Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 453

PPS files, lot 64D563, box 728

Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington,] November 20, 1951.

Outline for Discussion at JCS Meeting November 21, 1951¹

us-uk alliance

The Nature of the US-UK Relationship

1. We have, in fact, at the present time a special relationship with the U.K. which involves consultation between us on a wide range of matters of joint concern.

2. It can be assumed that one of the major reasons for Churchill’s visit is his desire to develop what he regards as a US-UK partnership.²

3. It is important for us to consider what we regard as the purpose of this special relationship or partnership with the U.K.

a. There is, of course, the general purpose of maintaining the leadership of the free world in the hands of those closest to us in tradition and outlook. Through our relationship with the U.K., we and the British Commonwealth of Nations have been able to maintain such leadership.

b. Another purpose of our close association is our desire for the use of British bases generally, and specifically the use of British facilities for our strategic air force. The most effective way of assuring that these bases and facilities will be available to us at such time as we may wish to use them will be to secure a concert of views between the two countries.

c. The other major purpose of our relationship is to make the most effective and efficient use of our respective total capabilities. Here also we require the same objectives, as far as possible, in order to achieve our purpose.

4. In some areas of the world the U.S. carries the major responsibility and therefore exercises the predominant leadership. In Korea, for instance, we would expect the British to support our policies to the greatest possible extent. In Egypt, where the British carry the major responsibility, they would expect the same of us. It is clear that neither country can give a blank check to support the other’s policies, but to the extent the alliance or partnership functions successfully the areas of disagreement will be thereby minimized.

5. It is in our interest to take such measures as we can to strengthen the British position generally and in specific areas, so that they can carry out a large share of the overall responsibility.

6. If it develops that the British are not capable of continuing to exercise responsibility in a given area, we will have to decide the strategic importance of the area and whether we will be willing to substitute ourselves (as in the case of Greece), or whether there is some other alternative to British responsibility. Obviously our efforts should be directed toward reducing the number of instances in which British capabilities are unequal to the responsibilities they have undertaken in any case, one of the advantages of a partnership is that it can facilitate the shifting of responsibilities to accord with capabilities.

Specific Area Problems

1. In Korea we wish to secure the advance support of the U.K. for certain military actions which we presently consider may be necessary as a means of dealing with continued hostilities there or a renewal of hostilities after an armistice.

2. In the absence of specifically altered world conditions, we want the British to join with us in preventing the seating of Communist China in the UN and the return of Formosa to the authority of Peiping.

3. It will be necessary for us to recognize the importance which the British attach to Hong Kong and the probable necessity of committing ourselves to furnish assistance to them in Hong Kong if their support for our policies elsewhere results in increased Communist pressure on Hong Kong.

4. The British may raise the question of their participation in the Pacific Security Pacts and may seek an extension of such security arrangements, at least to include Singapore. The question of what commitments we undertake in Southeast Asia and what division of responsibilities will be borne there require a further concert of views.

5. In Iran the British will continue to seek full U.S. support for their position. It will be impossible for the U.S. to give its complete support to the U.K. unless we can arrive at a joint agreed estimate of the situation. …

6. In Egypt we have recognized the predominant British interest and are giving them our support. We should attempt to move the U.K. in the direction of a settlement of the Sudan problem and we should continue to support a Middle East Command as a means of settling the dispute about the Suez bases.

7. With respect to the other Arab States, our policy should be to support the British and seek by means of a Middle East Command to strengthen the area and permit the British to exercise responsibility there.

8. The British position with respect to the creation of a European defense force and other European organizations of an economic and political nature is another problem on which we should seek to concert our views. The relationship of the U.S. and the U.K. to continental European organizations presents a further range of problems on which progress is desirable.

9. While general agreement has been reached with the U.K. as to the desirability of creating German forces, there remain important differences of view with respect to the way in which this should be accomplished. The differences are in large part a consequence of the present financial plight of the U.K. and its unwillingness to forgo German assumption of occupation costs. The problem is broader than this, however, since it inevitably involves the question of the pace of the whole of NATO and indicates the necessity of agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. as to the appropriate timing of the European defense effort.

10. The general question of our relationships with the U.S.S.R. requires continuing efforts to maintain a common front. There are certain differences in our general appraisals of the situation. The U.K. is apt to put great weight on the narrow objective of reducing tensions while we put greater emphasis on working toward that degree of strength and solidarity in the free world that will permit us to look forward to a retraction of the U.S.S.R. and a modification of the Soviet system. Even in the field of negotiation with the U.S.S.R., there are likely to be some differences between us.

specific us-uk problems

The Atomic Energy Program

1. In connection with the atomic energy program, the U.K. will probably seek a closer association. The U.S. will have to consider whether the present arrangements are adequate to assure that the U.S. and the U.K. programs are complementary and also that the U.K. has available adequate information to permit judgments comparable to our own. We will not secure a real concert of views if the U.K. lacks an awareness of the elements of strategy we believe most desirable.

The U.K. Economic Position

1. The U.K. faces a critical economic and financial situation. It is essential that the causes of the U.K. difficulties be thoroughly analyzed to determine what measures are needed to deal with the problem.

2. There will obviously be measures which ought to be taken by the U.K., and these may involve import controls, tightening of credit, export drives, increases of output, and sterling area controls.

3. There are also measures which we might take. These might involve raw material purchasing, export assistance on critical materials, financial aid, and the foregoing of interest on past loans.

4. There are also structural aspects to the question which will have to be considered to see what improvements can be affected. The structural aspects involve the EPU, the sterling area, the International Monetary Fund, and others.

The Machinery for Concerting US-UK Views

1. In trying to determine how best to secure a concert of views with the British, we will have to give attention to joint mechanisms as well as the most effective organization on the U.S. side.

2. While our object is to concert our actions and policies with the U.K. to the greatest possible extent, it would not be in our interest to provide the U.K. with the veto power over our decisions. We do not wish to reduce the U.K. to the position of a satellite but instead, by consultation, to secure a working relationship which will permit us to utilize our respective capabilities in our common interest.

3. As a general principle to be applied to the question of machinery for concerting our views, it would be our position that what is needed is combined machinery for consideration of problems but not their decision. This principle is applicable to the military, the economic, and the political problems with which we will be dealing. It is applicable to problems between the U.S. and the U.K. vis-à-vis the rest of the world and to problems between the U.S. and U.K. themselves.

4. There would not appear to be any necessity for new formal machinery. In short, we do not want to create a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization or a similar organization in the political field.

5. By avoiding formal combined machinery for consultation, it should be possible to concert our views without large joint staffs, and it will be easier to avoid pressure for tripartite and multilateral machinery which we do not wish to see proliferated.

6. What we are interested in is developing means of consultation which will be an improvement over methods in use at present.

7. The Slessor type talks³ can be utilized as a means of securing a continuing review of emerging problems on which U.S. and U.K. views should be concerted. These talks should be held at regular and frequent intervals (perhaps every month). As a result of such a periodic review of the problems that are arising as between the U.S. and the U.K. and between them and the rest of the world, each government could submit to the others its views or questions which it may have on particular problems.

8. Those matters which could be dealt with in the Slessor type talks would continue to be handled there, but whenever a matter was brought up which required a different type of consideration, each government could appoint representatives to an ad hoc committee to provide such consideration. This would permit different types of consideration, depending on the nature of the matter involved.

1. For a record of the discussion of this paper at the Department of State-JCS meeting on November 21, see the record of the meeting, infra
2. Regarding Churchill’s visit to the United States, see the editorial note, supra.
3. Presumably a reference to the informal political-military talks between the United States and United Kingdom, initiated in January; see the memorandum of conversation, Document 427.