London, and Frankfurt. There was no answer to this telegram.↩
- For text, see vol. iii, Part 1, p. 1068.↩