Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 586

663.001/11–2251: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, at Rome¹

top secret
priority

Washington, November 23, 1951—7:46 p.m.

Tosec 60. As we see situation, fol questions raised by Secto 68² on Aust Treaty:

1. Shld mtg be held without tripartite agreement on whole program designed to present abbreviated treaty? In our view such agreement is highly desirable but in the final analysis we believe mtg shld be held if agreement not obtainable. Abbreviated treaty is a forward step in Aust policy. If old treaty concluded on basis Brit and Fr plans we wld have to move immediately after conclusion for revision similar to action on Italian treaty. If Brit and Fr are fundamentally opposed to principle of abbreviated text and its presentation to Sovs either now or in near future, they shld so state. Alternative appears to be continued and fruitless negot on old text with its consequent effect both on Aust morale and on our position of supporting a punitive settlement unless abbreviated treaty becomes basis of future negots.

2. Shld West accept Sov version unagreed articles and so inform Sov deputy at outset of negots? We do not believe that US can adopt this course without raising adverse domestic criticism and endangering ratification if treaty concluded by such tactics. Although NSC policy decision in 1949 agreed such action might be taken to obtain conclusion of treaty,³ we wld not recommend these tactics at this time without consultation with Joint Chiefs and new NSC decision. We realize that unagreed articles are relatively unimportant and have no major bearing on basic issue Aust future status, but mere statement that we are accepting Sov terms after five years of negots cld not be publicly explained in this country at this time. Furthermore, if Sovs continue to stall in face of such an offer these tactics wld make it impossible to introduce abbreviated text in near future as it provides settlement more favorable to Aust than draft which Sovs refuse to conclude.

3. Wld abbreviated draft upset status quo? We do not agree with Fr view that new text wld lead to Sov retaliation and blockade of Vienna. No connection ever drawn in past between Sov action as occupying power under Control Agreement and course of treaty negots. Sovs might retaliate if we called off all negotiations on treaty or attempted to modify Control Agreement. Existence of Vienna in present status is exploited by Sovs as well as by West as shown in World Peace Council mtg and location of WFTU headquarters. Sovs, therefore, not likely to upset status quo in Aust unless it is part of a change in their gen policy toward West. Our policy is not to maintain status quo in Aust but to obtain settlement requiring withdrawal Sov troops. We agree with Gruber that no Aust settlement will be possible except in context gen peace settlement and for that reason prefer abbreviated text as a more reasonable settlement if such develop ever takes place.⁴

4. Wld abbreviated draft scrap old treaty? In our view it wld and shld scrap old draft, but Brit and Fr apparently overemphasize this point since new draft with one exception contains articles already agreed with Sovs. It is not a new text in that respect, but one which contains essential elements for Aust settlement which reflect Moscow Declaration but does not contain type of restrictions found in Italian treaty. We believe that abbreviated draft can be justified politically and diplomatically.

5. Does possibility conclusion of treaty raise security interests? Tripartite plans exist for initial Aust army and real progress has been made in this field. This force can prevent internal subversion and ordinary infiltration but cld not protect Aust from external attack by Sovs or satellites. If Treaty signed and West troops withdrawn, prior West commitment will be required to include Aust in West defensive plans in similar way that occupied Aust now covered by Art 6 of NAT. If such arrangements are made, we do not believe that Aust will be any more susceptible to external aggression than at present.

In view foregoing comments and necessity of tripartite agreement, suggest fol.

1. That a mtg of the four deps be called after tripartite agreement has been reached. As suggested Paris 3030 Nov 20⁵ Sov deputy be asked if new developments have occurred in their position which might make possible conclusion of Treaty. In all probability Sov deputy will read latest Note on Trieste⁶ and report Sviridov’s accusations about remilitarization of Western Zones. If this occurs there wld be no point of offering to conclude Treaty on Sov terms since these terms cld not be accepted by West. In this event, Western deps should refer question to govts for further consideration at the same time arranging for future mtg.

2. That no offer be made at this mtg to accept Sov versions unagreed arts. If Brit or Fr make such offer we could not associate US with it. We cannot recommend this without new NSC and JCS approval and discussions with Senatorial leaders.

3. If complete tripartite agreement not obtainable prior to quadripartite mtg West deps should meet thereafter to draw up program in light of outcome of quadripartite mtg. We shld continue to press for abbreviated text and wld welcome any suggestions from Brit and Fr for a constructive program designed to break stalemate in negots and provide reasonable settlement for Aust.

Recognize that this program provides only for interim procedure, but we cannot accept basic point in Brit and Fr position on public announcement of concessions to Sovs.

We will raise this problem with Def.

Webb

1. Drafted by Williamson and cleared with EUR, EE, and Matthews. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.

   Following their meeting on November 22, the three Foreign Ministers and their delegations left for Rome for further discussions before and during the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council.

2. Supra.
3. This is presumably a reference to NSC 38/4, November 17, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1190.
4. Telegram 3076 from Paris, November 22, reported to the Department of State that Gruber had a discussion with Vishinsky in Paris on November 19 during which Vishinsky was “unusually friendly” but indicated that an Austrian settlement was likely only as a part of a larger settlement of East-West issues. (663.001/11–2251)
5. Document 584.
6. See Document 123.