Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 616

611.4094/3–251: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

secret

Washington, March 2, 1951—8:45 a.m.

Civil Aviation Policy Vis-á-vis USSR and Satellites

Reference is made to the Department’s circular instruction, above subject, dated January 5, 1949,² and to the Department’s telegram 104, January 10, 1950,³ as well as to other correspondence concerning the aforementioned policy.

Since the approval of NSC 15/3,⁴ referred to in the above mentioned telegram of January 10, 1950, the Department has been engaged in conversations with the British Government with a view to arriving at an understanding between the United States and the British Government concerning the revision expressed in NSC 15/3. These discussions have been concluded upon a satisfactory basis.

As the result thereof, the British Government is instructing its diplomatic representatives in accordance with a draft instruction, a copy of which is attached as Enclosure “A”.⁵ As indicated therein, you may expect shortly to be approached by your British colleague concerning the desirability of making a fresh approach to the government to which you are accredited concerning this revised policy.

It will be recalled that NSC 15/3 in no way alters the policy expressed in NSC 15/1⁶ that the export, directly or indirectly, of aircraft, aircraft spare parts and kindred aviation equipment to the Soviet orbit is to be prevented.

With respect to civil aviation operations, it will be recalled that NSC 15/1 expressed the concept that in no case was it desirable for airlines of the Soviet orbit to operate into Western Europe. NSC 15/3 states that if, on balance, the over-all interests of the non-Communist areas of the world would be served by permitting Communist civil air operations to the Western states, such operations would, under the conditions specified, be acceptable.

The revised recommendations of NSC 15/3 on that score are quoted for your information:

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 12–18 of NSC 15/3.]

It is apparent that the application of the standard of balance of interest expressed in NSC 15/3 must be applied in light of political realities of the moment. The Department has given most careful consideration whether the fullest implementation of the revised policy could best be accomplished by making such an approach at any of the Western European posts concerned. In this respect, consideration has been given to the attitude in the past of the various foreign governments toward the implementation of the policy as expressed in NSC 15/1, and toward the apparent need, in view of the present condition of world politics, for further containment of Soviet and satellite airlines and for more rigid enforcement of export controls. The Department fears that any indication whatsoever of a changed policy would at this time probably be erroneously construed by the governments of Western Europe to be a relaxation of our policy. As the United States Government knows of no pending case which on balance, in accordance with the terms of the revised policy, should be considered appropriate for permitting Soviet or satellite airlines to operate to or through Western Europe, it has been concluded that there is no immediate urgency for presenting the revision of policy expressed in NSC 15/3 to the other governments of Western Europe.

It is therefore desired that in discussing this matter with your British colleague you should express the view that it would be in the mutual interest of the United States and the United Kingdom not to make, either jointly or separately, further approaches to the governments of Western Europe at this time. Should you discover cases arising in the future which should be given further consideration in light of the revised policy, such cases should be reported by you to the Department for its consideration. On the other hand, if there are reasons which lead you to believe that, notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, an approach should be made to the government to which you are accredited, you should so advise the Department and await further instruction before discussing the matter with your British colleague.

As was the case in the implementation of NSC 15/1, it is contemplated that the United Kingdom alone will approach members of the British Commonwealth.⁷

Webb

1. Drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA) and cleared by BNA, WE, EE, and AV. Sent to 13 diplomatic missions in Western Europe for action and repeated to 7 missions in Germany, Austria, and Eastern Europe and to 5 Embassies in the British Commonwealth countries.
2. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 184.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, ibid., 1950, vol. iv, p. 1.
4. For text of NSC 15/3, January 5, 1950, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and Its Satellites,” see ibid .
5. Not printed.
6. For text of NSC 15/1, July 12, 1948, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and Its Satellites,” see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 451.

7. Largely identical instructions were transmitted to diplomatic offices in the American Republics in a circular airgram of March 7, 8:30 a.m. and to 16 Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian missions in a circular airgram of March 21, 11:10 a.m. These circular airgrams differed from the one printed here only in the concluding special instructions. The circular airgram of March 7 concluded as follows:

   “As the United States Government knows of no pending case which on balance, in accordance with the terms of the revised policy, should be considered appropriate for permitting Soviet or satellite airlines to operate to or through Latin America, it has been concluded that it is not desirable to approach at this time any Latin American Government.

   “It is therefore desired that in discussing this matter with your British colleague you should express the view that it would be in the mutual interest of the United States and the United Kingdom not to make, either jointly or separately, approaches to the Governments of Latin America at this time. It is important, however, to keep a constant watch over possible Soviet or satellite attempts seeking operational rights in Latin America; such cases should be promptly reported by you to the Department for its consideration in the light of the revised policy. Special attention should be given to the possible export or transshipment of aircraft spare parts and associated aviation equipment to Iron Curtain destinations. On the other hand, if there are reasons which lead you to believe that, notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, an approach should be made to the Government to which you are accredited, you should so advise the Department and await further instruction before discussing the matter with your British colleague.” (611.4094/3–751)

   The circular airgram of March 21 concluded as follows:

   “The Department is not aware of any new factors which might serve to modify the position set forth in numbered paragraph 14 of NSC 15/3, above. New approaches by either the United Kingdom or the United States to the governments to which you are accredited do not, therefore, appear to be necessary or desirable at this time. If there are reasons which lead you to believe that, notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, an approach should be made, now or at some future time, to the government to which you are accredited, you should so advise the Department and await further instruction before discussing the matter with your British colleague.” (611.4094/3–2151)