665.001/9–1151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)1
Subject: Italian Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Mr. B.A.B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. K.D. Jamieson, Second Secretary, British Embassy | |
| Mr. P. Francfort, French Embassy | |
| Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., WE | |
| Mr. Howard J. Hilton, WE |
In opening the meeting I suggested that the problem was to determine the areas of agreement and disagreement preparatory to [Page 662] the meetings of the Ministers on the question of the Italian Peace Treaty.2 After I had reviewed our position, Mr. Burrows circulated a paper (copy of which is attached3) setting forth the British suggestions for procedure and timing for the de facto revision of the Italian Treaty on a bilateral basis.
Mr. Burrows said that they preferred the position set forth in this paper to the position advanced by the United States since it afforded greater flexibility and best met the problems posed by differing public opinion in the United States, Italy and Yugoslavia. On the one hand, public opinion in the United States and Italy is demanding some action in the near future. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, agreement with Italy on the future of Trieste has been set by Tito as a condition for Yugoslav support of revision of the other parts of the Italian Peace Treaty. Mr. Burrows said that the British suggestions had been drafted with the view of meeting these different demands. The issuance of the declaration is a step, which could be taken in the near future, to indicate the desire of the three Powers to achieve some action on the Italian Treaty. The delay between the declaration and the final notes accomplishing de facto revision would provide time for Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on the question of Trieste. Since the United States position contemplates the completion of formal action immediately after the Italian request, it does not provide the period for such negotiations. He recognized that there would be a period of some six weeks for diplomatic preparation for formal action, but felt that the exchange of notes might come at the most inopportune time in connection with the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on Trieste.
In this connection I emphasized that the important point in the British procedure is that the formal notes are not conditional upon Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question. I indicated that it was my interpretation of point 5-a that the final step, following about six weeks to two months after the declaration, would not be dependent upon an Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question. I said I believed the United States Government would not be willing to accept any proposal which made solution of the Trieste problem a condition to revision of the Treaty. Mr. Burrows agreed in general with this interpretation but said that they would verify [Page 663] this point. I repeated that if this interpretation was incorrect a fundamental difference of opinion would exist since we did not contemplate delaying action on the Italian Treaty pending such a settlement.
The French position as expressed by Mr. Francfort remains unchanged. It contemplates first the issuance of a tripartite declaration, second, endorsement by the United Nations, and then formal notes to the Italian Government waiving the Italian obligations to the governments concerned and renouncing the moral stigma of the Treaty. The following dangers of this position were stressed in the discussion of Mr. Francfort’s remarks: it would not provide the Italians with the initiative; and endorsement of this action by the United Nations would present serious obstacles. I pointed out that both the British and ourselves were still uncertain about the desirability of going to the United Nations and that if we were to go to the United Nations it would not be for endorsement but merely for a resolution in which the United Nations would note with satisfaction the action taken. Moreover, unless we were assured of a big majority, it would be best not to submit the question at all.
Mr. Francfort also expressed concern about the juridical effect of our action revising the Italian Treaty. We commented that the action taken would not in legal terms constitute revision of the Italian Treaty but would rather consist of a renunciation of Italy’s obligations to the governments concerned in connection with the specified articles of the Italian Treaty. We hoped, however, that the action would be considered by the public at large as revision and that the press would so term it, although in legal terms it would not, in fact, be revision. Mr. Francfort said that he did not know what Mr. Schuman’s position would be on this, but that he would endeavor to present to him our views before the discussions on this question. I turned to Mr. Francfort and said that this subject would be discussed with them this afternoon at the meeting of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman.4
I agreed to present the British suggestions to the American delegation and give him an early reply.
- Drafted by Hilton.↩
- See the editorial note, infra.↩
- Not printed; it briefly outlined the following steps for dealing with the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty: agreement with the Italians on the wording of a note to all treaty signatories, issuance of a tripartite statement, delivery of the Italian note, sympathetic acknowledgement of the note, interval of 6 to 8 weeks while the Trieste issue was settled, formal notes from the signatories that they did not desire to enforce certain specified treaty articles, and acknowledgement from the Italian Government of these notes.↩
- For the minutes of the Acheson-Schuman meeting of September 11, see vol. iii, Part 1, p. 1249.↩