750G.00/1–351: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State 1
2835. I. In our view question whether US, UK and France should approach Italian and Yugoslavian Governments to urge secret agreement mutually acceptable solution FTT problem depends primarily on practical consideration of whether there is any actual possibility achievement such Italian Yugoslavian agreement now (Deptel 2715, December 302). In our opinion, in light of many complex factors bearing on problem at present time, prospects of success do not justify our urging negotiations in immediate future.
[Page 209](1) It is assumed that any settlement would be based on compromise involving redefinition FTT boundaries based on ethnic considerations which would give city of Trieste and major part Zone A, and Capodistria and other principal Italian cities of Zone B to Italy; and minor border Slovene communities of Zone A and major part of hinterland of Zone B to Yugoslavia. There could be no possible consideration of discussion of cession of Gorizia or any other present Italian territory to Yugoslavia. The question is whether Italian and Yugoslavian Governments under present national and international circumstances would be prepared to agree voluntarily to such a settlement.
- (a)
- While it is true Sforza with De Gasperi’s support has on numerous occasions stated Italy’s willingness agree compromise solution on ethnic basis it is our considered opinion that government in face of present national and international crisis would not now be willing accept political liability involved in agreement on basis paragraph (1) above. Italian people, Parliament, and government are undergoing one of gravest crises of history in facing up to present Communist challenge. In this situation government would surely not want to arouse strident nationalist opposition which would certainly result from any agreement to “cede” to Yugoslavia even an inch of present FTT territory. Government, and Sforza in particular, have taken a beating over “failure” regain colonies.
- Would not seem advisable for them to risk at present time another “failure” particularly one which can apparently be postponed. Neither do I consider that it could be in our interest to urge government to risk a crisis on these grounds at this time.
- (b)
- It is true Italian-Yugoslavian relations have in recent months improved, economic negotiations have been largely successful and Italian resentment over conditions in Zone B has greatly diminished. However, we are not aware of any real indication that Yugoslavian Government now prepared accept settlement on basis paragraph (1) above or indeed that government’s position has advanced beyond that of March 1948 when the then Foreign Minister, Simic, declared Yugoslavian readiness negotiate settlement “in the spirit of the Tito-Togliatti talks” (Belgrade’s despatch 285, March 25, 19483).
II. (1) Re Moscow’s 1239, December 234 and general relation Russia to FTT problem we do not believe that any moves or moods of Soviets should be permitted to influence our difficult course toward achievement our basic objectives re FTT. In our opinion in contrast many other points of real difference with Soviets, FTT of no real concern to Russia but merely a place of troubled waters where they fish when it suits their purpose. In our view Russia’s [Page 210] relationship FTT problem remains much as it was March 20, 1948, i.e., we are still awaiting direct reply to our proposal that they agree to negotiation of revision of Italian Peace Treaty in light of consideration FTT provisions unworkable. In absence Russian reply our position has developed along lines of encouraging negotiate mutually acceptable compromise between Italians and Yugoslavians …5 there the matter rests so far as Soviets are concerned. In our opinion there could be no question of our agreeing to any Soviet demand in any four power talks to agreement to implementation FTT since there is no legitimate Russian interest in problem and concessions to their point of view could therefore play no part in relieving general East-West tensions. Their interest in matter is obviously ever-present interest of sowing discord wherever possible.
(2) Re question of withdrawal US-UK troops leaving aside purely military-strategic considerations we believe psychological effect on Italians would be most unfortunate and that action would be widely interpreted as liquidation of commitment in conformity with some underlying strategic plan of moving back from untenable (Italian frontier) position.
III. (1) Should Department decide urge Italy and Yugoslavia negotiate secretly we presume it would be on assumption governments would be able reach agreement voluntarily. That case Embassy would agree that powers should refrain entering into territorial aspect negotiations.
(2) Although Embassy would agree desirability give thought possible methods implementing any Italian-Yugoslavian agreement would seem not be matter urgency until we first have some indication kind of agreement which might ultimately be reached.
(3) Re question French participation Embassy would strongly recommend French be included in view of strong and sympathetic interest of French in negotiation March 20 proposal.
IV. To sum up: While Embassy appreciates in arriving decision Department must take into consideration factors beyond competence and cognizance this Embassy, from point of view Italian-US relations, and as we see broader problem from here, it would appear our basic objective of maintaining security of the area can best be served in present circumstances by continuing to encourage Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement through gradual resolution of outstanding differences as feasible. It would not be in interest Italians, Yugoslavians or ourselves to attempt force solution issue which, in present circumstances, cannot be resolved. An unsuccessful attempt might very well embitter Italian-Yugoslavian relations [Page 211] to a degree that would cancel out good progress thus far made in sound rapprochement.