No. 475

763.0221/1–3051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Austria 1

secret

1512. Legtel 1611 Jan 30.2 Dept will approve Brit/Fr plan occupation costs as basis negots with Sovs in AC if responsible Aust officials believe hope of relieving Aust danger of unilateral demands for cash allocation or future Sov bills for civ costs justifies contemplated large expenditure.

Dept has assumed Aust cld, with US support, resist unilateral demands even in absence agreement on allocation and that whole question future presentation bills too problematical to justify additional present burden on budget. However, Austs with considerable experience in these matters and knowledge of their financial situation may believe these assumptions not correct.

Dept understands Brit/Fr proposal wld mean cash payments for 1949 and 1950, above civ occupation costs reported to have been paid already, of approximately 114 million schillings to Sovs, 64 million to Fr, with no additional to Brit. If allocations were reduced to 130 million for 1949 and 127.5 million for 1950, comparable additional charge on Austs wld be approximately 96.5 million for Sovs, 46.5 for Fr. If these estimates correct, difference for 1949 and 1950 under Brit/Fr plan wld be either approximately 143 or 178 million schillings additional requirement. This figure wld be reduced however, if, as first suggested, Fr take only amt of cash urgently needed. If civ costs for 1951 ltd to 120 with 25 million maximum payable in cash, plan wld not materially change amts Austria wld pay for 1951, since allocation by Austs for Fr/Sov in 1951 in excess Fr/Sov civ costs wld be offset by saving resulting from Brit assuming portion of their occupation costs. Another possible offsetting factor is probability that Sovs wld increase their civ costs in 1951 in light of tendency shown in second-half of 1950.

If you agree with this analysis suggest you present question to top Aust officials, including Figl, Schaerf and Margaretha, in this way, offering to be guided by their views and either (a) to attempt to block further cash allocations and support Aust resistance to unilateral demands or (b) to negotiate with other three powers to secure an agreement with lowest possible cash figure and highest degree of assurance against back bills or additional demands. Important [Page 1021] that Austs recognize our efforts in negotiating this matter have been guided by their desires.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Dulles and Kimpel and cleared with Williamson and Bonbright. Repeated to London and Paris.
  2. Supra.