264.1111–Vogeler, Robert A./5–251: Despatch
The Minister in Hungary ( Davis ) to the Department of State
No. 737
Subject: The Vogeler Case
The Vogeler case, which has colored Hungarian-American relations for the past year and a half, has finally reached a satisfactory [Page 1460] conclusion and it may not be amiss to review the protracted negotiations and consider their implications. For ready reference a time table of the principal events is inserted at this point.1
Analysis of the foregoing reveals that what may have been uppermost in the minds of the Hungarians from the very beginning of negotiations for Vogeler’s release was the question of radio interference. The Vienna journalist’s brain child—that Hungary was demanding St. Stephen’s Crown—provided an opportunity to raise the ante had they so desired; and for a while it appeared that they did so desire. The American “concessions” on consulates and travel documents merely restore the position before Vogeler’s arrest. They were on the verge of getting restitution, and they knew it. In other words, they have gained nothing—and demanded nothing—in exchange for Vogeler beyond shifting the Hungarian medium wave broadcasts of the Voice from 251 to 314 meters and their place of origin from Munich to Salonika.
It should be noted, however, that while the reopening of Hungarian consulates in the United States merely restores the status quo ante, it is a step which the Hungarians evidently very much desired. This has been made clear in conversations at various times during the negotiations and in the urgent attention reportedly being given by the Foreign Office to recruiting consular staffs even before Vogeler was out of the country. Thus one act of retaliation at least—the closing of the consulates—seems to have exerted useful pressure.
The composition of the proposed restitution mission to our Zone of Occupation also suggests that the Hungarians were willing to pay a fairly high price for permission for it to enter Germany—not necessarily for the sole purpose of taking possession of restitutable property.
This is not to suggest that Vogeler was arrested and his trial staged as a devious means of breaking up Voice Interference with their own Radio Petofi. Surely more direct and less troublesome means could have been found. As a matter of fact, the interference problem was to a considerable extent artificially created by the Hungarians themselves. The motive for Vogeler’s arrest and trial was something else.
I retain my belief that the motive, insofar as the initiative was Hungarian, for Vogeler’s arrest and conviction was: first, to demonstrate the power of the communists to persecute a prominent representative of American big business with impunity; second, to lay the foundation for enforcing a drastic reduction in the size of this mission; and, third, to pave the way for nationalization of the few [Page 1461] remaining but fairly important foreign (i.e. Western) industrial enterprises in Hungary.
As to the first of these assumed objectives, the Hungarian Government certainly succeeded brilliantly. It produced Vogeler in open court, appearing perfectly normal, and broadcast to the whole country his full confession, in his own natural voice, of crimes we know he did not commit, and his abject plea for mercy in terms we do not recognize as characteristic of the man.
As to the second, it succeeded partially, but fast footwork on our part forestalled serious damage and, to be completely frank, led to results reasonably satisfactory to ourselves.
As to the third, it also scored a success, but of minor importance. It is a safe assumption that nationalization was inevitable in any event. All that was accomplished was perhaps to hasten it somewhat and to provide some justification for the benefit of Hungarian public opinion.
The motives of the Kremlin, skulking always in the background of Hungarian foreign affairs (and indeed domestic affairs as well) are less obvious. The demonstration that a satellite government has the power to push an American citizen around was certainly not unpleasing. The support given by Vogeler’s confession to the anti-imperialist, hate-America, expose-the-warmongers campaign must also have caused smiles of satisfaction in Moscow. Whether there was some further and deeper motive I could not say, although the temptation is strong to suspect a pinch of pure cussedness in the recipe for every Moscow brew.
Why this particular time was chosen, by the Hungarians or by the Soviets, to agree to Vogeler’s release—and without gaining the gratuitously offered point regarding St. Stephen’s Crown—is somewhat of a mystery. True, the Hungarian Government obtained its desire to silence the Hungarian broadcasts of the VOA from Munich on 251 meters; but the Voice is still heard—and for the present at least without interference—through other channels. Again, the Hungarians were on notice that the absence of an agreement for Vogeler’s release before May 1 would result in liquidation of restitutable Hungarian property in Germany; but while they talk of that property in large figures they must realize that its value is not great. It will be recalled that more than a year ago Rakosi himself indicated to me his knowledge that its value had greatly decreased. Perhaps the best explanation of their timing is their realization that they had attained their principal objective and that the American Government would make no further concessions. If this be correct, the question for them was simply whether to accept the price we offered as the best obtainable or be left with Vogeler on their hands indefinitely. They had played us against [Page 1462] the British for months. Having reached an impasse with the latter, they may have decided to try the leverage of an aroused British public opinion to obtain a favorable trade agreement in exchange for Sanders.2 For it is to be expected that if the American chief victim is released on relatively easy terms while his second string British associate remains in prison, the British press will want to know why and questions will be asked in Parliament of a none too stable government.
Both my British colleague3 and I have held to the belief, ever since the Hungarian government first indicated a willingness to negotiate more than a year ago, that having extracted the maximum propaganda value from the trial and public confessions of Vogeler and Sanders, the victims became, in Hungarian eyes, no more than commodities to be exchanged for the highest acceptable price. It thus became our problem to determine what we could afford to pay, having due consideration for political and strategic, as well as economic, effects in the broad international field, and to discover how low a price, within these limits, the Hungarians would consider (or be permitted to consider) adequate. In the case of Vogeler the answer was found in changing the Voice wave length. Thus we come once more to the conclusion that the Voice was the really important consideration in their minds, so far as Vogeler is concerned. In the case of Sanders we believed that the answer was to be found in the resumption of negotiations for a trade agreement; but after some months of bargaining on this basis the Hungarians injected a condition which the British have so far been unwilling, from consideration of global interests, to meet.
An interesting postscript to this line of reasoning has been furnished by my Belgian colleague. He had an appointment to see Mr. Berei on April 23, two days after the Hungarian announcement of an agreement with us for Vogeler’s release. He had sought that interview in order to renew the Belgian government’s previous [Page 1463] appeal for executive clemency for a Belgian subject serving a sentence of life imprisonment for espionage. M. de Caritat de Peruzzis asked whether the recent announcement of Vogeler’s impending release might foreshadow a disposition to greater leniency in other similar cases. Mr. Berei replied quite frankly (according to my Belgian colleague) that the Hungarian government had no interest in Vogeler, Sanders, the Belgian woman or any other alleged spy; but would await an offer from the Belgian government. It was for that Government to produce a quid pro quo—the Hungarians would weigh it.
There was probably also an element of national pride in the Hungarian calculations. They have negotiated with a great power of the West and struck a bargain by which they obtained certain things they wanted. They were able to publish a statement under the headline “Hungarian-American Negotiations” with no hint that any other power was in any way involved. They are in a position, which undoubtedly they will exploit before their own public, to make it appear that they forced the American Government to grant certain things which it had “illegally” withheld. Finally, they will have the satisfaction of again displaying the Hungarian flag on consulates in two large American cities.
It may well be that a very important element in the Hungarian position was no more than the personal prestige of one man—Matyas Rakosi. It will be recalled that at my interview with him on March 25, 1950, he raised the question of radio interference, quite emphatically but not specifically as a condition for Vogeler’s release. It will also be recalled that several times during the ensuing protracted negotiations Berei reminded me of Mr. Rakosi’s personal interest in this matter. Finally, once we announced that we had taken unilateral action to remove the interference complained of, the Hungarian Government quickly came to terms and dropped the question of the crown in an almost casual manner. Thus Rakosi has again shown his associates, at home and abroad, that he knows how to get what he wants even to the extent of forcing a great power to his will. The Hungarians could have gone a long way to removing the interference without any action on our part; or they could have accepted our offer of joint action by our respective engineers. But Rakosi wanted the interference wiped out and he wanted it done his way. He got his way and we got Vogeler.
Perhaps the sum total of these reasons was sufficient to move the Hungarians to an agreement. They do not, however, explain why the Soviet government should permit such agreement. There is, of course, no direct evidence that the Soviet Government has played any part or taken any interest in the Vogeler case, but it would be naive to suppose that it has not at least been consulted. It [Page 1464] must therefore be assumed that the Soviet Government, for reasons of its own, was not unwilling that Hungary reach any agreement with the United States at this time or specifically that Vogeler be released on the terms we offered. We do not know what effect was produced in the Kremlin by the approach, on humanitarian grounds, made by our High Commissioner in Austria to his Soviet colleague and I can only speculate as to Soviet reasoning or motives in the premises. Does the Kremlin see in agreement with the Americans but continued deadlock with the British a possible wedge to drive us apart? Does it hope to increase pressure on the British for an Anglo-Hungarian trade agreement including the much-sought-after copper? Does it hope to give a lift to drooping Hungarian spirits? Does it consider the enforced shift in VOA broadcasting channels a precedent for similar and more effective action elsewhere—or a genuine victory over the Voice? As viewed from Budapest, any or all of these considerations could have played a part in Soviet thinking.
Action requested:
Department please send copies to AmEmbassies at Moscow, London, Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, AmLegations at Vienna and Bucharest.
- Not printed.↩
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Edgar Sanders, a British citizen and a representative in Hungary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, was, like Robert Vogeler, arrested by Hungarian authorities in November 1949 on suspicion of espionage and subsequently held incommunicado. With Vogeler and four Hungarian codefendants, Sanders was tried and convicted by a Hungarian court in February 1950 of espionage and other crimes against the Hungarian state, and was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.
The Hungarian Government had suggested that Sanders might be released if the British would, in a new trade agreement, guarantee that Hungary would receive certain quantities of copper and lead. The British Government informed Hungary in early February 1951 it was prepared, upon the release of Sanders, to begin negotiations with Hungary for a new trade agreement but that no assurance could be given Hungary of the receipt of any specific commodities. (Memorandum of conversation by Campbell, February 6, 641.64/2–651)
↩ - Geoffrey Arnold Wallinger, British Minister in Hungary until June 1951.↩