No. 596
763.5/2–151: Despatch
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the
Secretary of State
1
top secret
No. 2127
Paris, February 1,
1951.
Subject: Transmitting French aide-mémoire re Austrian army (Ref Embtel 4543 of February 1, 19512)
The Embassy encloses, in informal translation and in the original
French,3 the aide-mémoire tendered
to the Embassy today, containing the French Government’s official
reply to the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of
October 17 on the subject of the future Austrian army,4 which had been handed to
the Foreign Ministry pursuant to the Department’s telegram No. 1861
of October 11.5 As the
Department will note, the French aide-mémoire
is dated January 18. The delay in its transmission was due to the
lengthy clearance procedures referred to in the Embassy’s telegram
under reference as well as in the Embassy’s telegram No. 4160 of
January 18.6
In handing the aide-mémoire to an officer of
this Embassy, Sauvagnargues,
the chief of the Ministry’s Division of Central European Affairs,
remarked upon the unfortunate wording of the beginning of the fifth
paragraph, which might more felicitously have expressed the
Ministry’s agreement with the contemplated procedure, with certain
qualifications, rather than what would appear, on first reading, to
be a disagreement in principle. As the Department will note, the
French Government is in accord with the substance of the
contemplated approach to the Austrian Government, and the
limitations which it proposes were intended only to offer more
stringent safeguards of security.
When it was pointed out to Sauvagnargues that the French position as expressed
in the aide-mémoire is quite likely to
decrease rather than increase the possibility of secrecy—implying,
as it does, that political agreements between the coalition parties
must precede any planning work on the Austrian side—he remarked that
the aide-mémoire leaves the question entirely
open whether the American security plan is to be adopted, and that
if the High Commissioners were to receive the directive in the
amended form that
[Page 1192]
the
French propose, they would have sufficient leeway to decide locally
on the “technical” aspects of its implementation.
[Enclosure—Translation]
top secret
Paris, January 18,
1951.
Aide-Mémoire
The Government of the French Republic has carefully studied the
report rendered on August 11, 1950, at Washington, by the
tripartite working party on the equipment of a future Austrian
army,7 as
well as the Aide-Mémoire submitted on
October 17, 1950, by the Embassy of the United States.
The French Government is in agreement with the American and
British Governments in considering that it is essential to take
all useful steps in order that the Austrian armed forces
foreseen by the draft treaty can be established and equipped
within the period of 90 days which is foreseen between the
ratification of the treaty and the evacuation of Austria by the
occupation forces.
The French Government accepts, consequently, the part of the
report of Washington which deals with the equipment of Austrian
forces numbering 28,000 men, although it is deemed necessary to
recall that due to the increasing costs of its own military
program, it is unable to reconsider its position regarding the
financing of such equipment.
The action that is envisaged should not, in the view of the
French Government, involve an immediate stockpiling of arms,
munitions and other materials on Austrian territory. Such a
measure could, in fact, not be kept secret and it would not fail
to bring about Soviet reactions of a kind that would call into
question the functioning of quadripartite controls. If, for
technical reasons, immediate stockpiling appears necessary, it
would be preferable to undertake this outside of Austrian
territory, for instance in the American occupation zone of
Germany.
Moreover, the French Government is unable, for the moment, to
accept without reserve the recommendations of the Washington
report relative to conversations between the Allies and the
Austrians on the organization of the army. Indiscretions seem,
in effect, to be hard to avoid. Inasmuch as the American and
British Governments, as well as the French Government, consider
the quadripartite functioning of the Allied Council as one of
the fundamental
[Page 1193]
elements of their general policy in Austria, it would be
inopportune to give the Government of Moscow in this manner a
pretext to accuse the Western Powers of a violation of the
Control Agreement, and to bring about the partition of
Austria.
The French Government does not, however, perceive any objection
to having the High Commissioners devote their primary attention
to the question of the establishment and training, within the
agreed limits, of gendarmérie units in
the western zones. It would be equally disposed to agree that
the High Commissioners communicate the Allied projects orally to
a limited number of members of the Austrian Government, which
could be the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Minister of Interior. On the occasion of that démarche, they would express their desire
to have the two principal political parties of Austria compose
their differences on the subject of the future army.
The government consequently accepts the draft instruction to the
High Commissioners which was prepared pursuant to agreement
between the American and British Governments, with the following
qualifications:
- 1.
- In paragraph 2(a), substitute “training the expanded gendarmérie as quickly as possible” for
“training an expanded gendarmérie as quickly as
possible.”
- 2.
- In paragraph 2(b), eliminate in the second sentence
“and continuing pressure should be exerted upon the four
ministers to build up the gendarmérie reserve” and eliminate likewise,
in the last sentence and examine
with them whether the minimum necessary number of
experts could not be attached to one of the three
Western Headquarters for the purpose of carrying out the
work described above.”