No. 596

763.5/2–151: Despatch

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1

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No. 2127

Subject: Transmitting French aide-mémoire re Austrian army (Ref Embtel 4543 of February 1, 19512)

The Embassy encloses, in informal translation and in the original French,3 the aide-mémoire tendered to the Embassy today, containing the French Government’s official reply to the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of October 17 on the subject of the future Austrian army,4 which had been handed to the Foreign Ministry pursuant to the Department’s telegram No. 1861 of October 11.5 As the Department will note, the French aide-mémoire is dated January 18. The delay in its transmission was due to the lengthy clearance procedures referred to in the Embassy’s telegram under reference as well as in the Embassy’s telegram No. 4160 of January 18.6

In handing the aide-mémoire to an officer of this Embassy, Sauvagnargues, the chief of the Ministry’s Division of Central European Affairs, remarked upon the unfortunate wording of the beginning of the fifth paragraph, which might more felicitously have expressed the Ministry’s agreement with the contemplated procedure, with certain qualifications, rather than what would appear, on first reading, to be a disagreement in principle. As the Department will note, the French Government is in accord with the substance of the contemplated approach to the Austrian Government, and the limitations which it proposes were intended only to offer more stringent safeguards of security.

When it was pointed out to Sauvagnargues that the French position as expressed in the aide-mémoire is quite likely to decrease rather than increase the possibility of secrecy—implying, as it does, that political agreements between the coalition parties must precede any planning work on the Austrian side—he remarked that the aide-mémoire leaves the question entirely open whether the American security plan is to be adopted, and that if the High Commissioners were to receive the directive in the amended form that [Page 1192] the French propose, they would have sufficient leeway to decide locally on the “technical” aspects of its implementation.

David Bruce
[Enclosure—Translation]
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Aide-Mémoire

The Government of the French Republic has carefully studied the report rendered on August 11, 1950, at Washington, by the tripartite working party on the equipment of a future Austrian army,7 as well as the Aide-Mémoire submitted on October 17, 1950, by the Embassy of the United States.

The French Government is in agreement with the American and British Governments in considering that it is essential to take all useful steps in order that the Austrian armed forces foreseen by the draft treaty can be established and equipped within the period of 90 days which is foreseen between the ratification of the treaty and the evacuation of Austria by the occupation forces.

The French Government accepts, consequently, the part of the report of Washington which deals with the equipment of Austrian forces numbering 28,000 men, although it is deemed necessary to recall that due to the increasing costs of its own military program, it is unable to reconsider its position regarding the financing of such equipment.

The action that is envisaged should not, in the view of the French Government, involve an immediate stockpiling of arms, munitions and other materials on Austrian territory. Such a measure could, in fact, not be kept secret and it would not fail to bring about Soviet reactions of a kind that would call into question the functioning of quadripartite controls. If, for technical reasons, immediate stockpiling appears necessary, it would be preferable to undertake this outside of Austrian territory, for instance in the American occupation zone of Germany.

Moreover, the French Government is unable, for the moment, to accept without reserve the recommendations of the Washington report relative to conversations between the Allies and the Austrians on the organization of the army. Indiscretions seem, in effect, to be hard to avoid. Inasmuch as the American and British Governments, as well as the French Government, consider the quadripartite functioning of the Allied Council as one of the fundamental [Page 1193] elements of their general policy in Austria, it would be inopportune to give the Government of Moscow in this manner a pretext to accuse the Western Powers of a violation of the Control Agreement, and to bring about the partition of Austria.

The French Government does not, however, perceive any objection to having the High Commissioners devote their primary attention to the question of the establishment and training, within the agreed limits, of gendarmérie units in the western zones. It would be equally disposed to agree that the High Commissioners communicate the Allied projects orally to a limited number of members of the Austrian Government, which could be the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Interior. On the occasion of that démarche, they would express their desire to have the two principal political parties of Austria compose their differences on the subject of the future army.

The government consequently accepts the draft instruction to the High Commissioners which was prepared pursuant to agreement between the American and British Governments, with the following qualifications:

1.
In paragraph 2(a), substitute “training the expanded gendarmérie as quickly as possible” for “training an expanded gendarmérie as quickly as possible.”
2.
In paragraph 2(b), eliminate in the second sentence “and continuing pressure should be exerted upon the four ministers to build up the gendarmérie reserve” and eliminate likewise, in the last sentence and examine with them whether the minimum necessary number of experts could not be attached to one of the three Western Headquarters for the purpose of carrying out the work described above.”

  1. Copies sent to London and Vienna.
  2. Telegram 4543 briefly summarized the French aide-mémoire. (763.5/2–151)
  3. The French text is not printed.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Same as telegram 1850 to London, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 494.
  6. Telegram 4160 summarized the draft of the French aide-mémoire and noted that it still needed clearance by the French Ministry of Defense. (763.5/1–1851)
  7. Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 488.