No. 58

740.00/5–1251: Despatch

The Consul at Strasbourg ( Andrews ) to the Department of State 1
confidential
No. 395

Ref: Consulate’s Telegram No. 146, May 11, 19512

Subject: Schuman Plan Debate, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe

The Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly debate on the Schuman Plan was opened at the morning sitting May 10 upon the submission of the Report of the Committee on Economic Questions (Doc. AS(3)31) by André Philip (Socialist, France), who summarized the terms of the European Coal and Steel Community treaty signed at Paris April 18. In his summary (Doc. AS(3)CR8) Philip anticipated German objections to Articles 60 and 61 of the Treaty condemning unauthorized cartels, combines and concentrations, and pointed out that similar opposition had been offered by the French Comptoir Sidérurgique which would be similarly affected. He discounted objections that the High Authority would constitute an irresponsible power, pointing out that it was answerable to the Assembly, that not even France and Germany acting jointly could block a decision of the Assembly, and that the Court was available to individuals in case the High Authority should abuse its powers. Unforeseen difficulties could be overcome by revision of the Treaty by the Committee of Ministers; but meantime, Philip urged, it should be ratified promptly as the first step in the functional approach to a united Europe.

The debate which followed was noticeably affected by the impending elections in France and the hopes of British Conservatives and German Social-Democrats to bring about government crises in their own countries. Wilhelm Nölting (Social-Democrat, Germany) accordingly raised every objection which has been voiced by the SPD for domestic hearers, many of them self-contradictory, and took a narrowly nationalist position which in other Assembly debates has scarcely been equalled even by the Irish. Nölting urged successively (1) that the Plan created a new supercartel; (2) that the Council of Ministers proved the nationalist conception behind it; (3) that the High Authority was an uncontrollable body of technocrats; (4) that the unions’ one-third representation in the Consultative [Page 118] Committee was insufficient for cogestion[?]; (5) that the Committee was in any case powerless; (6) that the High Authority is not genuinely supra-national; (7) that it is the successor of the International Authority for the Ruhr; (8) that Germany’s representation should be based on productive capacity only (45 percent of West European steel, 51 percent of coal); (9) that German coal integration is forbidden, while French steel combines persist; (10) that the Deutsche Kohlensyndikat has never been a monopoly; (11) that the Ruhr Authority and the German steel production limitations must be abolished before Germany ratifies the Treaty; (12) that self-financing alone is excluded from High Authority control, and the German industry has no funds for self-financing; (13) that Germany, with the Netherlands, as a low-cost producer, must subsidize foreign rival industries; (14) that Germany cannot accept that the Saar ratify the Treaty or be represented among the French delegates; (15) that “the policy of the victors will be anchored in the Schuman Plan for 50 years”; (16) that the Social-Democrats reject the Plan because of their sense of responsibility toward Europe as a whole; (17) that the Plan has too little in the way of truly European direction or dirigisme; (18) that the Social-Democrats want a strong, viable Europe which shall include Great Britain and Scandinavia.

Certain speakers expressed benign approval (Macmillan, Conservative, UK; Motz, Liberal, Belgium; Lannung, Radical, Denmark; Schaefer, Free Democrat, Germany; Van de Kieft, Labor, Netherlands; Giacchero, Christian Democrat, Italy; Margue, Christian Socialist, Luxembourg; Struye, Christian Socialist, Belgium), with occasional reference to the special risks and sacrifices borne by their respective countries. Others criticized particular points, although approving the Treaty as a whole; thus Falck (Christian Democrat, Italy) believed that it would have to be revised even before ratification, finding that the scope of the Court’s authority was too narrow, being confined to interpretation of the Treaty; and Beaufort (Catholic People’s Party, The Netherlands) objected that there was no guarantee each nation would have one representative in the Court. British Conservatives did not let slip the opportunity for irony at the conservatism of their Labor colleagues, and Reynaud (Independent Republican, France) was freely sarcastic on the “internationalism” of the Socialists, German school. Sandys (Conservative, UK) expressed his surprise at the Labor Party’s nationalism; in reply Blyton (Labor, UK) answered that Britain’s coal and steel industry was altogether too important to be placed under a supranational authority, although it might be associated with such later on; meantime, he said, it was surprising to find Sandys and Macmillan regretting that England had not participated in the [Page 119] Plan negotiations, since that was not the view of the Conservative Party at home. Lord Layton (Liberal, UK) declared that England should negotiate for participation in the Plan, and hoped that the Labor Party would strive to enable Britain to play her role without abandoning her liberty.

The interjection of the Saar issue (see Strasbourg’s despatch No. 392, May 12) “under cover of the Schuman Plan debate” was deplored by Larock (Socialist, Belgium), and by Von Rechenberg (Free Democrat, Belgium), who accused Saar delegate Dr. Heinz Braun of being the first to raise the question. Von Rechenberg apparently had not listened to Dr. Nölting’s address, for it was Nölting (see above) who first brought the matter up by objecting both to ratification of the Treaty by the Saar and to Saar representation in the Plan’s administrative organs.

The serious portion of the debate was devoted almost entirely to rebuttals of Nölting’s arguments. Von Campe (Christian Democrat, Germany) urged that any trade treaty involves give and take on both sides, and that Germany would benefit economically by a stabilization and expansion of her coal and steel industry, besides participating in the creation of a united Europe and enjoying the benefit of permanent peace with France. Von Brentano (Christian Democrat, Germany) spoke at length, commenting on the contradictions in Nölting’s theses, noting that if representation had been based solely on productive capacity, the Plan would indeed represent just the kind of producers’ cartel to which Nölting objected. He declared that the Common Assembly would be truly supranational under Article 24, and would exercise democratic and legislative powers under Article 95. He called for similar supranational authorities in agriculture, transportation, electric power, etc.

On Friday, May 11, the final word was given to André Philip, who, after expressing hope that Great Britain would adhere to the organization, applied himself to Nölting’s contentions. He pointed out that the two-thirds majority rule is not new; that the Assembly has great power in dismissing the High Authority en bloc, even if that be its only means of manifesting dissatisfaction, because that is the normal way of removing governments; that labor representation cannot be increased unduly without risking transformation of the Consultative Committee into a corporative body; that opposition to deconcentration is foreign to Socialist principle; that representation cannot be based solely on production, and that Nölting’s argument would turn out especially unfavorable to Germany if Britain should adhere to the Plan, or if (as is intended) the same Assembly and Court should be employed for specialized organizations of agriculture and transportation. Like Brentano, Philip emphasized that representation according to productive capacity only [Page 120] would convert the Plan bodies into a cartel, albeit governmental; and added that the Socialist principle is to represent the interests of all workers, and not merely the employees in this or that industry. With regard to finance and self-financing, Philip suggested that self-financing is normally accomplished by utilization of abnormal profits; that such profits will disappear in the competition for the European market; and that in any case loans guaranteed by the High Authority, together with public knowledge of the Authority’s program for closing unprofitable enterprises, will sufficiently discourage self-financing or speculative investment in uneconomic mines and plants. He agreed that Germany could be easily outvoted, as Nölting feared; and argued that France could be too, as could France and Germany put together; and that such was the intention of the Plan. He solemnly and movingly appealed to the Germans not to use such phrases as “victors’ policy” as being not only unjust and untrue, but dangerous; that it had not been easy for France to persuade herself to take this step of collaboration, contrary to her memories and subconscious instinct.

Following a brief statement by Jakobsen (Socialist, Denmark) who said that delegates from non-Schuman Plan countries should as Europeans vote for the Resolution (see referenced telegram and Doc. AS(3)31 enclosed with Consulate’s despatch No. 388, May 10, 1951.)3 calling upon the parliaments concerned to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, the Assembly immediately approved the Resolution by the following vote:

For: 80

Against: 7 (German Social-Democrats)

Abstentions: 9 (8 British Laborites and Luxembourg Socialist Pasquin)

George D. Andrews
  1. Copies pouched to Paris, London, and Frankfurt.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.