752.5/7–1751
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Naval Operations (Sherman)
| Present: | General Franco |
| Marques de Prat | |
| Ambassador Griffis | |
| Admiral Sherman |
Ambassador Griffis stated that following their previous discussions I had arrived to initiate exploratory conversations on the military level, and that the purpose of the meeting would be to discuss mutual defense problems without definite commitments.
I then informed General Franco through the Marques de Prat,1 who acted as interpreter, that the President had authorized my coming to Madrid as a representative of the Defense Department and the United States Chiefs of Staff. I stated that we had given long and careful consideration to the strategic problems involved in the defense of the western world—western Europe and the United States—and then commented briefly on the strategic importance of Spain in connection with the defense of western Europe. My comments included reference to her importance in air communications to and from western Europe, and her commanding position with respect to sea and air communications through the Mediterranean.
I then summed up the military problems which would confront us in the event of hostilities. I discussed briefly the problem of deployment of air forces to support the defense of western Europe and of naval forces to support the defense of western Europe and to control the Mediterranean in connection therewith. I also outlined the problem of evacuation of U.S. civilians from western Europe and the Mediterranean and our probable need to stage some of them through Spain.
I then outlined the measures which it seemed necessary to accomplish in the current situation. These included air operating and transit privileges in Spain, Spanish Morocco and the Canaries. I also outlined our need for the use of anchorages in Spanish territorial waters in the same three areas, as well as in the Balearics, and indicated briefly our concepts of anti-submarine operations and carrier operations in the Mediterranean.
[Page 833]I stated that we envisaged initiating measures of military cooperation to include surveys of installations, exchange of military information, consultation in connection with plans for defense of Spain, and technical advice on the questions of military supply and military logistics. I mentioned also that we would expect to ask Congress to authorize our assisting in the improvement of air fields and supporting facilities, and that we would expect also to assist in military training.
I then informed the General that we would like to have further conversations on the staff level in the near future to develop details.
General Franco indicated his agreement in principle to my remarks. General Franco then commented at considerable length on the steps which he had taken since 1945 to prepare Spain to meet the threat against western Europe. He stated that he had done everything possible with the means available to train his personnel, and that he considered the active forces and also the reserve elements to be fundamentally well-trained, but that they lacked equipment. His comments during this part of his discussion were obviously concerned with the equipment of the army, and he made particular reference to tanks, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft artillery.
He emphasized that a great deal of time had been lost and that it was quite late to commence to prepare Spain to participate effectively in facing the probable aggressor. He repeatedly stated his apprehension that the French (as distinguished from the French Army) would not fight the Russians, but that in the event the Russians over-ran the rest of Europe, the French would be prepared, under a new government, to fight Spain. In all this, he made a careful distinction between the French Government and the French Army. He spoke of General Eisenhower’s success in highly complimentary terms.
He went very thoroughly into the necessity to prepare a nation completely, in the economic as well as in the military field, for war, if that nation were to grant operating rights which would of necessity give the nation a belligerent status whenever those rights were used in war.
He then developed Spanish needs for economic assistance and emphasized the need for economic preparation of Spain to withstand the vicissitudes of war. He mentioned the drain on the economic resources which would be inherent in its use as a base for military forces.
I then commented on his last point, to the effect that while furnishing military equipment would not in itself constitute economic assistance, expenditures of funds to develop base or logistic facilities [Page 834] would inevitably be of help to the Spanish economy. I said also that we were familiar with the economic problem, but that I could talk only in the military field.
Ambassador Griffis then stated that whatever course of action Spain might take, she would definitely be a target for Russian attack in the event of a general war. I then made the point that the United States had only two courses of action. The preferred course was to do everything possible to assist in the defense of western Europe, and that General Eisenhower, in my opinion, was making great progress and had considerable optimism as to his eventual success. The other course of action would be to revert to isolationism. Accordingly, we were discussing the mutual problems of Spain and the United States on the first basis.
The General then said that he would be glad to have us proceed with detailed conferences on the staff level. (I indicated that the conferees from the United States would probably be on the Major General-Rear Admiral level.) He said that any further conferences should take place in Madrid, and that holidays would give place to getting the work done. The Ambassador and I then both said that we would report back to our respective superiors and that if our proposals were approved we could hope to have further conferences take place early in August.
General Franco then told us that new ministers would be involved because of cabinet changes soon to be made.
The general then stated that as to any agreements developed, he would be bound to inform Portugal to the extent required by the existing treaty.
- Head of the American Section of the Spanish Foreign Office.↩