750G.00/1–351: Telegram
Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Airey ), to the Secretary of State 1
359. Continue believe outstanding unanswered question connection Deptel 2715 Rome December 302 is that raised mytel 112, August 263 concerning military aspects. Even more today than last summer would appear that usefulness of study of Trieste problem limited without decision whether continued US-UK control of this strategic point and presence in this area of Allied troops outweigh desirability regularize Italo-Yugoslav relations, remove potential sore point and relieve UK and US of commitment.
Two subsidiary questions also remain unanswered, viz. (1) would Soviet Union be likely to seize upon settlement of Trieste question undertaken in disregard Soviet objections as pretext for interference in Yugoslavia, and (2) are we sufficiently clear on means of implementing Yugo-Italo agreement? Should Italian and Yugoslav Governments find mutually acceptable solution unobjectionable to US I believe concrete steps toward de facto if not de jure implementation would have to follow rather promptly and therefore concur second point, second paragraph, Deptel 2715. Perhaps implementation can proceed along lines Department’s aide-mémoire, August 84 if British and French concur. Of procedure outlined therein, I question [Page 207] only proposed plebiscite, which might raise more difficulties than it solves.
Assuming foregoing possible obstacles to settlement disposed of, next question is views of interested parties and their willingness seek settlement now. Has been our impression here that neither Italian nor Yugoslav Government now wishes take strong initiative alter status quo since both find presence Allied troops and consequent US-UK involvement in possible events this area advantageous to them, especially in face of threat of war. Also, presumably no 100 percent realization tripartite proposal possible and therefore Italian Government may be reluctant face adverse public reaction which would follow on its accepting anything less than full territory “pledged” to Italy March 20, 1948. Moreover, there is view, not often expressed and perhaps held only in restricted circles, that in present situation which may be disrupted by war Italy would be unwise settle formally for small gain when more substantial recovery lost territories might later be possible. Finally, Italian officials have on number occasions expressed doubts about proceeding toward agreement without knowing how it could be implemented.
While from here it appears internal repercussions of renouncing to Italy all Zone A and even part Zone B is not basic concern Yugoslav Government and Tito presumably not so worried as earlier about giving evidence closer relations with West, Yugoslav Government undoubtedly desires continued presence Allies at its back as long as it faces active threat Soviet aggression.
Views local population as usual strongly divided but feel that those groups actively in favor bilateral settlement outweighed by those actively opposed or passively satisfied with present situation even though officially favoring return to Italy.
General Airey and British PolAd continually make clear UK reluctance continue commitment troops here (Depcirtel December 21, 4 a.m.5); both for reasons economy and military requirements, British ever more desirous pulling out. General Airey stresses and I concur that our job here will inevitably be more difficult as time goes on and we continue walk tight rope between US-UK policies on one hand and those Italy and Yugoslavia. However, do not regard situation as any worse than upon my arrival last April nor do I see real cause for concern in near future.
Three principal courses are available to us: (1) carry on with status quo, with routine encouragement to Italians and Yugoslavs seek agreement; (2) follow first course but withdraw great bulk troops to satisfy British concern and leave US and UK forces sufficient only to man policy positions AMG; (3) exert combined US-UK [Page 208] and possibly French pressure on Italian and Yugoslav Governments, particularly former, to meet at early date in secret discussions to find mutually agreeable partitioning Free Territory between them.
Second course satisfies neither desire for settlement nor military considerations. Moreover raises questions local internal security which would require study here before decision reached. British idea reference Depcirtel withdraw from Zone entirely in absence agreement seems entirely unacceptable except for possible value as threat to push two parties into negotiations (Moscow’s 1239 to Department December 23).6
Third course clearly preferable if military and two subsidiary considerations discussed above do not render it undesirable. If this course adopted, however, I would not underestimate either pressure required to bring parties together, necessity our entering into substance territorial aspects of question, at least at outset, or blame which will inevitably be placed on US and UK for whatever compromise adopted, especially by Italian nationalists and Cominform. Do not regard 1951 communal elections as sufficiently serious concern of Italians to make them very useful as threat.
Recommend consideration points of procedure outlined at close my reftel 112 if negotiations are to be actively encouraged; first of these points now essentially realized.
- Repeated to Rome, London, Paris, Moscow, and Belgrade.↩
- Document 84.↩
- Telegram 112 raised numerous questions concerning the military aspects of the Trieste situation; for example, is Trieste itself or the U.S. presence there of such potential strategic significance that the United States should remain for the present regardless of the political advantages of removing this source of Italo-Yugoslav friction. It also questioned whether Trieste was an important supply port in case Yugoslavia was invaded. (750G.00/8–2650)↩
- Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 1329.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 84.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 84.↩