No. 48

850.33/3–1451: Despatch

The Special Adviser to the Deputy Chief of the ECA Mission in France ( Goldenberg) to the Department of State 1
confidential
No. 2616

Subject: Recent Conversations on the Schuman Plan

In recent informal conversations with Mr. Goldenberg of the ECA Mission to France, two important personalities representing the French steel cartel and a leading French Socialist, have expressed their strong antagonism to the version of the Schuman Plan which is emerging from the present discussions of the Conference of Six.2 Two of these men indicated their belief that even if the Conference approves the Schuman Plan, the French Chamber of Deputies would not ratify it. The three men are:

Mr. A. Aron, leader of the French Steel Industry and its representative on the Working Committee of the Schuman Plan Conference.

Mr. Pierre Ricard, First Vice President of the Conseil Patronat Français and active leader of the Federal of European Industies which recently openly attacked the Schuman Plan.

Mr. Robert Lacoste, former Minister of Industry and Commerce and a leading Socialist member of the French Chamber of Deputies.

The main points made by the above are as follows:

[Page 99]

Mr. Aron

Most of the arguments presented by him had been advanced on numerous earlier occasions but never had he been so vehement in denouncing the Plan as during this interview. His bitterness was directed not only at Monnet, but also at the Americans since, according to Aron, Mr. Monnet constantly uses the threat of American withdrawal of funds from France and Europe if the Schuman Plan is not approved. Aron asserts that without this club the Plan would have no chance whatsoever of passing, since, according to him, all the delegations, with the exception of the “socialistic” delegation of the Netherlands and the “socialistic” French delegates, are against it.

Mr. Aron maintains that the Americans were “taken in” by the above “socialists” and he reverted to the old complaint that the champion of free enterprise, the United States, is sponsoring and forcing a socialist and “dirigist” organization upon Europe. He again maintained that of course the steel industry is for the Schuman Plan, but not for the one presently suggested. He said that if a united Europe is needed, why not do it through the establishment of a united army, a united transportation and electric system and other similar combinations that lend themselves naturally to a unified arrangement.

He again brought up the argument that the United States would never think of imposing such a plan on its own industry—why then should the French steel industry be treated like a band of criminals who cannot be trusted with a public consciousness and with a desire for improving its own affairs. He asked why the industry was not given a definite period of years, say three or five, with certain demands made upon them, and then, if these demands were not fulfilled, nationalize the industry. He almost implied that the steel people preferred nationalization to the Schuman Plan, since, according to him, the High Authority will ultimately be under the domination of the Germans and then, with coke under their control, the Germans will always be able to “prove” that theirs is the most efficient industry and that the French industry should be producing continuously reduced amounts of steel.

He stated, on the other hand, that given freedom to negotiate, the French industrialists would have no real difficulties in obtaining coke from Germany, since Germany is in need of many French products and a natural exchange would take place between the two countries. In this connection he said that the German industrialists had approached the French steel people on many occasions asking them to organize an entente, but that the French had refused. He reiterated that they could come to an understanding on coke and [Page 100] on other matters as well, but that the Schuman Plan would mean domination by the Germans.

Aron attacked the Plan on its presumed inconsistencies, citing as an example its approach to competition. On the one hand, the Plan stands for free competition; on the other hand, stated Aron, the Plan implies that if there is too much competition, the High Authority is to set quotas. He asked where free competition comes in in this case. He reiterated his earlier arguments, that the old European steel cartel was completely misrepresented—that it had nothing to do with the type of cartel that prevailed in the petroleum, rubber and tin industries. He also stated that if there were now an entente between European steel producers the shameful situation of the extremely high prices at which steel in Europe is sold for export would not have taken place.

He was also very bitter against the French Administration which, he stated, is the only one in Europe that maligns the steel industry of its own country, while none of the other European governments ever attack their steel industries. Yet, he asserted, the French steel industry is no different in management practices from those of its neighboring countries. Aron voiced an additional complaint against the Administration on the score that in no other European countries do officials go around “snooping” in the steel plants to see whether they are properly run, as is the case in France.

The representative of the mission gathered the impression that Mr. Aron’s bitterness is, to an important extent, due to his belief that the Schuman Plan is about to be adopted by the Conference, and that it will be ratified by the French Assembly.

Mr. Ricard

Mr. Ricard recently returned from an informal trip to Spain for the purpose of renewing close contacts between the leaders of the French industry and those of Spain. Prior to his departure he had seen Mr. Schuman. On this occasion, Mr. Ricard said that he had discussed the present state of the Schuman Plan with him. According to Ricard, Schuman agreed that the High Authority should be deprived of its “authoritarian” powers and that he presumably was in agreement on many other points advocated by Ricard and his associates. The reason Schuman has not intervened recently on a greater modification of the Plan is due, in Ricard’s view, to the fact that since January 15 there has been practically no Government in France, since everybody is passionately absorbed by one subject, the electoral reform.3

[Page 101]

Ricard went on with the discussion of the Schuman Plan and stated that all the difficulties and problems surrounding the Plan were due almost entirely to the personality of Monnet. Even now, he said, if it were possible to somehow remove Monnet from the leadership of the conference, a text could be achieved which would meet with the approval of the Assembly. In its present form, Ricard asserts, the Plan meets with opposition from the entire French industry, labor and most of Parliament. He cited the case of P. Lacoste, former Minister of Industry and Commerce, who, while a socialist, is vehemently opposed to the Plan.

Mr. Ricard expressed his belief that the French Parliament would not ratify the Schuman Plan, and stated that he foresees this with profound regret since the Schuman Plan was one of the most important and original contributions made by French diplomacy and it should not be allowed to fail. He again reverted to Monnet and said it would be the fault of the latter who refused to invite the collaboration of other interested parties in so vital a matter. Among the difficulties created by Monnet, Ricard brought up the following: Monnet was supposed to have promised certain members of the Assembly that he would not proceed with the Schuman Plan for any length of time without discussing it with the Commissions of Foreign Affairs and of National Economy in the Chamber of Deputies, but up until now this has not happened. Ricard asserted that he knows very many members of Parliament who for this and other reasons would not vote for the Schuman Plan.

Mr. Lacoste

In a brief conversation during a luncheon with Mr. Lacoste, he stated that the Schuman Plan contains too many objectionable features. In his opinion the French Chamber of Deputies will not ratify it. He holds that the High Authority will be endowed with too much power over industries vital to France and expressed his belief that the High Authority should include representatives of the six respective governments who would be qualified to defend the interests of their countries.

Leon Goldenberg
  1. A marginal notation indicates that the source text was approved for transmission by William M. Tomlinson, Treasury Attaché in the Embassy in France.
  2. On February 20, the Conseil National du Patronat Français, claiming to speak for the industrial federations of Western Europe, circulated a letter approving the principles but condemning certain specific aspects of the Schuman Plan, especially the proposed right of the High Authority to interfere in cartelization activities. (L’Année Politique, 1951, pp. 42–043)
  3. For further information on the influence of the electoral reform bill on French politics, see the unnumbered telegram from Ambassador Bruce, Document 163.