No. 49

850.33/3–1551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
top secret   priority

7411. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. Situation re Law 27 and Schuman Plan now as follows:

1. Last Thursday after my conference with the industrialists and labor union leaders,2 I again saw Adenauer and told him about results my discussions. At his request I also agreed send him letter stating my conclusions about the application agreed formula to specific cases of integration coal and steel. Chancellor stated he prepared go ahead with initialling of Schuman Plan as soon as details worked out.

2. Since then we have worked with Chancellor’s office on draft of letter from Chancellor to High Commission submitting proposals by Federal Government for solution of problems of steel unit companies, integration coal and steel, and dissolution DKV. This letter delivered to the High Commission this morning. Copies will be pouched immediately.3 Proposals in letter conform to those we had indicated would be satisfactory.

3. In discussions with Chancellor, I made it clear these proposals would be acceptable only in context of Schuman Plan containing effective provisions against cartels and combinations. He acknowledged this as basis on which proposals were submitted. Since then we have also had further discussions with German delegation re provisions Articles 60 and 61 dealing with cartels and combinations. If Germans adhere in negotiations in Paris position taken our discussions, it should be possible work these out in acceptable form without substantial delay. French fully accept articles in form satisfactory to us and have obtained similar assurance from Dutch and Italy. Reports from Murphy on Belgian attitude cause me some concern.4

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4. It seems we arriving at critical point on Schuman Plan. Yesterday Adenauer told Francois Poncet he would send Hallstein to Paris on Friday to initial treaty and seemed prepared sign himself early next week, but Hallstein intervened saying political questions still open would preclude Adenauer signing this TA. Feel Hallstein attempting hold Chancellor back and may still be intriguing through other delegations to gain support for weakening Article 61. If necessary I expect to tell Chancellor again how important US considers prompt signing of treaty in-order clarify political situation especially in view possible Four Power conference.

5. I believe it would now be desirable for Department cable Benelux countries urging our representatives each country stress importance we attach prompt conclusion Schuman Plan and to necessity directing their energies to that end.5 With situation on Law 27 now clear, I think time ripe for concluding and fear delay may allow opponents regroup/Timing also especially important at this stage east-west issue. It important for all countries to know conclusion plan is direct object US policy and highly significant for its future attitude toward Europe.

McCloy
  1. Repeated to Paris eyes only for Bruce and to London eyes only for Gifford.
  2. Ambassador McCloy met with representatives of the German trade unions on March 3, but it was not until May 15 that an aide-mémoire detailing these discussions was drawn up by the Correspondence Control Unit at Bonn. A copy of this aide-mémoire is in Bonn Mission files, lot 311, D(51)286. McCloy met with representatives of the German steel industry on March 7; no record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files.
  3. No copy of the Chancellor’s letter has been found in Department of State files.
  4. In telegram 1481 from Brussels, March 13, Ambassador Murphy reported on a luncheon conversation that day with the Belgian Foreign Minister during which Van Zeeland had complained that the Schuman Plan, as developed in the negotiations at Paris, had gone far beyond its original objectives and that the complexity of the proposed organization, “its far-reaching implications and dirigism inherent in proposed structure almost defeat its purpose.” Murphy took Van Zeeland’s comments to reflect “generally lack of sympathy with Articles 60 and 61.” Murphy added that he had consulted McCloy by phone on this matter. (850.33/3–1351)
  5. See telegram 1055, infra.