Austrian-Italian Desk files, lot 54D541, 1601—Italy, 1951
Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Winterton),1 to the First Secretary of the Embassy in Italy ( Horsey )2
official–informal
Dear Outer: Your letter of March 203 has been helpful in giving us the atmosphere of your discussions with the Italians on the current unpleasantness. I can see the difficulty of talking in Rome when you are not informed on the facts concerning each of the detailed complaints which the Italians raise. As you may guess, we ourselves are often not informed on these matters since they are mostly of such an inconsequential nature that, until raised, they have not seemed in any way controversial or worthy of attention. After all, if the Italian Government is really concerned over a fancied change in AMG policy should they not have been persuaded [Page 223] by the explanations (which have seemed quite satisfactory to me) given them for all the cases that they have raised. Is it reasonable that every new point, however petty, should immediately require a full justification or else it reawaken their worst fears? Their attitude seems even more unreasonable when you consider that the other evidence, including many cases of a more substantial nature than stencils on railroad cars and signs over tobacco shops, should have satisfactorily demonstrated to them the good faith of our administration here.
I was pleased with the talk that Tommy and Dean had with Guidotti although I agree that it was not conclusive.4 My hope had been, as I gather it had been yours in Rome, that the matter could be forcefully handled and perhaps settled in the course of the meetings in London.5 I find that we were sadly deceived in that hope since none of the reports coming from those meetings indicate that the question was ever even raised. Now we are faced with the problem in a more acute form which it seems to me more than ever calls for high-level representations. This time it is not a matter of the Italian mission or Trieste’s irredentist groups but rather the Italian Government itself. I am referring to the recent action of the Rome Court of Cassation which I reported in my telegram 567 of March 22, 1951.6 I can now add to that the fact that one Trieste case has apparently already been referred by the Rome Court for retrial in Venice. Under the established procedure the case comes back to our courts for referral to Venice and, in view of the stop order imposed by the Director of Legal Affairs which I mentioned in my telegram under reference, the referral to Venice has not taken place. Our legal people are now studying the official documents on the Rome Court of Cassation’s decision and related matters and we will shortly report more fully on this with our recommendations, but it seems to me that we may now be reaping the fruit of having left this question to be handled in London.
This whole unpleasant situation makes one wonder whether we should go on fighting the Italian encroachments or whether it might not be easier to relax and let them take over the Zone de [Page 224] facto, pending such time as they can take it over de jure in implementation of the tripartite proposal. Certainly a terrific number of cables and despatches could be eliminated and our relations with the Italian Government would be free of the thorny question. However, as I am sure you know, I do not believe this course can be seriously considered in view of our undertakings under the Peace Treaty and before the Security Council and to keep our good name internationally. I believe we have no choice but to insist that Allied Military Government be recognized as undisputed authority for the administration of this Zone. This is not to say that its administration will not be guided by the reality of the March 20 proposal as well as the terms of the Peace Treaty and other considerations.
I am as interested as you in the “examining maps” going on in London or anywhere else although I must confess that my optimism on this score is tempered by a recollection of many past false starts, by the feeling that the Italian Government probably does not want to risk the internal crisis which the announcement of an agreement with the Yugoslavs would entail and the Yugoslavs like things fine as they are.
To go back to the point about the PolAds visiting Rome, I am naturally prepared to do so if it seems useful. However, I think the issue is one of making the Italian Government recognize the spirit of our actions taken as a whole, which is obviously as friendly as it can be, rather than our having to reassure them on every petty point. And much more, they must themselves be prepared to respect the status quo and desist from such provocations as their conduct in the Court of Cassation issue.
Sincerely,
- Gen. Sir Terrance S. Airey was replaced by Maj. Gen. Sir John Winterton as Commander of the British-U.S. Zone, March 19, 1951.↩
- A copy sent to Greene in the Department of State is the source text.↩
- This letter reported the difficulties of negotiating with the Italians over the policies of the AMG in Trieste. (Austrian-Italian Desk files, lot 54D541, 1601—Italy, 1951)↩
- The conversation under reference concerning the situation in Trieste between Llewellyn Thompson, U.S. Minister in Rome; Patrick H. Dean, Counselor of the British Embassy in Rome; and Gastone Guidotti, Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is summarized in despatch 2586 from Rome, March 6. (750G.00/3–651)↩
- Presumably a reference to the talks mentioned in paragraph 2 of telegram 4766 from London, Document 92.↩
- Telegram 567 reported that the Rome Court of Cassation decided that appeals from Trieste would be admissible in its chambers and that AMG orders to the contrary were void, thereby crippling the authority of the AMG and the courts within its jurisdiction. (750G.0221/3–2251)↩