Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 635

660.001/6–2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs (Campbell)

secret

[Washington,] June 21, 1951.

Subject. Military clauses of satellite Peace Treaties.

Participants:	Earl Jellicoe, First Secretary of the British Embassy
	John C. Campbell, EE

Lord Jellicoe reported the views of the Foreign Office in response to the Department’s question whether the British Government was still opposed to making formal charges to the satellite governments that they have violated the military clauses of the Peace Treaties.¹ He said that the Foreign Office was still not disposed to take this step at this time for the following reasons:

(1) The Foreign Office does not think that such action would strengthen the position of the Western Powers in connection with current or future Four-Power talks. They think it doubtful that we would receive any reply, and that if replies were received they would be designed to lead us into side issues and would not bolster any case we wish to make in Four-Power talks.

(2) Such action would actually be in opposition to the general approach that has been taken toward the Four-Power talks. If we are going to impress world opinion, the Foreign Office says, we shall have to offer broad positive and constructive proposals. From that point of view, it would be inadvisable to lead off by initiating futile exchange of notes on this subject.

(3) The Foreign Office recognizes the force of the argument that charges in regard to the satellite Peace Treaties could be used in connection with efforts to revise the military clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty. They question whether formal denunciation is necessary for that purpose. World opinion already recognizes that the satellites have violated their Treaties, and it is not necessary to place this formally on record. To do so might restrict our freedom of maneuver on the Italian Treaty.

I told Lord Jellicoe that we still believed it would be desirable to take the steps we had proposed but that I did not know what the Department would wish to do next after considering the British position. He gave as his personal opinion that, while the Foreign Office seemed to have definite views on the matter, whether formal protests were or were not made was not a question of great significance and the arguments were fairly well balanced on each side. He considered the Foreign Office views not as final but rather as representing their estimate at this particular moment.

1. Regarding the Department of State proposal to make such charges, see Bonbright’s memorandum of conversation and the memorandum from the Department of State to the British Embassy, Documents 614 and 615.