641.61/10–1951
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)1
Churchill’s Idea of Possible High-Level Meeting With Soviets
the problem
If the Conservatives win the election in the United Kingdom, which is likely, it is almost certain that Mr. Churchill will propose, and he may do so very promptly, a high-level quadripartite meeting involving the Soviets at the Stalin level. It is necessary, therefore, for us to have a position on such a proposal developed for possible use any time after October 25.
indispensable conditions
- 1.
- That a truce in Korea be arranged prior to such a meeting.
- Comment: While this is a point on which White House judgment should be ascertained and be controlling, it is believed that it would be politically impossible for the President to sit down while fighting continues with the head of the State who has the power to bring about a cessation of aggression against the U.N.
- 2.
- That the meeting not be held in Soviet-controlled territory.
- Comment: A neutral location such as Stockholm would be acceptable to us. The Soviets, however, would probably insist on a location where they could control their own communications. As a practical matter, this might limit the choice to Vienna or Berlin.
- 3.
- That the French be included making the meeting quadripartite.
- 4.
- That the Chinese Communists not be included.
- 5.
- That there be a full understanding with the British and French as to the limitations of such a meeting and agreement on the part of the three to make these limitations clear to the world.
- Comment: All we could hope to accomplish would be (a) to exchange views on an admittedly tense world situation (b) as far as can be done by word (probably little) attempt to dispel Soviet fears that she is “being ganged up on” (c) if any disposition to negotiate seriously is discovered that a very limited number of questions on which progress might be possible be placed in train for progress towards settlement. Austria, Germany, and disarmament are possibilities.
reasons for and against such a meeting
Pros
1. In a period when the relative power position of the West is slowly but gradually improving, there is always the danger that leaders of a totalitarian state, if left in isolation, might arrive in such a period at unwise decisions. In such a period no harm can be done and it may be useful to maintain contact with the Soviet leaders, particularly Stalin.
Comment: By talking possibly some apprehensions which may be held might be lessened (it would be too much to expect that they could be removed) or more probably talks could open up some new or different channels of thought by the Soviet leaders. As the French view it, a potential enemy is less likely to make a move while you are talking to him.
2. Subsidiary to (1) above:
- (a)
- A mere exchange of views with Stalin might, under the circumstances, lessen tension. At a minimum such an exchange of views would provide us with an opportunity of obtaining the best indication we can get of Soviet thinking.
- (b)
- If any desire to negotiate seriously is found, progress towards solution might be started on a few selected subjects such as Germany, Austria and disarmament.
3. There is a strong demand over the world, even in countries closely allied to us—UK and France—and also in this country—to attempt further negotiations.
[Page 977]4. There may, therefore, be an important propaganda advantage deriving from our taking the initiative.
5. Churchill’s idea is for a meeting with Stalin. While the results of such a meeting would be problematical, if there is any possibility for negotiation, they would more likely be found as a result of talking with him directly than through contacts with lesser Soviet officials.
6. It will be very difficult to reject such a proposal if Churchill makes it, which is very likely, especially if it becomes known that he has made it which would almost certainly be the case.
Cons
1. False hope would be raised in the world with probable consequent disillusionment.
2. There is no indication of a change in Soviet attitude which would lead to hope that any specific problems are ready for solution.
3. Possible adverse effect on the Western rearmament effort.
4. There would be more pressure because of public opinion on the President to make the meeting a success which would mean to make concessions than on Stalin who does not have to worry about public opinion.
the domestic political problem
This question will require evaluation by the White House. It boils down to a question as to whether the President would or would not come under serious attack for agreeing to such a meeting at this time. There is undoubtedly sentiment in the country both ways which needs to be weighed.
tentative conclusions
1. Strictly from the foreign policy angle there is a slight edge in favor of agreeing to a meeting.
2. The edge, however, is so thin that we ourselves should not advocate a meeting. We will almost certainly be confronted, however, by such a proposal from Churchill if the Conservatives win the election which it would be extremely difficult to reject.
3. Under the circumstances, we should probably go along with Mr. Churchill’s proposal unless the evaluation of the domestic political angle is strongly against such a course.
[Page 978]- This memorandum was transmitted as an enclosure to a memorandum from Bohlen to Matthews, dated October 19, in which Bohlen stated that he believed the conditions set forth in it were indispensable for any meeting with the Soviets. Bohlen further suggested that Matthews discuss the paper with Secretary Acheson. At the bottom of Bohlen’s memorandum is the following handwritten notation: “Oct. 25. The Secretary last evening strongly opposed any idea of a meeting with Stalin at this time.”↩