Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 669

749.00/3–3051: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

top secret
air priority

Washington, March 30, 1951.

A–1767. For Achilles from Barnard. Re Depto 536, Feb 20.²

I. The following is our estimate of situation in Czechoslovakia:

1. Far-reaching Soviet control exerted over a highly industrialized and strategically important country through a mass Communist Party (proportionately largest of all communist parties in spite of recurrent check-ups and purges); control manipulated generally by subservient Moscow-trained Stalinists, many of whom are of Sudeten German or Hungarian ethnic origin, rather than by Soviet nationals; accelerated Sovietization and Russianization of institutions, education and culture since early 1950.

2. Improvement during past year in control of armed forces through energetic efforts of hard-bitten Moscow stooge, Cepicka, as Minister of National Defense; shake-up in top command and systematic purge of other levels; presence of Soviet mission estimated about 1000, headed by Soviet Military Attaché, Colonel General N.I. Gusev; reorganization along lines of Soviet armed forces; and accelerated political indoctrination.

3. Current expansion of ground forces from estimated 120,000 to 135,000 with heavy equipment steadily improving but still deficient in quality and quantity. Air Force continues to be of negligible combat importance; air fields, however, are being rapidly enlarged and improved probably as potential advanced bases for exclusive use of Soviet Air Force (Soviet land carrier) in event of war. In military training, morale and general reliability Czechoslovak armed forces are considerably inferior to Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian, but aside from Air Force might be used for limited combat purposes such as against Germany. The steady increase of military capabilities is at a rate more indicative of long-range objectives than preparation for imminent international hostilities.

4. Quickened conversion of industry to requirements of Soviet imperial and military economy, marked by pronounced expansion of heavy industry at considerable expense of traditional light consumers industries; by intense efforts to increase production in mining, metallurgical, engineering, raw materials and electric power fields; and by rapid growth in proportion and volume of trade with Soviet bloc (45 percent of total foreign trade in 1949, 54 in 1950, and 60 planned for 1951). Soviet demands on industry, greatly increased by new five year trade agreement with Soviet Union (November 1950) and supplementary protocol for exchange of goods in 1951 (March), are resulting in severe shortages of manpower and raw material supplies, depressive effects on standard of living, and heavy strain on entire economy, administrative apparatus, and popular attitude. Collectivization is now extended to about 20 percent of arable land, although against bitter resentment of peasantry.

5. Extinction of organized resistance of general importance, although some highly localized armed opposition apparently exists in Slovakia. While Roman Catholic Church is only nation-wide anti-Communist organization still to survive, it is being beaten into submission and brought under effective state control. Passive nature of Czechs, high proportion of urban workers, and discernible influence on youth of Communist educational and informational monopoly assist Soviet domination. Population in general looks to war as only means of early liberation.

6. Vulnerabilities include strength of democratic and humanist traditions, growing aversion to the regime, particularly because of progressive regimentation and Sovietization, continued penetration of Curtain through widespread reception of Western broadcasts, and unreliability of large segments of the Mass Communist Party. While there are certain tensions within Communist Party leadership arising from personal differences and rivalry, varying conceptions of speed versus gradualism in moving toward a complete Communist state, and of nationalism versus Stalinism in relations with Moscow, high-level Communists are firmly controlled by and dependent upon Kremlin. Present difficulties in Czechoslovakia are interpreted largely as consequences and demonstration of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with performance of local Communist regime in production, deliveries and management of economy, as well as with insufficient records of absolute conformity on part of certain Communist officials rather than serious internal situation with prospect of Titoist defection. Even in case of war the only overt resistance which may develop would probably be in the Slovak mountains of proportions not constituting a significant liability to the Soviet Union.

II. US Policy Toward Czechoslovakia is to:

1. Pursue objectives and policies, mutatis mutandis, as set forth with respect to Poland in Department’s airgram No. A–1615 of March 10, 1951;³ and in addition to

2. Exert constant and, wherever feasible, increasing pressure on the Communist regime chiefly by exposing through Czech-Slovak language broadcasts its nihilism, fraudulence, servility, lack of moral scruple, disregard of civilized standards and responsibility for specific offenses in violation of the country’s traditions of probity and humanism.

3. Attach even more importance to VOA operations directed to Czechoslovakia than to those for other countries of the Soviet bloc because of the widespread radio facilities in Czechoslovakia, established national habits of listening to Western broadcasts, and attenuated line of contact otherwise available.

4. Take no position with regard to the future constitutional relationship of Slovakia with the Czech lands other than that this is considered a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples to determine themselves of their own free choice following liberation from the present regime and that until such free determination is possible we must continue to deal with the concept of the territorial state of Czechoslovakia.

5. Encourage the assimilation of the Sudeten German population of the German Federal Republic (some two million) into German economic and political life so that it will not maintain a separate identity with a view to eventual return en masse to the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, although the US recognizes the inhumane aspects of the transfer as it was carried out and that this issue will be a continuing source of friction between Czechoslovakia and Germany for some time.

6. Make every effort to facilitate the early resettlement of the large number of Czechoslovak refugees in Germany and Austria as well as to assure their protection until they may be resettled.

III. Cooperation and coordination among NATO countries is regarded as especially desirable in:

1. Maintenance, operations and protection of Western diplomatic missions in Prague, particularly in applying principle of reciprocal treatment.

2. Application and continuing review of trade export controls in order to achieve maximum benefit to West.

3. Development of defensive measures against growing Czechoslovak discriminatory trade practices, dumping and aggressive trade negotiations, taking into account special difficulties raised by membership of Czechoslovakia and majority of NATO countries in GATT.

4. Implementation of agreed civil aviation policy toward Czechoslovakia.⁴

[Barnard]
Acheson

1. Drafted by Vedeler and Jerabek of EUR/EE and Tims of DRS/RD and cleared by RA, RD, UNA/R, GPA, and EUR.
2. In telegram Depto 536, Ambassador Spofford reported that the North Atlantic Council Deputies had tentatively agreed on a future exchange of views on the political situation in Eastern Europe. Spofford hoped that such a discussion would afford a common background or appreciation by NATO countries of the situation “behind Iron Curtain” and the nature and magnitude of the threat posed to the West. He requested information and material to allow his participation in the discussion. (740.5/2–2051) In addition to the airgram printed here, the Department replied with a policy statement on Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania (telegram 4000 to London, Document 617), and a policy statement on Poland (airgram A–1615 to London, Document 746).
3. Document 746.
4. Telegram Depto 836 from London, April 26, reported on the North Atlantic Council Deputies 32d meeting of April 25. One of the items taken up during the meeting was the situation in Czechoslovakia. The views of the Deputies were generally in agreement with the substance of the airgram printed here. (740.5/4–2651)