Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 713

249.1111–Oatis, William/10–3151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Briggs) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret
niact

Praha, October 31, 1951—6 p.m.

363. Re Embtel 362, Oct 31.²

A. Will limit approach as suggested Deptels 255 and 257 Oct 30³ unless new instrs recd prior mtg.

B. Agree primary purpose mtg is initiate negots Oatis’ release. But in order avoid loss time, initial discussion shld:

(1) Show Czechs practical basis for negotiation exists.

(2) Clearly present broad outline US attitude. Minimum effort achieve (1) may in my opinion require acceptance view set forth in Embtel 360, Oct 30.⁴ It wld appear from Prochazka press statement Sept 25⁵ and subsequent discussion thereof Czech press, that there is little prospect Oatis’ release unless US prepared revoke at least some of retaliatory measures that is, “remove pressure” (Embtel 273, Oct 2⁶).

I accordingly propose inform Siroky at outset that US recognizes importance from Czech point of view of avoiding appearance acting under pressure, but that Czechoslovakia must recognize equally the importance from Amer point of view of avoiding appearance of “paying ransom or blackmail for Oatis”. Insofar as appears commensurate with objectives (1) and (2), I wld seek avoid more detailed discussion of specific issues.

C. As re general aspects negots, believe we wld make serious mistake if we approached problem in bargaining frame of mind. Either Czechoslovakia has reached point where Commie leaders believe it in their interest to release Oatis, or they have not. Bargaining or poker approach might encourage Czechs to try to broaden negots to include RFE, VOA or GATT and might tend create precisely situation with which Dept concerned in first para Deptel 257, Oct 30.⁷ Contrary to bargaining we believe we shld be prepared to indicate at early date what US will and will not do to obtain Oatis’ release.

D. Fol summarizes our understanding US position main issues which may arise during negotiation:

1. Measures US might take unilaterally:

(a) Renew processing Consular invoices.⁸

(b) Validation US passports for travel Czechoslovakia (possibly of little or no interest to Czechoslovakia).

(c) Cancel those US export restrictions applied to Czechoslovakia in retaliation Oatis’ arrest (we understand this narrow fringe compared restrictions of gen applicability which are not susceptible removal).

2. Measure US cld take only in concert with other nations: CSA overflights West Ger.

3. Not open for discussion: Basic East–West trade policy, GATT, VOA and RFE and steel mill.⁹

Wld appreciate learning whether Emb’s understanding these points is correct.¹⁰

Briggs

1. Secretary of State Acheson was in Europe from late October until early December as head of the U.S. Delegation at the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly at Paris beginning November 6 and later as head of the U.S. Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council held at Rome, November 24–28.
2. Telegram 362 reported that Ambassador Briggs had arranged to meet with Foreign Minister Široký on November 1. (249.1111–Oatis, William/10–3151)
3. Department of State instructions to guide Briggs in his meeting with Široký were transmitted in telegrams 251, October 26, and 255 and 257, October 30, to Praha. Briggs was to raise with Široký the possibility, first mentioned in July by Ambassador Procházka, of exchanging Oatis for a Czechoslovak national imprisoned by American authorities in West Germany or even broader arrangement involving the exchange of several Americans for several Czechoslovak prisoners. Were Široký to raise the question of what other steps might follow such a prisoner exchange, Briggs was only to intimate further actions for the improvement of relations between the two countries. (249.1111–Oatis, William/10–2651 and 10–3051)
4. In telegram 360, Briggs proposed that in view of Široký’s imminent departure for the U.N. General Assembly session in Paris, it might be necessary to make maximum headway in the first negotiating session by being more specific in the intimation of withdrawal of American economic measures against Czechoslovakia following Oatis’ release. (249.1111–Oatis, William/10–3051)
5. See footnote 3, supra.
6. Not printed.
7. Not printed, see footnote 3 above.
8. See telegram 79 to Praha, Document 694.
9. In 1947 Czechoslovakia placed an order in the United States for steel rolling mill equipment (estimated value $16 million). By 1948 delivery of the steel mill was precluded by the U.S. system of export controls. Telegram 282 to Praha, November 28, reported that despite the Department’s efforts to preserve secrecy, the national metalworking weekly newspaper Iron Age contained a brief article suggesting that the steel mill might be used in trade for Oatis’ freedom. The Department was seeking to answer inquiries from the press on the matter by maintaining that the disposition of the steel mill would be decided upon apart from the Oatis case. (249.1111–Oatis, William/11–2851)
10. Telegram 259 to Praha, October 31, stated that Briggs’ understanding of the main issues in the negotiations was generally correct. The Department was, however, concerned that any concrete offers to relax unilateral measures taken against Czechoslovakia might result in the United States being put initially in a poor bargaining position. The Department was therefore anxious to limit the first negotiation to the offer for the exchange of prisoners. (249.1111–Oatis, William/10–3151)