611.52/6–2851: Despatch
The Ambassador in Spain (Griffis) to the Department of State 1
No. 1587
Subject: Opposition Reaction to Prospect of Bilateral Military Pact Between United States and Franco Regime
As there are two main groups within the present-day opposition to the Franco regime, there have been two types of reaction, in some respects contradictory, to the prospect of a bilateral military pact between the United States and the Spanish Government. This prospect has recently become more distinct in Spanish minds due to General Bradley’s remarks upon his arrival in Paris June 9, 1951, the visit of Air Minister Gallarza to the United States, the Ambassador’s speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Madrid June 16, 1951, and Congressman Gavin’s address, released in the Spanish press June 21, 1951, all of which have been highlighted locally as indications of an approaching military accord between Uncle Sam and the Caudillo.
One main group of the Spanish opposition is the C.I.C. (Comite Interior de Coordination), combining socialists, anarchists, and monarchists. These are the militant, persevering enemies of the Franco regime, most of whom have fought the latter from its inception. Their reaction to a bilateral military pact between the United States and the existing Spanish Government seems to be: that such a rapprochement, although unfortunate, was expected; that it will not alter C.I.C. policy; that the people of Spain have learned how to protest with relative impunity and will not be stopped now; and that the Franco regime, although reenforced by American aid, will fall sooner or later, preferably sooner. Their attitude is fairly well [Page 823] characterized by the following quotation from an editorial in Solidaridad Obrera, an anarchist organ published in Paris, June 16:
“The able diplomats there (in Washington) and the guileless politicians can decide what they like and can effect injections for the Falangist administration; speculating with international dangers, they can consummate this betrayal of free peoples by a bilateral military pact; but they will not be able to escape the fact that each day the opposition within Spain is more resolved than ever, that the strikes are spreading, and that the whole Falangist structure is sinking. The Spaniards themselves, not the American politicians, are going to decide the destiny of Spain. The latter, with their hypocritical policy and their concessions to an oppressor, were formerly able to slow up, even jeopardize the liberation. Now, no; now, the people have raised their heads and have learned the way …, and will not be deterred from reaching the final goal, which is the triumph of independence and of social justice”.2
There is a certain amount of bravado in this. The C.I.C. is believed to be too intelligent not to realize that American policy in these days does affect the destiny of Spain. Otherwise, how can it explain that there have been no serious strikes or manifestations within the country since the Madrid boycott of May 22, in spite of the prediction of the C.I.C., which has associated itself with these protests, that they would follow each other with increasing frequency and intensity? The fact is that the man designated by the C.I.C. to maintain liaison with the American Embassy, and who has been accustomed to visit the Chancery once a week, has not paid a call since May 28, perhaps revealing in this way a certain degree of discouragement on the part of this element of the Spanish opposition.
On the other hand, there has been no evidence that the two traditional clandestine trade unions, the socialist U.G.T. and the anarchist C.N.T., both represented in the C.I.C., have abandoned their resolution of January 15, 1951 (Embassy despatch 865, January 31, 1951)3 which said:
- (1)
- The inclusion of Franco Spain directly or indirectly in the North Atlantic Pact or in American plans for rearmament would have serious consequences.
- (2)
- The masses of Spanish workers are resolved not to cooperate with the industrial or military efforts of Spain in the event of war if General Franco continues in control.
- (3)
- The leaders of the anti-communist workers organizations would be unable to prevent the sabotage of any military operations directed by General Franco.
On the contrary, the head of the socialist U.G.T. in Spain told an Embassy officer June 25, 1951 that both clandestine unions adhered to their resolution of January 15.
The other main segment of the Spanish opposition is composed of men whose hostility to the Franco regime is relatively recent. Most of them—professional men, businessmen, minor government officials, and some Army officers—fought on Franco’s side during the Civil War, but have become disillusioned by the way he has consolidated his dictatorship and throttled the political and economic life of the nation through a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. Unlike the C.I.C., they are amateurish and inexperienced and tend to split into small groups without clearcut consistent aims. They run hot and cold, being easily encouraged and easily discouraged, and are constantly concerned about personal risks to themselves and their positions. Their reaction to the prospect of a bilateral military pact between the United States and the Franco regime is: that it would greatly strengthen the Franco regime; that it would tend to silence those elements like themselves, the former supporters of Franco, who are the most dangerous to him; that there would be no further protests or manifestations such as have occurred in Spain during the past four months; and that the United States would lose most of its popularity with the Spanish people. This group thinks that United States policy, whether negative or positive, is the determining factor in the Spanish problem, and that the United States can solve this problem by refraining from aiding Franco, thus precipitating his downfall, or it can perpetuate the regime indefinitely through economic and military aid.
As is evident, the reactions of these two principal opposition groups differ on several important points, and it is difficult to say which is more representative of the Spanish people as a whole. The organized opposition, the C.I.C, appears to think that American support of a bilateral pact with the Franco regime may slow up, but cannot stop, popular protests and the proximate downfall of the present government, for the destiny of Spain rests now with the Spanish people, not with the United States. The other group described above states that the domestic political situation in Spain depends upon American policy, and that if that policy leads to a bilateral pact with the Franco regime, the opposition will be demoralized and Franco will be reenforced in power for years to come. The political tranquility of the past month tends to support the thesis of the latter group. These persons are undoubtedly discouraged, and while the leaders of the elements in the C.I.C. may continue their militancy, they must find that their efforts at organization and their plans for further protests have been slowed up by a certain hesistancy on the part of the rank and file.
[Page 825]It remains to be seen whether the recent series of strikes and manifestations have definitely ended or will continue. It may well be that the prospect of a bilateral pact between the United States and the Spanish Government may have one reaction among the ex-supporters of Franco, and still another among the working classes represented by the two traditional clandestine trade unions. Then, too, there will be some in each group who will think like the other group. As for American popularity in Spain following a bilateral pact, there is little doubt that Americans will be less popular with opposition leaders, although with Spaniards generally, the pervading feeling may be, as it is often expressed, that we are again proving to be big children (niños grandes) in international politics, hoodwinked by that clever devil in the Pardo.
First Secretary of Embassy