611.52/3–1651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)
Subject: Attitude of Spanish Government Regarding Common Defense of Western Europe Against Aggression
| Participants: | Mr. Burrows—Counselor of British Embassy |
| Mr. Byington—WE |
I informed Mr. Burrows that the Department had this morning received Ambassador Griffis’ report on his conversation on March 14 with General Franco.1 In reply to an inquiry about the views of the Spanish Government regarding the defense of Western Europe against Communism, General Franco had made the following remarks:
- 1.
- Spain would defend itself under any conditions.
- 2.
- He referred to the British Under Secretary’s recent speech in Commons as an example of the way Spain is being isolated from the Western European community and also expressed doubt as to the attitude of France.
- 3.
- Bringing up the question of the NATO, Franco said he realized thoroughly our commitments under NATO and he realized that a unanimous invitation was necessary before a new member could be admitted into the North Atlantic Pact. He doubted whether such an invitation would be extended to Spain. (The Ambassador did not at any time make a comment on this aspect of the situation or on the relations between Spain and England and France.)
- 4.
- Under present world conditions the best solution would be for a direct agreement between the United States, Spain and Portugal.
- 5.
- If the United States furnished adequate military assistance, Spain would be willing to enter into an agreement with the United States with exactly the same obligations as those contained in the NAT. Spain would thus be bound to all the NAT commitments including those relating to the initiation of hostilities against any NATO member by the USSR.
- 6.
- Under any and all circumstances, regardless of whether or not there were any pacts, if Spain were properly armed it would send troops to fight north of the Pyrenees.
Mr. Burrows expressed his appreciation for our having informed the Embassy so immediately after the Ambassador’s initial conversation with the Spanish Chief of State. He inquired whether there had been time for any reaction on the part of the Department to the rather startling position taken by General Franco. I pointed [Page 812] out that the message had only just arrived, and the Department was now studying it. He asked what action the Department now proposed. I said that the Department would want to have the views of the British Government on this development. It would also inform the French and would want the French reaction. It seemed to me that before we could go any further it was also necessary to have more precise information from our military authorities as to just what our objectives should now be in the light of the Spanish attitude. I said that the Department’s present thinking was along the lines of military conversations with them and the French and that I would keep him informed. I emphasized that there had been no change in the Department’s view regarding the necessity of developing Spain’s military potentialities and strategic position for the common defense of Western Europe.
Mr. Burrows then asked me whether there had been some reference to the subject of air and naval bases in Spain during our Ambassador’s conversation. I pointed out that this first conversation of Ambassador Griffis was designed to sound out Spanish basic policy with regard to the overall question of European defense. It seemed to me that it would be difficult for our Ambassador to discuss any concrete details on the military aspects of the question until we know more precisely the views of our military leaders and only after the basic framework for our relationship with Spain had been established. The first conversation was designed with that objective in view.
I also took the occasion to mention to Mr. Burrows that it was common knowledge among the press that Ambassador Griffis had called on General Franco, and that there would undoubtedly be a rash of speculative stories about what had transpired. I wanted him to know that the Department did not intend to initiate any publicity in this matter, and there would be no information about it given out to the press either formally or informally.
- See telegram 803, Document 371.↩