663.001/10–2451
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in France 1
Aide-Mémoire
The French Government still considers that, in order to comply with the wish expressed several times by the Ministry of Foreign [Page 1160] Affairs of the Austrian Federal Republic, and with the expectations of Austrian public opinion, it would be advisable to convoke a new meeting of the Deputies, if possible before the end of the current year.
It thinks that at that time the Western Deputies should once again try to break the impasse in the negotiations in which they have found themselves for more than a year due to the bad faith of the Soviets and due to the repeated attempts of the USSR representatives to subordinate the settlement of the Austrian question to that of other problems bearing no relation to it. It is in this spirit that the French Government has examined the draft of an abbreviated treaty which was submitted by the Secretary of State to his French and British colleagues during their recent meeting at Washington.
The French Government thinks that the interest in a new text to be presented to the Soviets lies in whether it affords greater chances of quickly bringing about the signature of the Treaty, or whether it places the Western powers in the best position in the field of propaganda.
An examination of the American draft leads to the finding that it does not meet these two requirements.
Actually, aside from the withdrawal of a certain number of articles already agreed upon in the text presently under discussion, this draft in its Article 6 proposes the complete surrender of German properties to Austria and in this way cancels the essential concessions made to the Soviets by the acceptance of Article 35 of the draft which has been debated for several years. This major modification and, furthermore, omission of all reference to denazification and to the limitation of the armed forces that Austria would be authorized to re-establish, leaves no hope of having the USSR accept a text of this nature.
If this fact is discounted and if the draft in question actually has a solely tactical aim, its effectiveness is just as problematical also from that point of view.
In fact, it is probable that the Soviets will not agree to resuming the discussions on the basis of this document, in spite of the theoretical possibility which is offered them of negotiating for the reintroduction of certain clauses formerly accepted, and notably the provisions relating to German property. Rather they will take advantage of the occasion absolutely to reject this new version of the treaty and to present it as a dishonest maneuver of the Western powers which would allow the latter to regain their freedom of action with the idea of making Western Austria into a military base directed against the USSR.
[Page 1161]Thus the responsibility of the Soviets for non-agreement on the Treaty will not be increased in the eyes of public opinion, and the desired effect will no more be realized in the field of propaganda than in the tactical field. The Allies could even seem, in the eyes of a part of public opinion, to have made a gesture of provocation.
Under these conditions, the French Government feels that the tactics which have been followed up to this time should be continued.
As a follow-up to the communiqué published at the end of the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, the Deputies for Austria could be convoked before the end of the current year.
At the time of this new meeting, the Western representatives should do all in their power to persuade their Soviet colleague to resume the discussion.
If the Soviet Deputy refrained from the various obstructive maneuvers that he has heretofore attempted (Art 48 bis, denazification question, Trieste) and appeared ready to participate in a discussion which might lead to the signature of the Treaty as a whole, the Western Deputies could accept the Soviet version of the disputed articles, on the condition that this acceptance would lead to definitive agreement on the Treaty as a whole. This step would be predicated on the fact that on its part the Austrian Government would previously have undertaken with regard to the three Western powers certain obligations whose content would have been already agreed on by these powers.
On the other hand, renewed refusal or a new diversionary maneuver of the Soviets could give rise to a declaration by the Western Deputies that the continued obstruction by the USSR once again underlines the responsibility of that country for the lack of agreement on the Treaty and might lead the Western powers to revise their position with regard to the numerous concessions made heretofore to the Soviets.
There should then be contacts between the Western powers in order to determine their future attitude with regard to the Austrian problem.
It does not seem that the solution which consists in bringing this problem before the United Nations should be sought, for it could not have practical results insofar as the conclusion of the Treaty and the evacuation of Austria are concerned. The latter in any case depends solely on the willingness of the Soviets. Censure of the USSR by the United Nations would change nothing in this situation and could only bring about a stiffening in the Soviet attitude.
Consequently, the French Government thinks that in the interest of Austria and in order to avoid splitting that country in two, the best attitude to adopt in the event of new Soviet dilatoriness would [Page 1162] be to maintain the status quo. The discussion could be resumed, on the basis of the old draft, at the time of future meetings spaced at rather long intervals, while waiting for the development of the general political situation to lead the Soviet Government to modify its attitude in the Austrian affair.
- Transmitted to the Department in despatch 1130 from Paris, October 24. (663.001/10–2451) The aide-mémoire, handed to an Embassy official on October 23, was summarized in telegram 2388 from Paris, October 24. (663.001/10–2451)↩