Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 718

749.00/12–651: Despatch

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Briggs) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 178

Praha, December 6, 1951.

Subject: Arrest of Rudolf Slansky, Former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Events leading to the arrest of Rudolf Slansky on November 27, 1951¹ had their roots in the serious conflict which arose from the duality of authority between the real head of the Party, Slansky, and the head of the Government, Gottwald, who, although party chairman, permitted Slansky for the most part to direct and control Czech CP activities. The importance of this divergence of authority was brought into sharp focus as a result of the political and economic crisis which occurred in the twelve months period beginning September 1950.

At that time, the Prime Minister in a speech to the miners announced that henceforth bonuses would only be paid to the extent that management and workers saved an equal amount of money by increasing individual productivity. This statement signaled the end of the honeymoon for Czech workers. In November a Five Year Trade Agreement was signed with Russia substantially increasing Czech exports and necessitating the introduction of a super-plan to replace the last three years of the Czech Five Year Plan. A revaluation of norms followed shortly thereafter, and for the year 1951 individual work targets were raised considerably above previous levels. By spreading the application of the wage fund system to all important and critical sections of industry, wages tended to be frozen or even reduced if workers could not meet the raised targets.

In June the worker’s problem in maintaining his 1950 standard of living became more difficult as shortages in meat, dairy products and even summer fruits and vegetables appeared. Bread rationing had already been re-instituted when the Soviet Union temporarily halted grain shipments to Czechoslovakia as a penalty for the failure of the Czech Government to deliver goods as scheduled in the trade agreement. By mid-summer serious and widespread dissatisfaction was evident among wide masses of the workers including party members. At the same time, the nation was falling further behind in its economic program. In an effort to force workers to increase individual output, rations were reduced and the prices of free market goods, which could only be purchased by workers who received a bonus for exceeding the plan, were raised. To meet the acute problem of a manpower shortage, 77,500 office workers were drafted for industry. The net effect of all of these measures was to lower the standard of living of many workers.

Dissatisfaction within the party was fostered by two developments. Firstly, higher officials became uneasy as a result of the purges which Slansky carried through after the Sling-Svermova plot to capture the party was exposed and after the arrest of Clementis.² Secondly, as stated above, the rank and file party members were disillusioned by the deliberate policy of the government to trap them between higher norms and higher prices of free market foodstuffs which were essential for families who wished to live better than on a bare subsistence level.

The most important manifestation of growing discontent was found in the unwillingness of workers to cooperate in the government’s effort to increase individual productivity. Absenteeism in the mines rose at an alarming rate after the September 1950 bonuses were paid and continued to be a serious problem throughout the following year. In other important sectors of production the government faced a similar problem. Volunteer industrial workers left their posts as rapidly as new workers were engaged. Shock-workers maintaining a high level of output risked being ostracized, or worse, by their fellow-workers. Apathy to party discipline, to political indoctrination courses, to attendance at compulsory party meetings, etc. was indicative of the deterioration of party morale.

Against this background of (1) Soviet dissatisfaction over Czecho’s failure to deliver heavy industrial products as provided for in the trade agreement, (2) a sharp decline in the morale of party members and (3) widespread and increasingly evident discontent among the workers, the division of authority between Slansky and Gottwald became an acute issue. As Secretary General of the Communist Party, Slansky bore the major responsibility for the decline in party morale and shared the responsibility for the poor production record. Apparently, the Moscow time table for Czechoslovakia placed major, in fact overriding, emphasis on the economic program.

By the summer of 1951 Slansky had ceased to be an indispensable man. Gottwald had taken advantage of the purge to place his own men in many key positions in the party hierarchy. The September 1951 reorganization of the government³ saw the old-guard led by Slansky, replaced by a new group which appeared to be better qualified to develop a program for Czechoslovakia based on the premise that increased production and increased deliveries to the Soviet Union were the most important tasks of the Czech CP and Government. In the new set-up there was no place for the former party Secretary General. He had antagonized the rank and file of the party membership by his autocratic control of party matters. He was discredited by the Sling-Svermova expose and, as one of the most unpopular men in the party was a target for the criticism of the many dissatisfied workers. (In this criticism there may have been an element of anti-semitism.) He had shown no marked success in the program to expand the socialist development of rural areas despite the fact he had personally directed much of the rural planning. With respect to CP cadre policy, which he controlled through Kohler and personal intervention, he had blocked the appointment of many technically capable men to important positions in all ministries, including those charged with the fulfillment of the economic plan. Most significantly, the importance of his role as the voice of the Kremlin diminished sharply when the Soviets began sending their own nationals to Czecho as supervisors and consultants.

There are thus a number of convincing reasons to believe that Slansky was removed for incompetence and because of his personal unpopularity.⁴ A brilliant man, well versed in all of the bloody intrigue of Communist Party politics, he also was probably too dangerous to the new regime in general and President Gottwald in particular to permit him to retain his freedom. His arrest is no loss to the party or to the Kremlin. Both the opposition and the majority of the party members are pleased with the action taken against him. Czechoslovakia’s loyalty to Moscow is in no way affected. On the other hand, the Embassy sees no reason to anticipate any significantly important results favorable to the Soviet Union as a consequence of his arrest. Gottwald is now undisputed leader but at the same time his responsibility for future failures is also clearly established.

There is transmitted herewith a translation of a Neue Zurcher Zeitung article on this subject.⁵ The article attributes Slansky’s downfall to (1) the unsatisfactory record in the coal mines (2) tension in the Army (3) Moscow’s consideration for Czech sensitiveness on the issue of Jews occupying a disproportionate number of prominent positions and (4) Moscow’s preference for less clever men who can be relied upon more than Slansky.

With respect to point (4) above, the Embassy believes there is ample evidence to prove that Slansky has always been a loyal servant of the Kremlin.

For the Ambassador:

Alexander Schnee

First Secretary of Embassy

1. The Czechoslovak Government announced on November 27 that former Czechoslovak Communist Party Secretary General Slansky had been arrested on charges of participating in anti-State activities.
2. See telegram 546 from Praha, Document 668.
3. On September 6 the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee announced a reorganization of the party apparatus including the abolishment of the post of party Secretary General and the transfer of the functions of that official (Slansky) to Party Chairman Gottwald. Soon thereafter a Czechoslovak Government reorganization was announced. Slansky, who had not until then held any government post, was named Deputy Prime Minister.

4. Joint Weeka 48, November 30, prepared by State, Army, and Air elements of the Embassy in Praha, commented upon Slansky’s arrest as follows:

   “Emb inclined to maintain view action against Slansky initiated in Czechoslovakia and that Soviet approval was based on incompetent manner in which he has led party support, and on deterioration economic position to point where active expression disapproval by workers steadily increasing.” (749.00(W)/11–3051)

5. Dated November 29, not printed here.