Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 380

S/S–NSC files, lot 63D351, NSC 72

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 72/6

Washington, June 27, 1951.

Spain

1. The national security objectives of United States policy toward Spain should be:

a. To develop urgently the military potentialities of Spain’s strategic geographic position for the common defense of the NAT area.

b. To concentrate planning on the use of Spain for the common defense, not solely for the defense of the Iberian peninsula.

c. To assist the Spaniards to improve their relations with the NAT nations in order to obtain a cooperative attitude toward the objectives of the NAT.

d. To obtain early Spanish participation in NATO. If full membership of Spain in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, to conclude alternative mutual security arrangements which would include Spain and which would not prejudice the attainment at the earliest practicable date of Spanish membership in NATO.

2. In seeking these objectives, United States policy should be guided by the following considerations:

a. All action to develop Spain’s military potentialities should be tempered by political considerations.

b. United States officials should emphasize in all discussions that the primary role envisaged for Spain is in support of the common policy of defending, not liberating Western Europe.

c. Any assistance provided to Spain should be guided by the principle that the NAT countries have priority for our aid and for materiel under the NAT, MDAP and ERP.

d. Any military or economic assistance given to Spain should be given under such terms and conditions as to advance and not retard Spanish participation in NATO. The Spanish Government would doubtless prefer a purely bilateral relation with the United States under which Spain received United States aid and the United States received certain rights from Spain without involving Spain in any obligations for the defense of Western Europe. This result should be avoided and aid should be given only if we are satisfied that by so doing we are furthering the attainment of our objectives.

3. To achieve these objectives, the United States should:

a. Discuss this policy with the British and French Governments for the purpose of informing them of our decision and, if possible, of agreeing on a common policy; if and when the latter is achieved, the NAT Council of Deputies should be informed and an effort made to establish a common NAT policy along these lines.

b. Approach the Spanish Government in order to acquire such facilities as bases for long-range bomber and fighter operations and behind-the-lines staging areas. We should similarly approach the Spanish Government for bases for naval operations.

c. Provide military assistance and the necessary and appropriate economic assistance to Spain insofar as this is consistent with the objectives set forth in paragraphs 2c and d above, while facilitating the acquisition by the United States and its allies of strategic materials of use in their mobilization efforts.

d. Release from Defense Department through the Civil Aeronautics Administration, either direct to the Spaniards or through the United States air lines operating in Spain, as much as possible of the air navigational aids and other electronic equipment which the Spanish Government requested last June during the renegotiation of the Civil Air Agreement.

e. Provide for the following in the field of military and naval cooperation:

(1) complete surveys concerning the military requirements and capabilities of Spain;

(2) provide for mutual interchange of information;

(3) consult regarding Spanish defense plans;

(4) give technical advice on problems of Spanish military and naval production and supplies;

(5) consult and give technical advice concerning the improvement of Spanish ports, roads, railroads, telecommunications and airfields.

4. Relations with Spanish officials, inherent in the foregoing recommendations, should be carried out in close coordination between officials of the Departments of State and Defense.

1. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet, indicating that this statement of policy was being circulated as NSC 72/6, and a note of transmission from Acting Executive Secretary Gleason.

   The National Security Council at its 95th meeting on June 27, 1951, considered the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 72/5 together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the recommendations of the Senior NSC staff contained in their memorandum of June 21. The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 72/5 subject to the revisions proposed in the Senior NSC Staff memorandum. The revised report was submitted to the President for approval. President Truman approved the revisions on June 28 as NSC 72/6 which then superseded NSC 72/4 as the official statement of policy toward Spain and “all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government” were directed to implement NSC 72/6. (Note by Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Gleason, June 27; memorandum by Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay to the National Security Council, June 28; S/S–NSC files: lot 63D351, NSC 72)