Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 693

249.1111–Oatis, William/8–151

Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹

secret

Washington, August 1, 1951.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: The Oatis Case

The basic strategy we are working on in our efforts to secure the release of Mr. Oatis is to provide Ambassador Briggs a group of coercive measures of varying intensity and also with authority to inform the Czechoslovaks that we are prepared to put into effect these measures if they were unwilling to release Oatis. Secrecy as to what the measures are and when they will be brought to bear seems desirable for two reasons:

(1) The weapons available to us do not appear to be decisive and, by introducing an element of uncertainty as to what the next step will be, we maximize the impact of the various measures.

(2) We fear that an overt display of force on our part in the nature of an ultimatum may freeze the Czechoslovaks in their present position and reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of obtaining Oatis’ release.

This strategy may be imperiled if various resolutions and bills pending in both the House and Senate, many of which call for the termination of commercial and diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, should be acted upon by the Congress. We are deeply interested in maintaining freedom of action and secrecy, in so far as possible, as to our basic strategy and the measures we intend to employ. On the other hand, the fact that resolutions have been offered, which indicate the seriousness with which the United States and the Congress view this action, is helpful in emphasizing to the Czechoslovaks that we are determined to obtain the release of Oatis.

In order to avoid legislation on this subject and to indicate that the Administration does have a program to the end of securing Oatis’ release, it may be useful for you to discuss with the leaders of Congress our basic strategy and the coercive measures we have assembled for use.

In addition to securing Oatis’ release by exchanging him for one or more Czechoslovak prisoners in the U.S. Zone of Germany, a vigorous demand for the release of Oatis to the new Czechoslovak Ambassador when he first calls, and a strong statement of U.S. views on this subject at the imminent meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the Department’s present course of action includes the following sanctions:

(1) Denial of military (travel) permits for Czechoslovak applicants desiring to enter Western Germany.

(2) Action to deny permit to Czechoslovak Airlines to overfly Western Germany, if it is possible to obtain British and French concurrence now being sought.

(3) Steps to revoke outstanding export licenses and deny future applications for export to Czechoslovakia.

With respect to the last sanction proposed, namely, embargo on exports, while this will not have any appreciable economic effects, it may have significant implications that we are prepared to take more severe action in the economic area should the present program be unsuccessful. While no decision has been taken by this Department that economic measures beyond the embargo on exports should be adopted, Secretary Snyder is properly concerned that we are almost committed to a program of increasingly far-reaching economic sanctions to the end that severance of all economic and diplomatic relations may result. The Treasury Department in particular argues that if we employ more drastic economic sanctions, such as the embargo of Czechoslovak imports and the freezing of assets, the immediate effect of this will undoubtedly be the flight of assets held in the United States by other satellite areas. There is, of course, a further consideration to be taken into account in any proposal to invoke such drastic sanctions in this immediate situation, for, should a more acute problem of national interest arise, we would be left without any retaliatory weapon in case of future need.

Because of these considerations, as well as the fact that employment of economic sanctions requires the use of the legislative authority of Commerce and Treasury, it seems desirable that the Oatis case be placed on the agenda of the National Security Council for informal discussion at its next meeting. Commerce and Treasury have indicated that, while they do not disagree with our moving ahead with the export sanction at this time, they would prefer to have the Department’s program of action considered, and the implications of economic sanctions discussed, by the Council.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the basic strategy outlined above and the measures we presently propose to take.

2. That the general strategy and program be discussed on a confidential basis with the Congressional leaders.

3. That the program be discussed informally at the next meeting of the NSC, particularly with reference to considerations of national interest should the present course of action be insufficient, which would present the United States with the decision as to whether further coercive steps in the economic field should be taken.²

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by Schaetzel (E) and approved by Vedeler (EUR/EE), Assistant Secretary Perkins, and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews.
2. The source text is signed by Secretary Acheson and bears the President’s handwritten endorsement “Approved Aug. 1 1951 Harry Truman.” No documentation has been found in Department of State files to confirm that the Oatis case was discussed by the National Security Council.