Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 583

663.001/11–2051: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, November 20, 1951—11 a.m.

3001. Secy received Gruber² yesterday and discussed Aust treaty strategy at some length. In answer to questions, Gruber indicated he definitely favors new approach along lines of abbreviated treaty, but feels first, that this shld be preceded by new concerted effort to obtain agrmt on old treaty and second, that there shld be lapse of time (he said few days wld be sufficient) to prepare Aust Parliament and press for the new line.

Gruber was asked what in his view wld be Aust public opinion re action if Western Powers offered to make certain concessions to Sovs at deps mtg and only shortly afterwards, after mtg broke down, were to come forward with new proposals nullifying these and other concessions. His reply was that if matter is properly presented to Austs, Sov claims that we must have been insincere at the deps mtg wld fall flat. Austs wld understand, he said, if they were told that Western Powers had been prepared to sign bad treaty just to get Sovs to withdraw from Aust, but that since Sovs were patently unwilling to sign any treaty whatever at this time, it was better to wait a while and get a good treaty whenever Sovs are ready to sign.

Secy remarked that such line wld have additional advantage of being the truth.

Gruber added that in his view, propaganda position of Western Powers wld in fact be the more benefited, the further they had showed themselves willing to go in offering to conclude treaty on basis of old draft, immediately prior to presentation of new one.

Gruber was also asked whether Aust opinion might conclude from introduction of abbreviated treaty that chances of treaty settlement had become smaller. His reply was that Aust Govt has prepared public opinion quite well in this respect and that hopes for treaty are not high at present. Austs wld understand that they wld have to wait in any event since Sov unwillingness to conclude treaty wld have been again demonstrated. If contemplated strategy is followed, Gruber added, Aust issue might also be carried to UN at next session.

Secy remarked that he perceived no advantage in letting old treaty remain as alternative once abbreviated one is tabled. Gruber agreed and said it is obvious that when Sovs are prepared to conclude Aust treaty they will do so on any basis, and when they are not they cannot be maneuvered into signing one.

Gruber is seeing Schuman today and will, we expect, mellow French position with respect to abbreviated treaty. We have not discussed with Gruber our tentative compromise proposal with respect to procedure (Embtel 2974, Nov 19³), which may be brought up in tripartite mtg on Wednesday if necessary.⁴

Bruce

1. Repeated to Vienna, London, Moscow, and Bonn for Reber.
2. Gruber was in Paris for a meeting of the OEEC.
3. Document 581.
4. For a summary of the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting of November 22 at which the Austrian Treaty was discussed, see telegram Secto 68 from Paris, Document 585.